Tuesday, June 12, 2012

Email to Hannity re: Restart Shuttle

Sean

The space shuttle is to valuable to be in museum.  We need to use and evolve the shuttle.  Enclosed is bob Thompson summary which is a bombshell in so far as how the shuttle termination was handled.  Please take up this issue , it is important to the country.
Kraft, Krantz ,Thompson, Cernan, Aldrin, Abbey, plus many others feel that we should use the shuttle.  My site has many articles on this.

Thanks
Bobby Martin 
580 8913343
Keeptheshuttleflying.com

Inaccurate perceptions became fact & were never responded to by NASA
How to evaluate the value of the Shuttle to the nation is a challenge. We see a lot of discussion about cost per pound of payload to orbit and the Shuttle being too expensive on this basis. This is a poor parameter to attempt to use in determining the value of a system like the Space Shuttle. What is important is the value of what it does and is it affordable on an annual budget that is sustainable. The Shuttle fit comfortably within a NASA annual budget of 1% or less of the nation’s budget for 40 years and enabled additional steps in the evolution of manned spaceflight. Hubble and Space Station are two examples of the evolution during this period. We have truly been a space faring nation since Apollo within an affordable cost of ownership. The perception that the Shuttle was too costly and risky should have been corrected. We should have been more thoughtful about how to evolve our manned spaceflight capability within a cost of ownership consideration.
 
Risk
How to evaluate the risk that the Shuttle entailed is also a challenge. The two fatal accidents contributed significantly to the perception of risk and hastened the desire to move on to a “safer” system. Safety is most often accepted as the gain/risk ratio and what the so called safer system does must be considered. It is my observation that current thinking favors the need for a separate launch escape system and a capsule/parachute earth entry configuration. This attempt to lower risk may become counterproductive to an evolving capability and should be carefully reevaluated. In this same issue of risk we seem to want to require a direct return to the earth surface from all regions in space occupied by humans. This will also be restrictive to our evolving move to deeper regions in space. The Shuttle experience will contribute to these considerations perhaps in an unfortunate way. The failures that led to the two Shuttle accidents should be carefully reviewed and objectively understood. The design weaknesses that led to the accidents are typical of the issues that must be corrected during operations in any complex flight system.
In summary my looking back observation is that the Shuttle configuration was a wise choice. The enabling capability that was used gave us a productive 30 year flight activity. The enabling capability for beyond earth orbit flight support was not properly understood by evolving management and essentially destroyed by the two fatal accidents. The decision to retire the Shuttle system made in 2004 by the Bush Administration and subsequently upheld by Obama Administration caused a radical shift in our manned spaceflight evolution path. Where we go from here is unclear at present. The shift to “commercial” for low earth orbit operations may prove beneficial and history may well record this as a wise move at this time. How to approach travel beyond earth orbit is currently vaguely directed toward an asteroid visit and a possible Mars fly by at some future date. We have embarked on a high cost high risk of cancellation program to develop SLS/Orion without a proper understanding of what we intend to accomplish. The so called “Flexible Path” discussion from the Augustine study directed by the current Administration may have value in providing guidance to research activities but does not give adequate focus for formal program planning. Before entering the high cost phase in any program you should have detailed plans on what you want to accomplish and a fair idea of when. Budget support is vital.
 
 
Modular Space Station
In the transition from Apollo to Shuttle a major consideration was the approach to a long term Space Station configuration. After much debate a modular approach was chosen and the desired modular size helped establish the payload bay size for the Shuttle. Modular assembly on orbit drove many of the capability features of the Shuttle. The modular Space Station approach was a wise choice.
 
Why was the program terminated?
My best summary of why the Shuttle program termination was announced in 2005 by President Bush and allowed to occur in 2012 by the Obama Administration would have to combine several factors. No clear rationale for termination was ever given by either the Bush or Obama Administrations that spanned the 7 year phase out leading to the final flight in 2011.
The Bush Administration announced in its “Vision for Space Exploration” that the venerable Shuttle would be terminated at a future date (2010) and that we would embark on a Lunar/Mars program. This Lunar/Mars program decision was not well thought out and proved to be a folly. It spawned a program called Constellation that expired due to poor engineering, poor planning, poor execution and lack of funding support. It was properly cancelled by the Obama administration but pieces linger on due to confused support by the Congress and the Obama Administration.
Clearly the two fatal accidents led to a perception that the Shuttle was unsafe. Most discussion of cost led to the perception that the Shuttle was too costly. The chronological age of the system led to a perception that the Shuttle was too old. These loose perceptions were never properly responded to by NASA. In fact they were instituted by many key NASA officials. For example when Mr. Griffin became the NASA Administrator he quickly proclaimed that the Shuttle and Space Station were a mistake and he was here to correct this mistake. He promptly wasted about 12 Billion dollars and five years. Therefore perception became fact and the Shuttle program was allowed to fade away gracefully over several years with no responsible study as to why. The Nation quietly found its self without a means for launching people into space. Depending on the Russian Soyuz system was the only option available to continue manning the Space Station.
The “Vision for Space Exploration” announcement by the Bush Administration following the second Shuttle accident and the confusion left by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board essentially set the country up for an inadvertent “Bait and switch” situation. Let’s terminate the venerable Shuttle, go back to the moon with an Apollo type throw away system and on to Mars. We can do this within current budget levels. Once the bait was taken the Shuttle was allowed to terminate and the idea of” Apollo on Steroids” disappeared. We are now in a “Down Time” and can hope for commercial to get us back in the space business with some limited capability. This so called “commercial” program started by NASA during the Bush Administration and wisely continued by the Obama Administration should be encouraged and properly supported. It is now May 2012, 42 years after establishing the Shuttle Program as a formal NASA endeavor. We are temporarily out of the manned launch business.
We need an Administration that can plan to use our available Space budget wisely. We should continue with commercial and carefully review the reasoning behind SLS/Orion. The budget level for NASA and all high cost program efforts need careful Executive and Legislative Branch understanding. NASA’S Manned Exploration Program is not effectively planned.  
Sent from my iPad

No comments:

Post a Comment