Keep the shuttle flying: Fwd: Cause of Virgin Galactic spaceplane crash identified

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From: "Gary Johnson" <gjohnson144@comcast.net>
Date: July 29, 2015 at 9:36:24 AM CDT
To: "Gary Johnson" <gjohnson144@comcast.net>
Subject: FW: Cause of Virgin Galactic spaceplane crash identified

By William Harwood CBS News July 28, 2015, 3:37 PM
Cause of Virgin Galactic spaceplane crash identified
Debris from Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo sits out in a desert field north of Mojave, California on Nov. 2, 2014.
Sandy Huffaker, Getty Images

The fatal in-flight breakup of Virgin Galactic's futuristic SpaceShipTwo rocket plane during a test flight last October was the result of pilot error, possibly triggered by a high workload, unfamiliar vibration and rapid acceleration, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded Tuesday.
But the NTSB also found that the pilot's misstep was at least partially the fault of spaceplane builder Scaled Composites, which failed to fully recognize and address the consequences of critical single-point human failures, trusting pilots to properly perform in a high-stress environment without a full understanding of those consequences.
The futuristic spaceplane was built by Scaled Composites, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman Corp., and was undergoing flight tests under contract with Virgin Galactic. The test flights were expected to pave the way toward the start of commercial launches carrying space tourists on brief sub-orbital trips above the discernible atmosphere.
Play Video
Virgin Galactic pilot describes moments leading up to fatal crash

But during SpaceShipTwo's fourth rocket-powered test flight on Oct. 31, 2014, the vehicle broke apart about 14 seconds after its hybrid rocket motor was ignited, killing co-pilot Michael Alsbury and injuring pilot Peter Siebold, who somehow survived being blown out of the disintegrating craft for a harrowing freefall and parachute descent to Earth.
After a nine-month investigation, the NTSB concluded, as expected, that the primary cause of the mishap was the co-pilot's premature unlocking of the vehicle's unusual rotating wing-and-fin assembly, known collectively as the feather mechanism.
The large, swept-back tail fins, or winglets, are designed to rotate upward 60 degrees before re-entry to stabilize the spacecraft and slow it down for a safe plunge back into the dense lower atmosphere.
Famed aircraft designer Burt Rutan came up with the idea while building a smaller, non-commercial version of the spaceplane. He said the feather system made the spacecraft descend somewhat like a badminton shuttlecock, relaxing guidance requirements and reducing stress on the vehicle.
But SpaceShipTwo's feather system was not supposed to be unlocked until the spacecraft reached a velocity of 1.4 times the speed of sound, fast enough for aerodynamic forces to keep it in the proper position prior to extension.
Video taken by a camera mounted on SpaceShipTwo during its launch last October shows the spaceplane's hybrid rocket motor firing with its wings and fins locked in the proper launch configuration.
NTSB webcast
But during the October test flight, cockpit video cameras show Alsbury unlocked the mechanism at just eight-tenths the speed of sound, or Mach .8. While the actuators that normally would rotate the feather upward later were not engaged, the aerodynamic lift acting on the fins at that velocity and altitude was strong enough to force the tail fins to suddenly rotate up toward the re-entry position.
The vehicle broke apart an instant later, raining wreckage on the Mojave Desert below.
The NTSB concluded Alsbury was ultimately responsible, but found that SpaceShipTwo builder Scaled Composites did not adequately address the possibility of any such pilot-induced errors, only how pilots could fail to properly respond to various system malfunctions.
Seconds later, the co-pilot unlocked the spaceplane's so-called "feather" mechanism earlier than expected, allowing the fins to rotate upward in the supersonic airstream. The vehicle then broke up, killing the co-pilot. The pilot was injured but survived a parachute descent to Earth.
NTSB webcast
"The National Safety Transportation Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was Scaled Composite's failure to consider and protect against the possibility that a single human error could result in a catastrophic hazard to the SpaceShipTwo vehicle," the NTSB concluded.
"This failure set the stage for the copilot's premature unlocking of the feather system as a result of time pressure and vibration and loads that he had not recently experienced, which led to un-commanded feather extension and the subsequent aerodynamic overload and in-flight break up of the vehicle."
The NTSB also faulted the Federal Aviation Administration for granting an unrequested hazards analysis waiver to Scaled during renewal of the company's license to conduct experimental test flights and said agency management blocked technical questions not directly related to public safety that might otherwise have identified problems.
The NTSB also cited "pressure" inside the FAA to move commercial spaceflight applications along, although the nature of that pressure, or its motivation, was not specified.
But most of the board's discussion Tuesday centered on Scaled's failure to fully consider the impacts of single-point crew failures and taking steps to make sure flight crews and controllers understood the threat posed by errors like a premature feather release.
"Scaled composites did not emphasize human factors in the design, operational procedures, simulator training or hazard analysis for SpaceShipTwo," said NTSB investigator Catherine Wilson. "During the design of SpaceShipTwo, Scaled did not consider the possibility that a pilot would unlock the feather before 1.4 Mach and as such, no safeguards were built into the feather system designed to prevent this."
Although SpaceShipTwo program personnel acknowledged they were aware that unlocking the feather mechanism during transonic flight could be catastrophic, "there was no warning, caution, or limitation in the SpaceShipTwo pilot operating handbook or on the PF-04 (powered flight No. 4) test card that specified this risk," Wilson said.
"The only documented discussions about the loads on SpaceShipTwo's tail occurred more than three years before the accident in an email and a Powerpoint presentation," she said, adding that FAA personnel were not informed about the issue.
"In addition, human factors were not fully considered in SpaceShipTwo training as the simulator did not replicate the vibration and loads nor did pilots train with the same flight gear that they were expected to where during the actual flight in the vehicle," Wilson said.
Alsbury was a veteran Scaled test pilot, but he only had one powered flight to his credit in SpaceShipTwo and "the lack of recent experience with powered flight vibration and loads could increase the co-pilot's stress, and thus his workload, during a critical phase of flight," Wilson said.
NTSB board member Robert Sumwalt said "as humans, we all commit mistakes."
"I think the question we're all trying to answer here is why did the co-pilot unlock the feather early? I think that's a question people have been pounding their heads trying to figure out for nine months now."
Quoting interviews with other Scaled Composite test pilots, Sumwalt said Alsbury was "'as professional a co-pilot as you could have and was 100 percent prepared for the mission. He was always looking for ways to do things better. No one knew the FAA regulations better than him. No one was better at procedures than him.'
"And I think that really puts it in perspective, this was somebody who was really a professional, trying to do it the right way and yet the error occurred."
The NTSB showed three videos documenting SpaceShipTwo's launch from the WhiteKnight carrier plane. One of those, from a camera mounted on one of the twin feather winglets, showed SpaceShipTwo's hybrid rocket motor igniting as expected a few seconds after the spacecraft was released from the carrier jet.
Then, unexpectedly, the wing fins suddenly begin swinging up. The NTSB video stopped at that point, an instant before vehicle breakup began.
NTSB investigators examine wreckage in the wake of SpaceShipTwo's in-flight breakup last October.
NTSB
While Alsbury's action initiated the failure, the NTSB was equally, if not more, concerned by Scaled Composite's failure to fully recognize and address the possibility of a single piloting error that could have such catastrophic consequences.
"Scaled understood very well that in the transonic region if the feather was not locked, the aerodynamic loads would push the feather up, those forces would exceed the ability of the actuators to hold them down, so therefore they had to remain locked during that transonic region," Sumwalt said. "They knew that and understood that very well."
He said the company effectively "put all their eggs in the basket of the pilots doing it correctly. So that's a single-point failure, if the pilot does it wrong or the co-pilot does it wrong, then it will have very bad results, catastrophic results in fact."
He then asked a staff member if a single-point mechanical failure mode would be acceptable.
"It would not," the staff member replied.
"It would not," Sumwalt repeated. "So why would a single-point human failure be acceptable? And it really should not be acceptable. The fact is, if you put all your eggs in the basket of a human to do it correctly, and I don't mean this flippantly, but humans will screw up anything if you give them enough opportunity."
He said he meant no disrespect to the crew, "but the fact is a mistake was made here. But the mistake is often times a symptom of a flawed system. So it's important to anticipate the errors and design an error-tolerant system."
The NTSB made 10 recommendations to improve the FAA's visibility into experimental spacecraft operations and systems, to improve communications and to make sure human factors are fully assessed from the start of a spacecraft's design.
Play Video
Richard Branson on spaceship crash investigation and future of space tourism

For its part, Scaled Composites has implemented multiple changes, including the addition of human factors expertise, and Virgin Galactic, which is pressing ahead with construction of a new spaceplane, has added an "inhibitor" to prevent a premature feather release on future flights and is upgrading crew resource management for its pilots.
"Even without an NTSB recommendation or requirement to do so, Virgin Galactic engineers have designed a mechanism to prevent the feather from being unlocked at the wrong time in future flights," the company said in a statement.
"Virgin Galactic had begun safety reviews and a vehicle improvement program prior to the accident in preparation for the expected transition of SpaceShipTwo from Scaled Composites for the start of commercial service. After the flight test accident, Virgin Galactic assumed full responsibility for the completion of the flight test program and is getting ready for commercial service."
Virgin Group founder Richard Branson said "we will never forget the tragic loss of Michael Alsbury." But with the NTSB investigation complete, "Virgin Galactic can now focus fully on a strengthened resolve to achieve our goals. It is important that our collective efforts and sacrifices are not in vain."
© 2015 CBS Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved.

© 2015 William Harwood/CBS News

NTSB Blames Pilot Error, Lack of Planning for SpaceShipTwo Accident
by Jeff Foust — July 28, 2015
Photo of SpaceShipTwo taken from an onboard camera moments before the in-flight breakup. Credit: NTSB
WASHINGTON — The accident that destroyed the SpaceShipTwo suborbital vehicle and killed one its pilots last year was caused by the co-pilot's premature unlocking of the vehicle's feathering system and inability of its developer, Scaled Composites, to foresee such an event and take measures to prevent it, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded July 28.
The NTSB, during a public meeting at its headquarters here, accepted a report regarding the Oct. 31 accident that also criticized the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Commercial Space Transportation for rushing to approve the vehicle's experimental permit application without properly scrutinizing its safety issues.
The probable cause of the accident, the NTSB concluded in a unanimous vote of its four-person board, "was Scaled Composites' failure to consider and protect against the possibility that a single human error could result in a catastrophic hazard to the SpaceShipTwo vehicle." That failure, the board concluded, "set the stage for the co-pilot's premature unlocking of the feather system as a result of time pressure and vibration and loads that he had not recently experienced," causing the vehicle to break up.
According to procedures, SpaceShipTwo's co-pilot is supposed to unlock the feathering system, which raises its twin tail booms for stability during reentry, once the vehicle reaches a speed of Mach 1.4. Instead, the co-pilot on the Oct. 31 flight, Michael Alsbury, unlocked the feather at Mach 0.82. The forces the vehicle experienced as it flew through the sound barrier caused the feather to deploy on its own, leading to "aerodynamic overload and in-flight breakup of the vehicle," according to the NTSB.
Rocket motor and tail boom control console. Credit: NTSB
Exactly why Alsbury, who was killed in the accident, unlocked the feather prematurely was not clear to investigators. However, the NTSB report found that the co-pilot was subjected to a number of "stressors," including memorizing a more extensive task list than previous test flights and being subjected to accelerations that he had not experienced in the vehicle since flying the first powered SpaceShipTwo test flight 18 months earlier.
In particular, the report noted that Alsbury was responsible for stating when the vehicle reached a speed of Mach 0.8, to provide a warning for the "bobble" the vehicle experiences as it passed through Mach 1. Immediately after making that notification, he unlocked the feather, the NTSB found.
The NTSB found that while Scaled Composites considered a wide range of possible problems SpaceShipTwo could experience in flight, the company never considered the possibility of pilot error, specifically, that the pilot could prematurely unlock the feather. That scenario was not formally noted in company documentation, although Scaled engineers and pilots knew, at least informally, that such a premature unlocking would be "catastrophic" to the vehicle.
"They put all their eggs in the basket of the pilots doing it correctly," said NTSB member Robert Sumwalt during the two-hour hearing. Such a "single point failure," he said, would be unacceptable for mechanical systems. "So why would a single point human failure be acceptable?"
"The assumption was that these highly-trained test pilots would not make mistakes in those areas, but truth be told, humans are humans," NTSB Chairman Christopher Hart said in an interview after the hearing. "Even the best-trained human on their best day will still make mistakes. That is one of the areas they did not adequately cover."
"Pressure" At The FAA
Another factor that contributed to the accident was a lack of familiarity in human factors issues by the FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation. In particular, the NTSB found that the office's review of Scaled's application for an experimental permit was "deficient" because it failed to catch that the company, in its application, had not identified hazards caused by human error.
The NTSB investigation also found problems with the overall review by the FAA of Scaled's original permit application in 2012 and its renewal in 2013 and 2014. FAA staff said that agency management would filter questions they wanted to ask Scaled, limiting them to issues relating to public safety, the office's mandate. They added they felt "political pressure" to complete reviews of permit applications within 120 days, the deadline set by law.
"Our interpretation of those statements made by staff was pressure of two types," Hart said in the interview. One pressure was to meet the 120-day deadline, he said, while the other was "figuring out where the line is drawn between protecting the public and mission assurance."
The NTSB approved 10 recommendations at the meeting, eight for the FAA. Those recommendations include developing human factors guidance for crewed vehicles, improved policies for communication between FAA staff and companies, and development of a lesson learned database of commercial spaceflight mishap data.
SpaceShipTwo's wreckage. Credit: NTSB
Two other recommendations were for the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, the industry group whose members include a number of companies developing commercial human spaceflight systems. Those recommendations called for working with the FAA on human factors guidance and advising its members to work with local officials on emergency response planning.
The report included no specific recommendations for Virgin Galactic, who was the customer for the Scaled-developed SpaceShipTwo and has taken over construction of the second SpaceShipTwo vehicle. The lead NTSB investigator, Lorenda Ward, said at the hearing that Virgin Galactic has taken steps to address the specific technical cause of the failure, adding an inhibitor to prevent the feather from being unlocked prematurely.
Scaled Composites, which continues to have a contractual relationship with Virgin Galactic to support SpaceShipTwo development, accepted the report's conclusions. "As part of our constant and continuing efforts to enhance our processes, we have already made changes in the wake of the accident to further enhance safety. We will continue to look for additional ways to do so," the company said in a statement issued after the hearing.
"Contrary to some initial speculation, the NTSB made clear that the spaceship Scaled Composites had designed, built, and then flew for us was performing exactly as it should have," Virgin Galactic founder Sir Richard Branson said in a video posted on the company's website after the hearing. The company, though, did not disclose when it planned to begin flight tests of its second vehicle.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Qv8Y0aMNix8
This video shows the tail booms rise up after the feather was prematurely unlocked at the 0:34 mark.

© 2015 SpaceNews, Inc. All rights reserved.

Space & Cosmos
Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo Crash Traced to Co-Pilot Error
By KENNETH CHANG
JULY 28, 2015
Photo
Peter Siebold, the pilot of Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo, parachuting to safety after its crash in October. The co-pilot, Michael Alsbury, was killed. Credit Mark Greenberg/Virgin Galactic

A single mistake by the co-pilot led to the fatal disintegration of a Virgin Galactic space plane during a test flight in October, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded Tuesday, and the board strongly criticized the company that designed and manufactured the plane for not building safeguards into the controls and procedures.
"Many of the safety issues that we will hear about today arose not from the novelty of a space launch test flight," the board's chairman, Christopher A. Hart, said during a hearing in Washington, "but from human factors that were already known elsewhere in transportation."
The safety board was also critical of the Federal Aviation Administration for not following up on issues that could result in mistakes by pilots.
The craft, called SpaceShipTwo, is designed to be carried aloft under a larger aircraft, then dropped before its rocket ignites and propels it upward. Near the top of its ascent, two tail booms rotate upward into a "feathered" position. That is meant to create drag and stability, allowing the plane to descend gently back into the atmosphere, much like a badminton shuttlecock.
Photo
The crash site of the Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo in Mojave, Calif., last November. Credit Ringo H.W. Chiu/Associated Press
Before the accident, the company, Scaled Composites of Mojave, Calif., founded by Burt Rutan, a renowned aerospace engineer, and now part of Northrop Grumman, knew that early rotating of the tail booms could be catastrophic, but its analysis considered only the possibility of mechanical failure, not that a pilot might release the lock on the booms by mistake, investigators said.
Scaled did not include a warning in the operating handbook or add a mechanism to ensure that could not happen. Investigators said the company had placed more concern on unlocking the feathering mechanism too late, also potentially dangerous.
Virgin Galactic, founded by Richard Branson, aims to fly tourists to the edge of space, providing a few minutes of weightlessness, for $250,000 a ticket. It hired Scaled to develop, build and test a suborbital space plane. During Scaled's fourth powered flight of SpaceShipTwo on Oct. 31, the co-pilot, Michael Alsbury, released the feather lock at the speed of Mach 0.82 as it rocketed upward instead of waiting until Mach 1.4, as specified in the procedure, when it would have been much higher in a thinner atmosphere.
The force of the air against SpaceShipTwo's tail caused the tail booms to pivot upward, and the craft broke apart.
Mr. Alsbury was killed. The pilot, Peter Siebold, survived after being thrown out of SpaceShipTwo while still restrained to his seat. Mr. Siebold was able to unbuckle himself before his parachute automatically deployed.
Cockpit video that showed Mr. Alsbury moving the lever to unlock the feather lock too early led investigators to look closely at the training of the pilots and the design of the controls.
"Would a single-point mechanical failure with catastrophic consequences be acceptable?" Robert L. Sumwalt, one of the safety board members, asked the investigators Tuesday.
It would not, answered Michael Hauf, part of the investigation team that spent nine months looking into the crash.
"So why would a single-point human failure be acceptable?" Mr. Sumwalt asked. "And it really should not be acceptable. The fact is, if you put all your eggs in the basket of a human to do it correctly — and I don't mean this flippantly, because I've made plenty of mistakes — humans will screw up anything if you give them enough opportunity. The mistake is often a symptom of a flawed system."
The safety board laid the primary blame on Scaled, describing the probable cause as "Scaled Composites's failure to consider and protect against the possibility that a single human error could result in a catastrophic hazard to the SpaceShipTwo vehicle."
The investigators said that both pilots were qualified and that no health problems or mechanical malfunctions had played a role.
Scaled issued a statement on Tuesday saying that safety was a "critical component" of the company's culture. "As part of our constant and continuing efforts to enhance our processes, we have already made changes in the wake of the accident to further enhance safety."
The safety board issued 10 recommendations, most directed at the F.A.A.
In 2013, before renewing Scaled's permit for operating SpaceShipTwo, the F.A.A.'s Office of Commercial Space Transportation identified shortcomings in Scaled's analysis of human factors and computer software. But without Scaled asking, it granted a waiver to those permit requirements, and Scaled did not redo its analysis.
At present, the F.A.A.'s responsibility in private spaceflight is to ensure that launchings do not endanger people on the ground, not to certify the design of spacecraft.
Referring to the F.A.A., Katherine A. Wilson, an investigator for the safety board, said, "There seemed to be a disconnect between the information that staff wanted, the technical information, and management, which believed that those questions were not relevant to public safety."
Virgin Galactic, not Scaled, is building a second SpaceShipTwo, and it hopes to resume ground and flight tests in the coming months. An automatic mechanism has been added to prevent the feathering from being unlocked early.
A version of this article appears in print on July 29, 2015, on page A13 of the New York edition with the headline: Co-Pilot's Error Is Blamed for Crash of Space Plane

© 2015 The New York Times Company

NTSB: Company should have prepared for human error
By KEVIN FREKING
.
View photo
FILE - In this Nov. 1, 2014 file photo, wreckage lies near the site where a Virgin Galactic space tourism rocket, SpaceShipTwo, exploded and crashed in Mojave, Calif. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will meet July 28 to determine what likely caused a Virgin Galactic spaceship to break apart over the Mojave Desert during a test flight 10 months ago, killing the co-pilot and seriously injuring the pilot. (AP Photo/Ringo H.W. Chiu, File)
WASHINGTON (AP) — The developer of the commercial spacecraft that broke apart during a test flight over California's Mojave Desert last year failed to protect against human error, specifically the co-pilot unlocking a braking system too quickly and triggering the accident that killed him, federal investigators said Tuesday.
In its finding, the National Transportation Safety Board took pains to make clear that Scaled Composites, an aerospace company that partnered with Virgin Galactic to develop the craft to take civilian travelers to the edge of space, should have had the systems in place to overcome the co-pilot's mistake.
The Federal Aviation Administration was also faulted in its role of determining whether Scaled Composites should get permits for flight tests, and the board recommended several steps to improve the FAA's oversight of private companies involved in commercial space transportation.
The recommendations included assigning FAA staff to individual operators instead of individual flights. That way, they have more time to become familiar with the training and operational controls that they're charged with inspecting. An FAA spokesman said the agency takes the findings and recommendations seriously and will respond in more detail within 90 days.
NTSB Chairman Christopher Hart said he didn't believe Scaled Composites took shortcuts that compromised the spacecraft's safety. Rather, he said, it simply didn't consider that the crew would make the mistake that occurred.
"The assumption was these highly trained test pilots would not make mistakes in those areas, but truth be told, humans are humans," Hart said after the hearing's conclusion. "And even the best-trained human on their best day can make mistakes."
The accident occurred during SpaceShipTwo's fourth rocket-powered test flight. At the time of the accident, Scaled Composites was responsible for SpaceShipTwo's flight test program under a contract with Virgin Galactic.
At the onset of the hearing, investigators told the board that the co-pilot, Michael Alsbury, prematurely unlocked the braking system and the resulting forces caused the brakes to actually be applied even without a command from the crew. The unique braking system includes twin tails that extend on booms from each wing. When activated they rotate upward to create drag, slowing and stabilizing the spaceship for re-entry into the thin upper atmosphere. They are called "feathers" because they function like feathers on a badminton shuttlecock.
The premature applying of the braking system at that speed and elevation created stress that caused the ship to break-up, though Hart said that protections to prevent a similar incident have been put in place since.
"We are confident that the steps they have taken would prevent this accident from happening," Hart said.
The spaceship broke apart over the Mojave Desert during a test flight 10 months ago. The accident killed Alsbury and seriously injured the pilot, Peter Siebold.
In determining the probable cause of the accident, board members were focused on how well officials prepared for the worst. NTSB member Robert Sumwalt said Scaled Composites "put all their eggs in the basket of the pilots doing it correctly."
"My point is that a single-point human failure has to be anticipated," Sumwalt said. "The system has to be designed to compensate for the error."
In a statement after the hearing, Scaled Composites said safety has always been a critical part of the company's culture.
"We have already made changes in the wake of the accident to further enhance safety. We will continue to look for additional ways to do so. We extensively supported the NTSB's investigation and appreciate all of its work to make the industry safer," the company's statement read.
Hart said he hoped the investigation will prevent such an accident from happening again. He said the NTSB learned "with a high degree of certainty the events that resulted in the breakup."
Virgin Galactic has been proceeding with its plans for space flight and is now building another craft. Company officials have said in recent months that their commitment to commercial spacecraft has not wavered despite the crash. Eventually, the company envisions flights with six passengers climbing more than 62 miles above Earth.
Virgin Galactic has collected deposits from 700 people in 58 countries who have put down a deposit of $250,000 to fly into space. The company is not publicly disclosing its timetable for flights.
In a statement issued after the hearing, Virgin Galactic said it has assumed full responsibility for the completion of the flight test program. It emphasized the Scaled Composites was responsible for SpaceShipTwo's flight-test program.
"We remain as humbled as ever by the difficulty of our work and the challenges of space," said Virgin Galactic CEO George T. Whitesides. "To date, only 549 people have gone to space, and we are as passionate and resolved as ever to increase that number."
"It is important that our collective efforts and sacrifices are not in vain but serve to inspire others to make big dreams come true," said Sir Richard Branson, Virgin Group's founder.
Copyright © 2015 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

Stunning Photo Shows SpaceShipTwo Pilot Parachuting to Earth After Crash
by Mike Wall, Space.com Senior Writer   |   July 29, 2015 08:30am ET

SpaceShipTwo pilot Peter Siebold parachutes to Earth after the space plane broke apart during a test flight on Oct. 31, 2014, killing copilot Michael Alsbury.
Credit: Mark Greenberg/Virgin Galactic View full size image
It is a picture of test pilot bravery in the face of the unthinkable. A newly released photo by Virgin Galactic shows a test pilot managing to parachute to safety after the tragic SpaceShipTwo crash last year is a moving reminder of the risks and resilience that have helped humanity push its way out into space.
The photo shows SpaceShipTwo pilot Peter Siebold floating back to Earth via parachute on Oct. 31, just moments after the vehicle broke apart in a test-flight disaster that killed co-pilot Michael Alsbury. The accident occurred because Alsbury unlocked the space plane's re-entry system too early, leading to the crash over California's Mojave Desert, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators announced Tuesday (July 28).
In the image, a seriously injured Siebold suspended beneath a red parachute, which provides a splash of vivid color against the gray-brown background of California's Mojave Desert. The photo was taken from above, apparently from an aircraft, by Virgin Galactic photographer Mark Greenberg.
"This photo shows pilot Pete Siebold as he parachutes safely down to Earth, with his arm up in the air to show everybody that he is alive and well," Virgin Galactic founder Sir Richard Branson wrote in a blog post Tuesday that featured the photo and addressed the NTSB investigation into the SpaceShipTwo crash. [SpaceShipTwo Crash Investigation in Photos]
Scaled Composites test pilots Peter Seibold (left) and Michael Alsbury were flying Virgin Galactic's first SpaceShipTwo when it broke apart and crashed over California's Mojave Desert on Oct. 31, 2014. Alsbury was killed in the crash, which seriously injured Seibold.
Credit: Scaled Composites
View full size image
An NTSB investigation revealed that the SpaceShipTwo crash in 2014 was due to pilot error..
Credit: By Karl Tate, Infographics Artist
View full size image
At the time of the crash, Siebold was serving as Director of Flight Operations at Scaled Composites, the aerospace company that built SpaceShipTwo for Virgin Galactic. He and Alsbury were experienced, veteran test pilots for the company.
Seibold survived the SpaceShipTwo crash because his seat was ejected from the vehicle as the spacecraft broke apart. He was then able to unbuckle from the seat, allowing his parachute to deploy automatically, NTSB investigators have said.
On Tuesday, the NTSB presented the results of its nine-month investigation into the SpaceShipTwo crash, with investigators stressing that Scaled Composits and Virgin Galactic have already developed a mechanism that will prevent the craft's "feathering" tail boom re-entry system from unlocking early.
"As part of our constant and continuing efforts to enhance our processes, we have already made changes in the wake of the accident to further enhance safety. We will continue to look for additional ways to do so," Scaled representatives said in a statement Tuesday. "We extensively supported the NTSB's investigation and appreciate all of its work to make the industry safer. Mike Alsbury exemplified the passion that all our employees share. He and his family are always in our thoughts, and they are especially so today."
Virgin Galactic plans to continue developing the six-passenger, two-pilot SpaceShipTwo to take paying customers to surborbital space, Branson said. A second SpaceShipTwo vehicle is currently under construction. [Meet Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo Pilots]
"Every new transformative technology requires risk, and we have seen the tragic and brave sacrifice of Mike and the recovery of injured surviving pilot Pete Siebold," Branson said in a video and in the blog post. "Their tremendous efforts are not in vain and will serve to strengthen our resolve to make big dreams come true."
SpaceShipTwo is designed to be carried to an altitude of about 50,000 feet (15,000 meters) by an aircraft called WhiteKnightTwo. The space plane is then dropped, and its onboard rocket engines kick on, blasting the vehicle up to suborbital space. Passengers who buy a ticket — the seat price is currently $250,000 — will experience a few minutes of weightlessness and be able to see Earth against the blackness of space before SpaceShipTwo glides home for a runway landing, Virgin Galactic representatives say.
That's the way things will work when SpaceShipTwo is up and running, anyway. The vehicle is still in the test phase; the Oct. 31 crash occurred during SpaceShipTwo's fourth rocket-powered test flight and 55th test flight overall.

Deadly SpaceShipTwo Crash Caused by Co-Pilot Error: NTSB
by Tariq Malik, Space.com Managing Editor   |   July 28, 2015 04:00pm ET

The fatal breakup and crash of Virgin Galactic's first SpaceShipTwo space plane last year was caused by a co-pilot error, as well as the failure of the spacecraft's builders to anticipate such a catastrophic mistake, federal safety investigators say.
SpaceShipTwo crashed in October when co-pilot Michael Alsbury unlocked the commercial space plane's re-entry "feathering" system too early during a test flight over California's Mojave Desert, investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board said in a hearing today (July 28).
National Transportation Safety Board chairman Christopher Hart asks questions into the Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo crash of Oct. 31, 2015 during a hearing on July 28, 2015. Co-pilot error was cited as the probable cause.
Credit: National Transportation Safety Board
View full size image
The aerospace company Scaled Composites, which built the spacecraft, also "set the stage" for the accident through its "failure to consider and protect against the possibility that a single human error could result in a catastrophic hazard to the SpaceShipTwo vehicle," NTSB Chairman Christopher Hart said as he read the board's findings. [Video: SpaceShipTwo Co-Pilot Error Led to Crash, NTSB Says]
"It is our hope that, through this investigation, we will find ways to prevent such an accident from happening again," Hart said during the hearing.
An NTSB investigation revealed that the SpaceShipTwo crash in 2014 was due to pilot error..
Credit: By Karl Tate, Infographics Artist
View full size image
Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo is a spacecraft designed to launch two pilots and six paying passengers on suborbital rides into space for a cost of $250,000 per passenger. On Oct. 31, 2014, the first SpaceShipTwo broke apart during its fourth rocket-powered test flight over the Mojave Desert in California, with debris from the spacecraft strewn across a 5-mile (8 kilometers) track near Koehn Lake.
Alsbury, a veteran test pilot who had flown on SpaceShipTwo before, was killed in theaccident. Pilot Peter Siebold suffered serious injuries but survived when his seat was ejected from the spacecraft as it broke apart, allowing him to use a parachute.
NTSB investigators said the accident occurred when Alsbury unlocked SpaceShipTwo's novel tail-boom "feather" system too early, while the craft was flying at Mach 0.8 and not at Mach 1.4 as the original flight plan required. (Mach 1.0 is the speed of sound.) You can see SpaceShipTwo's tails swing up unexpectedly in this video released by the NTSB.
The feathering system must be unlocked before SpaceShipTwo reaches a speed of Mach 1.8, or else the flight would have had to abort, NTSB officials said.
SpaceShipTwo's novel feather system rotates the craft's twin tail booms upward to help stabilize the craft during its re-entry into Earth's atmosphere at the end of a flight. During the boost phase, when the rocket motor is firing, it is locked into position to secure the tail booms during flight. When Alsbury unlocked the feathering system early, turbulence from SpaceShipTwo's transonic flight overpowered the tail booms' securing mechanism, leading to the vehicle's destruction, NTSB investigators said.
The NTSB reviewed a "mountain of data" from the accident, including telemetry from SpaceShipTwo and video recorded both inside and outside the craft, before reaching its conclusion.
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NTSB investigator Katherine Wilson said that Scaled Composites knew of the risk of unlocking the feather system early but that the company did not lay it out clearly in pilot manuals. It was only mentioned in one email and a PowerPoint presentation three years before the accident, she added.
NTSB board member Robert Sumwalt questioned why Scaled would not stress — through better training and safety precautions — the importance of unlocking the feather system on time.
"I don't mean this flippantly, because I've made plenty of mistakes, but humans will screw up anything if you give them enough opportunity," Sumwalt said. "And I don't mean that with any disrespect to the crew. The fact is, a mistake was made here, but the mistake is often a symptom of a flawed system."
NTSB investigators acknowledged that, in the nine months since the SpaceShipTwo accident, Scaled engineers and Virgin Galactic have developed an inhibitor that would prevent the feather system from being unlocked early.
Virgin Galactic founder Sir Richard Branson confirmed that fix in a video responding to the NTSB's SpaceShipTwo accident hearing, and he thanked the NTSB for an investigation that will "help make the fledgling commercial space industry safer and better."
"Over the past months, our engineers have already designed a mechanism to prevent the feather from being unlocked at the wrong time," Branson said, adding that Virgin Galactic's pilots have a range of experience flying commercial, military and actual space vehicles. "With the investigation completed, Virgin Galactic can now focus fully on the future with a clean bill of health and a strengthened resolve to achieve its goals." [Video: Meet the Pilots of SpaceShipTwo]
In a statement after the NTSB hearing, Scaled Composites representatives stressed that safety is a critical component of the company's culture, and that its pilots are experienced and well-trained.
"As part of our constant and continuing efforts to enhance our processes, we have already made changes in the wake of the accident to further enhance safety. We will continue to look for additional ways to do so," Scaled representatives said in the statement. "We extensively supported the NTSB's investigation and appreciate all of its work to make the industry safer. Mike Alsbury exemplified the passion that all our employees share. He and his family are always in our thoughts, and they are especially so today."
NTSB investigators also took a close look at the oversight of Scaled Composites and Virgin Galactic by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) in the years leading up to the accident.
NTSB investigator David Lawrence said that, while Scaled Composites was open and cooperative with questions from FAA AST regulators, some of those questions were actually filtered out by AST management and never reached Scaled. In 2013, the FAA gave Scaled a waiver excusing the company from some human- and software-error requirements, even though Scaled never asked for such treatment, investigators added.
The NTSB ultimately drew up a set of 10 recommendations, eight of them aimed at the FAA AST, to increase safety and reviews. The other two were for the Commercial Spaceflight Federation to serve as a safety proxy for the growing private spaceflight industry.
"The big picture: Commercial spaceflight stands on the verge of becoming a reality," Hart said. "But the success of commercial space travel depends on the safety of commercial space travel, at the level of every operator and every crew."
Branson also stressed Virgin Galactic's resolve to forge ahead and learn from the SpaceShipTwo crash.
"Every new transformative technology requires risk, and we have seen the tragic and brave sacrifice of Mike and the recovery of injured surviving pilot Pete Siebold," Branson said. "Their tremendous efforts are not in vain and will serve to strengthen our resolve to make big dreams come true."
Editor's note: This story was updated at 9 p.m. Et to include a statement from Scaled Composites received after publication.

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