Wrong Path

 

As a NASA aerospace engineer I was trained to look for warning signs of possible failure. We had indicating signs of failure before the Challenger and Columbia disasters…they were there but we ignored them. Notice I wrote "disasters" not accidents. Both were disasters because they were preventable and even survivable…they were not accidents.  Instead of admitting that the space shuttle disasters were human failures, NASA management concluded that the space shuttle had to be decommissioned and that the shuttle funding be used to develop a safer system for getting humans into space.   However, NASA management is once again ignoring the warning signs that there shuttle replacement is not 

On more than one occasion NASA Administrator Charles Bolden has stated that he is frustrated...and after taking the NASA top position said, "I really don't care what signal it sends. I did not want this job." (Ref http://www.spacenews.com/civil/bolden-talk-yields-insights-more-personal-than-political.html). I met Charlie when he first came to NASA JSC as an astronaut candidate. He is an A-number one nice guy and tries to please everyone and a NASA administrator can't be that guy. At a recent telecom he again said that his goal was to have a human mission to Mars. I challenged him that goal is impossible with the heavy lift Space Launch System (SLS) vehicles. There are too many negative to proceed with the development of Apollo class heavy lift launch vehicles. The "Austere Human Missions to Mars" presented by NASA at the AIAA Space 2009 conference requires nearly 2000 T be delivered to LEO to support a four member crew Mars mission. It would require 15 launches of the upgraded SLS to support the four year Mars mission with a launch cost of a minimum $30 billion plus the cost of the payloads. If one launch vehicle or payload fails the entire mission could be lost. With no cargo return capability on the Orion crew module there is no commercial value for this Mars transportation system. Reusable launchers with payload return capability and space based transportation vehicles with cargo bays commercial applications are the only affordable and viable option for human Mars missions. 

The SLS is a political vehicle designed to try to save an industry that supports NASA launch operations. The economic environment of the 21^st century dictates that we abandon government operated launch vehicles. Like the U.S. auto industry…we change or we shut down. 

Charlie…by resigning you sent the message that we are on the wrong path!

Don A. Nelson

Aerospace Consultant…Retired NASA Engineer

Content:

China's Space Shuttle                    MPCV/Orion crew module deathtrap     

NASA Management Solutions    NASA Technology Issues               

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NASA's Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program (SLS/MPCV) will fail because…mission costs are too high, the Orion/MPCV crew module has an unsolvable water recovery issue, and there is no commercial application. 

The following SLS/MPCV "operation" cost estimates were presented to the Congressional Budget Office after it failed to make the Congress aware of the prohibitive cost to operate expendable heavy lift vehicles.

·         The NASA human exploration budget will be flat lined at $2.8b for the foreseeable future. One report indicates a development cost of $38b and another reports that the first development version launch of the SLS could not take place until December 2017 and the 130mt production versions (crew and cargo) are not expected to unveiled until August 2032. This SLS development program scenario based on 13 flights over a 21 year period would have extreme difficulty maintaining the manufacturing labor force for such a low flight rate. However, it is the introduction of the cargo vehicle which forecast that it will require two launches of these mammoth vehicles to accomplish one mission. The SLS is the same heavy lift launcher concept used in the Constellation program which was cancelled because: "The U.S. human spaceflight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory. It is perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match allocated resources." Such is the case today.

·        NASA has failed to reduce the mission operation cost of the SLS/MPCV. The following $4.2b estimate of annual operations cost for the SLS indicated it will cost more to manufacture the expendable vehicles, plan the mission, and conduct flight operation than NASA has budgeted for human exploration. NASA is assuming that future budgets will be increased to cover mission operations. THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN!

 "It's the Launch Cost…Stupid"… paraphrasing Bill Clinton's presidential economy election theme. NASA must reduce its launch cost and the commercial space shuttle is the only option! The SLS/MPCV shuttle replacement plan is unaffordable, unsafe, and like the Constellation program suffers from incompetent NASA management.

Crew Modules are Death Traps

NASA Management has chosen not to disclose that crew modules have unsolvable safety issues that are inherent to all crew modules with parachute water landings and crew recovery. There is historical evidence that substantiates crew modules have been no safer than the space shuttle. In fact it is by chance that the crew module safety record is not much worst. NASA management has chosen to disregard the perilous "entry" phase of flight where two Soyuz flight crews were killed when their crew module failed during retry and the recent near fatal mishaps…all related to manufacturing errors.  Every flight of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) or any of the commercial crew modules will be a "test flight."

Orion Crew Module Crash Site

Remember one of reasons the space shuttle was decommissioned was to improve crew safety and that is not the case with crew modules! Ironically only the CSS would have crew escape pods that would protect the crew during every phase of flight. This is another NASA management blunder which again will have fatal consequences if implemented!

Recently published statements attributed to NASA state that the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Is: "designed to be 10 times safer during ascent and entry than its predecessor, the Space Shuttle." As a retired NASA engineer with extensive experience in the operation of crew modules, I challenged the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance about the authenticity of this statement.  Their reply (see below) was the Orion failed to meet the safety requirements for entry during their Constellation Program evaluations and that they have failed to establish a Level 1 set of requirement for the commercial crew modules and Orion MPCV. It is my opinion that the Commercial crew modules and Orion MPCV are potential deathtraps and NASA has misled Congress about the safety of these vehicles.

While the crew escape tower on the MPCV may provide significant improvement over a Space Shuttle without crew escape pods, it does not negate the many factors that have made crew modules a death trap during the re-entry phase of flight. As example, historically the Russian Soyuz crew module's safety record is not significantly better than that the Space Shuttle. While the Soyuz crew module has experienced a failure of the escape tower, it has been the re-entry phase of flight that has proven to be the fatal environment for flight crews. Potential fatal crew module failures are:   

·        Every crew module flight is a test flight! Manufacturing errors have occurred.   

·        Crew modules have very limited cross range capability which could require a reentry into unacceptable weather conditions. 

·        Crew module's notorious reentry errors result in an expanses landing zone that could prevent rapid access to the crew in dire circumstances.

·        Parachutes are known to fail. This is another unacceptable single point failure.

There are too many potential failures with fatal consequences for a crew module to be considered for 21st century human space transportation. The Russian Soyuz crew module is still in service only because their government cannot afford to develop a safer reusable lifting body winged runway landing crewed spacecraft. 

Email reply: Excerpts from NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance:

"At PDR, the Cx (Orion) design PRA estimate was better than the requirement for ascent and not there yet for entry. We don't have a set of level 1 requirements yet for the next NASA developed human system, but we do plan to use the Cx numbers above as part of our human rating requirements set for commercial crew to ISS.  I agree this will be a challenge for any capsule for all the reasons you give if not more."

Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods

This is the only viable crew escape/safe haven system and is available only on the CSS ( see: www.spacetran21.org ).

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