Disturbing & Ignorant Remarks from ASAP & CAIB Chair

← Save Hubble, Restart shuttleTwitter Updates for 2012-05-28 → Risk Assessment like this used on shuttle–note last two paras. Of The Future of Hubble . Posted on May 28, 2012 by Bob Risk assessment like this used on Shuttle!! Americans, we have shut down this shuttle program based on this kind of thinking. We need an emergency session of the House and Senate space committees to reassess this situation . We are in a crisis situation, if any of you know anyone with influence, please get them to help. Please get this to all your Congressmen and senators.  This ought to awaken all of you to the gross mismanagement of the space program by the adm and NASA. Read this,           it is not unsafe, but not safe, needs more studies. We believe it would be unwise.  DOD aircraft extensions have not turned out well. The shuttle is risky and becoming more so.  More risk than folks should shoulder. These people adm Dyrer and Gehman have essentially put a Safe multi- billion program in the TRASH, based on their emotions. Gehman–to be safe we should fly as few missions as possible before retirement.   John Shannon , SPM states that Dryer utterances are disturbing based on the recent (flights from Columbia to present) have been very clean. Shannon comments below— . ASAP—-comments “The ASAP does not, I’ll emphasize that, does not support extending the shuttle beyond its current manifest,” noted Admiral Dyer in his opening remarks to the House hearing to discuss the initial findings of the Augustine Review into the forward path for Human Space Flight. That comment was specific to safety, as cited in the Admiral’s opening statement, which gained the opening question from Mr Bart Gordon, a Democrat representative from Tennessee – who chaired the hearing. “In your comments, you made a very definitive statement concerning no extension of the shuttle,” Mr Gordon asked. “Now is that period, or is that or is that in context to 2020 (likely 2015), and would you extend it if it was recertified, or if there was a mission – or two missions – that came up in the next short period that seemed to be very important? Is there still a period where you wouldn’t go one more?” “Three quick comments: The thing that scares us the most is that kind of serial extension,” responded Admiral Dyer. “Point number 2: We take this position because we think the risk is more than what we should ask folks to shoulder – and we don’t think there is full transparency to that risk. “Thirdly, the time to extend the shuttle in the panel’s opinion was several years ago when the supply chain was still intact and when there was an opportunity to go forward with a (inaudible) program. A number of folks, who participated on the (ASAP) panel, have lived through an extension of number of Department of Defense aircraft programs after they were supposed to terminate. It is never a good experience. “I will also offer one other caution. Could you, with significant money and with recertification, extend the shuttle? Yes. The money would be impressive, it would have to go well through the supply chain, and the risk of finding things that demand even more resources during recertification is a real risk.” With the heavy tone on the risk, and with six shuttle missions still to be launched, Mr Gordon asked if NASA should be looking at one less flight – if the risk was as bad as the ASAP was portraying. That led to an astonishing claim from Admiral Dyer. “We say in the military world that the operational commander always has the authority to proceed in the face of absolute requirements – and it would be an equivalent position in the opinion of the panel. The shuttle is risky, it is becoming more so, and extension beyond what is planned through the current manifest we believe would be unwise.” Regarding Hubble repair (sts125, 2009) Sen. Barbara Mikulski, D-Md., was not happy with the decision. Last spring she asked the head of the CAIB, retired Navy Adm. Hal Gehman, to review the decision and address the issue of shuttle safety. He responded on March 5. Reviewing the actual risk posed during a shuttle mission, Gehman said, for now, and in the foreseeable future, by far most of the risk in space flight is the launch, ascent, entry and landing phases. So, he said, to be safe, NASA should launch the shuttle as few times as possible before it is retired. Though he said it was not unsafe, he also said it was not safe, either, and he called for more studies. John Shannon SPM comments “There were some disturbing remarks from the head of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP). We are working to understand these concerns from a Shuttle risk standpoint,” Mr Shannon noted. “We are flying safer now, and have a better safety culture and integrated team approach with many checks and balances to ensure that we are flying as safely as absolutely possible.” Mr Shannon also cited the recent Flight Readiness Review (FRR) and Mission Management Team (MMT) decisions not to launch a mission until they were absolutely sure the shuttle was safe to carry it out. These decisions are well documented, from the continuous External Tank foam modifications from STS-114 onwards, to the Engine Cut Off (ECO) sensor/LH2 Feedthrough connector issues surrounding STS-122, to the extensive Flow Control Valve (FCV) discussions, to the GUCP (Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate) misalignment, and right through to STS-128?s LH2 Fill and Drain Valve indications – to name but a few. Also, as noted by Mr Shannon as safety culture, internal memos have shown major efforts to welcome dissent from throughout the shuttle engineering team, even when such dissent was proven to be unfounded. A “no stone left unturned” attitude was how one source described the current culture to this site. Each time a problem has been noted, it has been proven that managers have stepped back, listened to the engineering community, before making absolutely sure they both understand the problem and are in a comfortable position to launch. “We have demonstrated over the last several flows that when we are not ready to fly, we stop and take the necessary time to understand the situation before we proceed,” added Mr Shannon, who added he wasn’t even sure if Admiral Dyer was speaking of the current program, given how alien his representations were to the reality of the program since Columbia. “(I am) extremely proud of how the team has worked through recent problems. (I am) not sure if the concerns of the ASAP chairman were echoes of the past, but they do not accurately reflect the current environment. We will work to understand these comments and to be sure that we have not forgotten anything.” The reality of the actual risk – a risk that is obvious and never underestimated throughout manned space flight – was shown in the extension study report that NASA filed with the White House back in May of this year. Those findings revealed a 98.7 percent probability of safely executing each flight, which painted a very different picture when compared to Mr Griffin’s alarming 1 in 8 chance of a disaster. “The latest Space Shuttle probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) indicates that the single mission risk for loss of crew and vehicle (LOCV) is 1 in 77; stated another way, there is a 98.7 percent probability of safely executing each flight,” noted the NASA study into extending the shuttle past 2010 (available on L2). Interestingly, that study based its figures on the SSP since 1987. Had the study was based on post Return To Flight findings, it would be highly likely resulted in a risk ratio would be significantly lower – simply due to the flight history since the loss of Columbia, and the numerous modifications made since the fleet returned to action with STS-114. However, even based on the conservative study findings, the risk is not deemed to a ratio that would increase, which directly counters the Admiral’s claims. “The average risk of LOCV has remained fairly consistent over that time. This risk is predicted to remain consistent over the remaining life of the program. The primary drivers for LOCV are, in order of the magnitude of their contribution to the overall risk: micro-meteoroid/orbital debris (MMOD), ascent debris, and Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) malfunctions. “In addition, NASA will continue to evolve its PRA tools to address anomalies encountered during flight operations. By monitoring anomaly trends across different categories (for example, by whether an anomaly is due to design issues, age, operations or procedurally-induced effects, or unknown or random phenomena), NASA gains both near-term insights into Space Shuttle performance opportunities for potential safety improvements during ongoing operations as well as longer-term benefit in applying experience-based risk models to future programs like Constellation. “NASA’s safety and mission assurance strategy emphasizes the need for rigorous program and independent safety reviews, as well as continual safety improvements throughout a program’s life cycle. Improvements to both processes and hardware are made for each Space Shuttle flight, and NASA will continue to invest in prudent safety enhancements through the last mission.” The latest SSP Top Risks Review presentation on L2 shows the vehicle is becoming safer, with the latest ratio updated to 1 in 81 LOV/C, from the previous 1 in 77.  The SSP also earned praise at the preceding meeting with the Senate side of Hearing from both the politicians in attendance and Mr Norm Augustine himself – who spoke of his “astonishment” at the morale and professionalism of the program’s workforce. Such comments are a good reflection of the highly respected SSP team. However, the continued uncertainty surrounding the future of both the Shuttle Program and NASA itself is understandably starting to pay a toll, as the program is forced to press ahead of a cull of its workforce based on the current plan to end the program after STS-133. Posted by keeptheshuttleflying.com at 6:27 PM Email This BlogThis! 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