NASA’s past considers its future
by Jeff Foust
Monday, July 9, 2012
Comments (47)
NASA may have had its issues over the years, from strained budgets to programs running behind schedule and over budget, but one thing it has never suffered from is a lack of advice. While the space agency has its own sounding boards, in the form of the NASA Advisory Council and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, there have been plenty of external reviews of the agency’s aims and efforts, often created at the behest of the White House or Congress. The result has been a steady stream of reports offering insights and recommendations—although that advice often remains trapped on the pages of those reports, never to be implemented by NASA or its overseers on either end of Pennsylvania Avenue.
“I can’t tell you how many times in the last few years I have been asked, ‘What do you think of NASA’s new direction?’” recalled Truly. “And I can’t answer that question. I am utterly confused.”
Another exercise in studying NASA’s present situation and offering advice for the agency is underway. The fiscal year 2012 appropriations bill that funded NASA included report language directing the agency to undertake an independent assessment of its strategic direction. That study, the report mandated, would “evaluate whether NASA’s overall strategic direction remains viable and whether agency management is optimized to support that direction.”
NASA brought in the National Research Council to perform the “NASA’s Strategic Direction” study, which is currently underway. The committee has held a pair of public meetings, including one in late June that included presentations by a number of current NASA officials, including administrator Charles Bolden. The June meeting also featured three of Bolden’s predecessors: Richard Truly, James Beggs, and Sean O’Keefe. The perspectives of those former administrators in particular provided some interesting insights into both the agency’s past and its future.
“I am utterly confused”
Some former administrators, in their comments to the committee, raised concern about the future direction of NASA—or, more accurately, a perception that the agency lacks direction. “I can’t tell you how many times in the last few years I have been asked, ‘What do you think of NASA’s new direction?’” recalled Truly. “And I can’t answer that question. I am utterly confused.”
Truly, who served as NASA administrator from 1989 to 1992, left the space field behind after leaving NASA, eventually taking a position as director of the Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Colorado. He described himself to the committee today as “a citizen who lives way out there in the country” who watches NASA’s activities from afar.
Truly said that after President George W. Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration, whose elements included the retirement of the Space Shuttle, he got comfortable with the idea of ending the shuttle program to help fund the future exploration systems. “But I never dreamed that the president then would not make another speech about the Vision” after his January 2004 address at NASA Headquarters, Truly said, and the program was not properly funded. He sounded disappointed that, when the Obama Administration decided to cancel the Constellation program in 2010, it did not decide to keep the shuttle going.
The confusion he said he experiences about NASA’s direction should be a concern, he warned. “But if I’m confused, and you multiply me by the millions of citizens who may also be confused, this is a dangerous situation for NASA. And that’s the reason that makes this study so important.”
Beggs, who was NASA administrator from mid-1981 through 1985, also expressed concern about NASA’s direction in his comments to the committee later the same day. He noted NASA’s 2011 strategic plan includes six specific goals, from “extend and sustain human activities across the solar system” to public outreach and fostering innovation.
“They are important in the sense that they do encompass that vision” laid out in the original Space Act that created the agency in 1958, he said. “Unfortunately, at this time, these goals have not been elucidated in such a way that they provide a clear framework and clear guidance to everyone in the agency.”
“We are not adrift,” Bolden said. “I think you heard some of my predecessors talk about they don’t know where we’re going. That’s their problem, not mine.”
“There’s a lot of uncertainty out there,” he continued. “The uncertainty is such that the folks who work in NASA and have been with NASA over the long term are not yet convinced that we have an appropriate plan.” Later, he said, “I still think we need a unifying mission. I am not satisfied with what they’re planning now is truly unified.” He suggested that a permanent base on the Moon should be that mission, citing interest in such missions from Russia and China.
Current administrator Bolden, who spoke to the committee the next day, rejected the suggestions from Beggs and Truly that NASA didn’t have a firm vision. “We are not adrift,” he said. “I think you heard some of my predecessors talk about they don’t know where we’re going. That’s their problem, not mine. I know where the agency is going. I know where I want it to go.”
Former NASA administrator James Beggs said, “There is too much institution for the program, and there is too much program for the budget.” (credit: J. Foust)
More institution than program, more program than budget
Another part of the testimony by NASA’s current and former leaders focused on the size and structure of the agency itself. That interest appeared to be triggered by one item in the project scope for the study: “Examine NASA’s organizational structure and identify changes that could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency’s mission activities.” To some, that sounded like code words for either closing centers or converting some into federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) run by other organizations. An example is JPL, which is funded by NASA but managed by Caltech.
Truly called out that that element of the project scope in his comments. “I hope you will stick to bigger stuff than that,” he cautioned, saying that the committee’s work should be at a higher level than reshaping organizational charts. “But if this is code for should we have this number of NASA centers going forward or not, fine.”
He warned that, based on his experience running an FFRDC for the Department of Energy, converting NASA centers to that structure may not be an ideal solution. While calling JPL one of the best examples of an FFRDC anywhere in the federal government, “I don’t think you want to trade the current NASA centers, that organization,” into FFRDCs. “I don’t think that’s a very good idea. And even if it was a good idea, I don’t understand what problem there is that this is the answer to.” He said that it would be a “nightmare” to transition centers to FFRDCs, and would be difficult to get them to work together once transitioned, citing the lack of cooperation among the Energy Department’s national labs.
Beggs also said he didn’t see a need to convert NASA centers into FFRDCs. “I’m a firm believer in the old slogan, ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,’” he said. “And I think the organizational structure of the agency is well-designed, well-structured, and it works. And I don’t see any reason to change it.”
“We could have, I think easily would have, seen that conversion [of NASA centers to FFRDCs] occur a few years back had there been just a little more time,” O’Keefe said.
One recent time that the idea of converting NASA centers into FFRDCs came up was in 2004 by the President’s Commission on the Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, or more commonly known as the Aldridge Commission after its chairman, Pete Aldridge. Its final report recommended a restructuring of NASA that would convert many of its centers into FFRDCs.
“FFRDCs provide a tested, proven management structure in which many of the federal government’s most successful and innovative research, laboratory, technical support, and engineering institutions thrive,” the report concluded. “The value of FFRDCs is rooted in their technical competence, flexibility, independence, and objectivity in support of a given federal agency’s technical projects.” It did recommend that centers involved with “specific governmental functions” like launch and flight operations not be transitioned into FFRDCs.
The NASA administrator at the time of the Aldridge Commission report, Sean O’Keefe, told the NRC committee he was open to that concept. “How do you rationalize ten different centers around the country?” he asked, suggesting that FFRDCs was one idea he pursued during his tenure and still worth consideration today.
“I was pleasantly surprised to find out how much enthusiasm there was for that [FFRDC approach] within the centers as well as within some of the universities” that might be asked to manage them. “We could have, I think easily would have, seen that conversion occur a few years back had there been just a little more time.” That was an apparent allusion to O’Keefe’s departure from NASA at the end of 2004 to become chancellor of Louisiana State University. He was replaced by Mike Griffin, who showed no particular interest in FFRDCs. O’Keefe said that the FFRDC conversion plan “became almost a victim of transitions.”
Even though who didn’t embrace the FFRDC concept acknowledged that NASA today has infrastructure that includes some relics of past programs no longer needed. “I would be less than honest if I told you we need everything we have,” Bolden admitted. “We don’t. There’s some stuff we don’t do anymore, and yet we have facilities that are capable of handling that if someone gave it to us. But in today’s budget environment, you really can’t honestly hope to maintain all that stuff, hoping that someday it will return when we know it won’t.”
“There is too much institution for the program,” Beggs concluded, “and there is too much program for the budget.”
Former NASA administrator Sean O’Keefe said he had seen some enthusiasm within NASA to converting some field centers to FFRDCs, but the effort died after he left the agency in late 2004. (credit: J. Foust)
Budget and leadership
Beggs’s solution to that conundrum was simple: increase NASA’s budget by $4–5 billion per year, which would give it enough money to carry out all its programs as well as future ones, like the lunar base he advocated for. “I really don’t understand how this great nation” can’t afford to spend more money on overall research and development, he said, on the order of two to three percent of the nation’s GNP. “Where is the leadership that we used to have?”
Such funding doesn’t appear to be forthcoming in today’s fiscal environment, where government officials regularly repeat the mantra “flat is the new up” regarding budgets. But NASA’s budget falling short of the desires of its advocates is nothing new.
“There is too much institution for the program,” Beggs concluded, “and there is too much program for the budget.”
“I never once encountered anybody who said, ‘We’ve got all the resources we need, thank you very much,’” O’Keefe recalled, going back to his time both at NASA and the Defense Department. “Instead, the bigger challenge is trying to figure out how to establish a range of priorities necessary in order to fit within what has been determined to be an appropriate investment level to do.” He said that while he would have appreciated a bigger budget while at NASA, “everything that was a priority, I never had a problem gaining the endorsement of the administration.”
“NASA’s program are so big and so expensive that presidential leadership and White House followup to give clear support to NASA as they carry them out is essential,” Truly said, along with key supporters in Congress. Public support is also key, he said. “NASA is lost if you allow confusion in what it’s doing among the citizens.”
What impact that testimony will have on the NRC’s final report, and what effect the report will have on the White House and Congress, will take months, if not years, to ascertain. But Bolden agreed that the NASA is at a rare point in its history. “We’re at a turning point in the agency today, as we were when I joined in 1980,” he said. He even suggested that the committee give its final report to Congress in a public session that “provokes public dialogue. If it doesn’t then the Congress has wasted your time.”
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site and the Space Politics and NewSpace Journal weblogs. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone, and do not represent the official positions of any organization or company, including the Futron Corporation, the author’s employer.
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+3
Deuce · 4 days ago
What is going to happen to NASA if the DOD goes through sequestration? What about when the government has to pay the bills for the new healthcare law beginning in 2014. Evidently Begg's thinks the budget could be increased by $4-5 billion in this climate.
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1 reply · active 1 day ago
+6
GeeSpace · 4 days ago
Current administrator Bolden, who spoke to the committee the next day, rejected the suggestions from Beggs and Truly that NASA didn’t have a firm vision. “We are not adrift,” he said. “I think you heard some of my predecessors talk about they don’t know where we’re going. That’s their problem, not mine. I know where the agency is going. I know where I want it to go.”
It's nice that Mr. Bolden knows where he wants NASA to go. Now, if he tells the public that information then the public will know too.
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1 reply · active 3 days ago
+5
William A Wheaton · 4 days ago
I believe that NASA's single, overarching goal must be the expansion of Earth Life and human civilization into the space environment. The expansion of humankind into space -- first local near-Earth utilization, already well under way, then into then into the entire Solar System in the next century or so, and eventually far beyond, for ages to come -- is a natural step in the evolution and development of Life on Earth, first from the Sea, then onto the Land, and now out to the limitless and challenging realm that lies beyond.
If Earth Life turns out to be unique in the Universe, this expansion can ensure its survival and safety -- against the many threats, imaginary and all too serious, that have been widely discussed -- for at least many, many millions of years to come.
If Life is common in the Universe, then we should encounter it, learn from it, and enrich to it, in ways that can hardly be imagines today, much as the Earth environment is enriched by the millions of species here that we are just beginning to comprehend.
This is too huge and general a vision to be a specific guide. First let us review the progress we have mad in the past 60 years.
First, and perhaps most difficult, we have already developed a moderately reliable and safe technology just for getting our instrumentalities and ourselves off the Earth, out from its very deep and challenging gravitational potential well, into space -- Low Earth Orbit (LEO) in particular.
Second, in the International Space Station (ISS), we have made a good start to establishing a long-term toehold, and the technology, to actually live and work off the Earth.
It is essential to understand in this regard, that Space provides us with all the resources we need for life to thrive, most particularly materials, energy, and nearly limitless room to grow. The clearest demonstration of this is the Earth itself, which is a natural spaceship, despite its limitations, which we are now beginning to notice and worry about. Using only the first kilometer deep of the surfaces of the terrestrial planets, moons, and asteroids, we have potentially available many times the material resources that we can reach on Earth. The energy needed to access those resources and use them to build new civilizations, is available almost without limit from the Sun, and by nuclear fusion of the abundant light elements. hydrogen and 3He.
Third, having reached the 0g environment of LEO, we have the technology at hand to use Solar-Electric and Nuclear-Electric low-thrust Propulsion (SEP & NEP) systems (like those already in use to explore the asteroids Vesta and Ceres), with a reach and capacity far beyond the chemical rockets needed to get us off the Earth. These SEP and NEP systems will need only material resources and energy widely available in space, without the requirement to haul thousands of tons of materials and rocket propellants off the Earth.
Thus, I propose for the logical next step in this adventure, the establishment of a permanent Base Camp on Phobos, the innermost moon of Mars. This objective addresses three of the immediate aims proposed for the NASA Beyond Earth Orbit program: a permanent human base on the Moon, a mission to a near-earth asteroid (NEA), and a crewed mission to Mars.
-- END PART 1 --
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1 reply · active 3 days ago
+3
William A Wheaton · 4 days ago
-- PART 2 --
The advantages of the Moon vs Phobos simply as a permanent human base in space seem comparable, yet Phobos is a much more useful site than the surface of the Moon. Compared to a base on the Moon, it has the great advantage of not requiring the large and expensive mass of chemical rocket propellants needed to land and take off against the Moon's considerable gravity. (Equivalent to a one-gravity potential step about 287 km high, compared with about 6,738 km high for escape from Earth. The potential well for Phobos is less than 1 m deep.) The mass of Phobos provides us with around a trillion tons of rock (silicon, metals, and oxygen, and maybe even some water ice near the poles) -- surely enough for our near-term needs. While the surface of the Moon is relatively near at hand measured in km, the more relevant kind of "distance" in space is the gravitational energy required to get there, (The energy required to get from high-Earth orbit to Phobos orbit depends on the trajectory and astro-dynamical tricks used, but is on the order of a few hundred km 1g potential equivalent. However the huge advantage of being reachable with an SEP system instead of chemical rockets overrides.)
Compared to a near-earth asteroid (NEA), Phobos is a competitive objective. First of all, in terms of scientific knowledge gained -- an important aim of NEA missions -- Phobos should be comparable, but overlaps in complex ways. For certain NEAs, very primitive material could tell us much of interest about the early history and formation of the Solar System. Yet Phobos may also have much primitive asteroidal material, mixed (to an as-yet unknown degree) with material incorporated from the early formation of Mars. Thus Phobos material should address both asteroidal and general planetary formation, and specific Mars history questions. It is also proposed that asteroidal materials could be used as resources for use in space. Silicon is an obvious candidate for fabrication into solar cells, and rocks contain metals (iron, aluminum, magnesium, calcium, titanium,...) and oxygen (in silicates). As for the Moon, polar ice (for life support and production of chemical rocket fuels) seems an interesting possibility. Yet the biggest advantage of Phobos over the NEAs is in its accessibility. NEAs are in random orbits with respect to the Earth's, passing at odd intervals of many years, at large inclinations with respect to our and Mars orbits around the Sun, and typically at fairly high velocities, Mars (and thus Phobos) comes back into position for trips to and fro from from Earth regularly every 26 months. so that a somewhat lengthy yet routine schedule of visits and returns can be envisaged. As a practical matter, this seems decisive. A trip to a random NEA will be a one of a kind thing, never repeated for decades or centuries. Phobos is a place we can revisit and exploit in practice, for roughly comparable costs.
-- END PART 2 --
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2 replies · active 3 days ago
+2
William A Wheaton · 4 days ago
PART 3
Such a program, based on the combination of the ISS as a long term habitat, and the SEP as a low-cost, high-performance, and efficient space drive, uses tools and hand and can be accomplished step-by-step much more safely and sooner than and actual landing on Mars. With a base on Phobos, we could continue to create a base on the surface of Mars which can grow and serve a wide variety of scientific, exploration, and eventually settlement goals.
All the elemnts of the current Beyond Earth Orbit program would play essential roles. Because it is incremental, the pursuit of this program can follow the vagaries of political support and bugetary realities. Interrupted at any stage, from LEO, to HEO, to Phobos, or in surface exploration, it would leave in place infrastructure that will be useful in the meanwhile, providing us valuable resources for future use as funding allows.
I believe that the current Beyond Earth Orbit Program could achieve the estabilshment of a Base Camp on Phobos by the end of the 2020-2030 decade. Then in 2030 humanity would be well-positioned to extend our frontiers to the Surface of Mars, to a permanent base on the Moon, to the Asteroid Belt, and beyond.
END
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1 reply · active 2 days ago
+3
Wilfred A. Roberge · 4 days ago
To quote Mr. Bolden about NASA being adrift "It's their problem, not mine, I know where NASA is going..." Well it's my problem too, because I am a person who loves space yet I have no idea where NASA is going.... Please Mr. Bolden tell me where NASA is going, I want to know, I think it's a terrible shame if Space-nut like me doesn't even know what's up which shows that there is a problem contrary to what you think.
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2 replies · active 2 days ago
+7
Stephen C. Smith · 4 days ago
I really have to laugh at the people who claim they have no knowledge of NASA's direction.
Try visiting NASA's web site. It's right there. Click on News, then select Budget. Read through the documents. I have.
For those who won't read, I'll boil it down to the basics for you:
* NASA's primary mission for human spaceflight for the rest of the decade is the International Space Station. We spent 13 years building it. Time to use it for its intended purpose, namely research in microgravity. We already have promising potential vaccines for salmonella and MRSA, with more research in the pipeline.
* To get to the ISS, we have new commercial cargo and crew programs. SpaceX has already flown the first commercial cargo demo flight. Later this month, NASA will announce the commercial crew finalists. With luck, the first test flights will be in late 2014/early 2015.
* By the end of the decade, we'll be flying the Space Launch System which gives us the ability to send astronauts back to the Moon, or to an asteroid, or to Mars. Congress views this as a jobs program, and imposed it on NASA without committing to any missions or destinations or funding for actual exploration. In my opinion, it's a dog of a program, but NASA is stuck with it so the administration will make the best of it until Congress changes its mind.
Seems clear enough to me. I'm constantly scratching my head wondering why some people refuse to get it.
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1 reply · active 3 days ago
+1
Robert G. Oler · 4 days ago
The confusion about where NASA is headed is by folks who still are clinging to the exploration model for human spaceflight...once you recognize that this model is dead...then you gain a lot more vision. until then well there is no vision RGO
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1 reply · active 3 days ago
+3
Paul Hazel · 4 days ago
to "extend and sustain human activities across the solar system."
No. Just, simply, NO.
I've been a space enthusiast since I was a child watching the Mercury flights. I'm a Star Trek fan and science fiction reader. I firmly believe that mankind needs to expand beyond Earth to reach our full potential. And I think it is a very good idea to encourage other countries to join us in peaceful exploration. I am certainly no member of the "Tea Party", I'm not even a Republican. But I believe there is absolutely no justification for our government to be allowed to consider itself responsible for spreading babies and good cheer throughout the universe.
That is not the job of our government. The government's efforts need to be in supporting the efforts of it's citizens and their businesses to spread those babies and good cheer throughout the universe by developing and testing technologies in the same way that the NACA did for the fledgling aviation industry - and then getting out of the way.
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2 replies · active 57 minutes ago
+2
Grand Lunar · 4 days ago
A simple, clear goal for NASA ought to be implimented.
Along with Paul Spudis, I think this should follow the Cislunar Next plan.
Simply develope the cislunar enviroment to where there's feedback between the moon and Earth for off-planet resources.
If NASA still gets the SLS, it at least can have a mission, and might not need to grow to the mammoth 130 mT size often quoted.
How nice it would be for this to become reality.
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-1
Vladislaw · 4 days ago
"Beggs also said he didn’t see a need to convert NASA centers into FFRDCs. “I’m a firm believer in the old slogan, ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,’” he said. “And I think the organizational structure of the agency is well-designed, well-structured, and it works. And I don’t see any reason to change it.” "
Ya, NASA ain't broke, 12 billion for Constellation and not even one single orbital test flight. 5 billion for a capsule .. and only a one billion more per year until 2021, gosh .. can you spell bargin?
Let's see a couple aircraft carriers or a disposable capsule... man .. what a hard choice .. let's go with the capsule.
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1 reply · active 2 days ago
0
DougSpace · 4 days ago
My opinion is that it may be difficult to determine the right strategic direction when speaking with previous administrators because, I believe, the right direction HSF BEO hasn't been done before. Specifically, we need to take COTS one step further to a "Lunar COTS" program (it would also involve crew).
I have just written up a description of a proposed cis-lunar architecture that I think can be set up with the launch of a single Falcon Heavy rocket. It would harvest and electrolyze lunar ice on the first trip and so would bootstrap the rest. I would like to share it with anyone who is interested for constructive input. Please email me a request for that at dougspace007 - gmail.
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1 reply · active 3 days ago
+1
guest · 3 days ago
Excellent article. They did not need to hear from Dr. Griffin?
For me this really clarifies where we are. Having been at NASA throughout the tenures of all of these administrators, I now see and understand where each was coming from and going, including Bolden.
Beggs came on the scene as Shuttle was developed and going into operation. He still had a capable, experienced workforce. He had a Shuttle designed from the outset to build a modular space station and which they were still expecting would fly two dozen times a year. The prospects of commercial utilization were real. The next logical step was clear to him. He needed to identify it and provide the rationale for it to NASA, the President and the people and he did exactly that. He sold the program and got station underway.
By the time Truly came on the scene, shuttle had experienced its first accident and had been cut back to fewer than 10 flights a year. Station had been going on 10 years and had bogged down in poor design decisions with respect to too much on-orbit EVA assembly. Increasing costs owing to the falsely proclaimed Shuttle consolidation contract, and delays and a slow down in the Shuttle schedule meant that utilization prospects were not as clear any longer and so in searching for rationale for the program, they came upon SEI. Truly responded that ideas about moon bases were great but he had his hands full flying Shuttle and designing a space station and did not need to lose focus elsewhere.
OKeefe came in. The Columbia accident led to the belief that Shuttle was flawed and needed to be replaced. ISS was partly built and operating but deisgn and development was long over. Bureaucratically he was probably the sharpest of the Administrators in putting together a logical plan to move forward and under him Adm Steidle would have a replacement for Shuttle flying in 2010-in fact 2 of them. There were also a roadmap for the future. Coming out of Columbia there was hope for the future. Its unfortunate he did not stay on another five years because I think we knew what we needed to do.
The came Griffin. He redirected everything to a project that threw away everything we had in favor of a new oversized Apollo and rockets that were poorly conceived from the standpoint of design and production. Orion was never a Shuttle replacement. The cost of the program was so overwhelming that there was no hope to do anything more than Apollo had achieved. And it depended on an Apollo sized budget that was never going to be provided.
Then came Bolden. He didn't know what to do and had no plan for how to carry out Constellation. That was not a problem since Obama tried to carry out his plan of deferring everything by at least 5 years, and he cancelled Constellation. Surprisingly, and with little thanks to NASA, some of the commercial COTS ideas looked like they might work. Congress said that NASA needed to keep spending its budget, and so they insisted on continuing Orion and planning an SLS. Sure, Orion is translunar return capsule. Unfortunately the rest of the spacecraft doesnt exist and wont at the uncontrolled rate NASA is spending money on it. ISS is up there, barely being maintained on the wings of the other countries' logistics spacecraft (as long as nothing too severe goes wrong), and talk about utilization is positive, though unrealistic until return capability is provided. There is no real plan beyond continuing to spend the same money. Bolden's days are numbered so why come up with a plan since that will be up to the next Administration. He knows what he is doing and has resigned himself to where he and the program are. Why think of the future? That is the next Administrator's job. The Congress and the next President will continue to spend about the same amount of money. If the Administrator comes up with a meaningful plan that he can get them to listen to, then the money might increase a little. Or if not, then we stay on the same path, which is at best uncertain.
What is certain in all of this: that Griffin over-reaching plan did not work because he did not define rationale, requirements, or a meaningful and realistic spending plan. that Bolden's lack of a plan is no better since it leaves everyone wondering...and looking for leadership.
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3 replies · active 47 minutes ago
-1
Jim Hillhouse · 3 days ago
"Congress said that NASA needed to keep spending its budget, and so they insisted on continuing Orion and planning an SLS."
Not true.
Congress continued Orion and created SLS, the design for which originated with the Stafford Committee, after eight months of House and Senate Subcommittee and Committee examination that included hearings and discussions with many players. By September 2010, those efforts yielded votes that showed vast majorities in both houses felt that this nation should have its own means of executing human spaceflight absent the commercial sector. You can go back and watch the full House debate of the merits of both that chamber's and the Senate's version of what became the 2010 NASA Authorization Act. In doing that, you'll note that nobody was talking about "...NASA needed to keep spending its budget..." but was about whether this nation wanted to cede its capacity and hinge its ability to explore beyond Earth to commercial entities. And by an over 2/3rds majority, the answer was, "No!".
Obviously there's a vocal minority who doesn't accept that policy perspective, who believes that the gov't should have no material role in BEO human spaceflight. But it is a misstatement at best to write that Orion and SLS exist solely because members of Congress wanted "...NASA ... to keep spending its budget...".
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1 reply · active 44 minutes ago
+3
Dan Roberts · 3 days ago
NASA could save a lotof money by having a clear and consistent goals and direction instead of changing every 4 or 8 years depending on what political party gets into office. NASA might alos consider off loading some projects and let the private sector fund and manage them. For instance if a lot of the science experiments like...Gravity Probe B (for instance) are really wonderful, let CALTECH or MIT Plan, develop, fund (have bake sales, raise tuition) and Launch the mission. Not all science experiments need to flown and managed and funded by NASA. In deed we should be talking about privatizing ALL of NASA. Manned space flight? Let Space X, Bigelow and Ad Astra get together and fly people to Mars. It will probably take a lot less time than the Government.
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+1
guest · 3 days ago
"NASA could save a lot of money by off loading some projects and let the private sector fund and manage them...not all science experiments need to flown and managed and funded by NASA..."
I think this was the idea starting back in the Griffin time-frame to save money by shutting down many of the NASA managed and funded science projects, especially for ISS. For example, prior to Griffin's time there was an active Centers for Commercial Development that was developing many of the science payloads for manned missions. They got a little funding from other sources by mainly it was coming from NASA, who also provided the flight opportunities. Besides, in Griffin's view, if ISS was being terminated in several years then why did anyone need to continue developing the experiments? The hope was that NIH would pick up human research, someone would pick up biotech, someone else would pick up earth observations, etc. But from what I have gathered, few funding agencies came forward, so lots of projects terminated, people laid off, and within the last couple years NASA has been adding some of these back.
A lot of people, particularly in the upper management echelons, seem to think that NASA exists mainly to design and build spacecraft. These people wonder why NASA should be doing anything when it comes to many varieties of science, beyond things like astronautics or aeronautics, or applied physics associated with things like propulsion, heat dissipation, etc critical for aero or astro vehicles.
But there are a lot of people working on behalf of NASA involved in many aspects of science that are only peripherally associated with aero or astro and its been developing over decades; there are large contingents doing global warming or human factors. NASA became an arm of the government for funding science. I think it started much larger in the university grant arena, and then migrated to involve more and more internal NASA and contractor people.
If one of NASA's prime roles is R&D, does this mean R&D only with respect to designing and developing air or spacecraft, or does it mean a much broader scope of science?
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0
Dennis Berube · 3 days ago
I do not understand one point in this on going debate. If so many are against SLS, then why doesnt NASA build the Orion for its purposes, and utilize the Delta IV heavy as its main vehicle for launch. Would that not save money? The design has already proved itself, and so lets move on.....
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+1
Fred Willett · 3 days ago
As Stephen Smith pointed out a few posts back NASA's current mission is quite clear.
1/ Use ISS
2/ Develop commercial to Leo capabilities
3/ Build SLS.
But I can see why for many people this doesn't seem enough of a program. Building a launch vehicle is not the same as actually going exploring.
And NASA's constantly repeted mantra of "ceding LEO to commercial" so NASA can "concentrate on BEO" just doesn't add up. Just saying something doesn't make it so.
So what is NASA's plan for BEO?
There is no plan.
Where is the money for BEO?
There is none.
There is some talk of an outpost at L1 or something like that, but it's just unfunded powerpoints.
And this is the problem.
The current plan (ISS, commercial and SLS) assumes that there will be no budget cuts.
Forget any hope of a real BEO program if the budget stays flat.
If the budget falls things get considerably worse.
So, is the situation hopeless?
No.
It all relies on commercial.
If competition can bring down costs (as competition has done in so many fields) then more will be possible on the existing budget.
But if commercial fails (or worse is squeezed out by SLS eating the commercial seed corn) then goodbye BEO for the forseeable future.
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1 reply · active 3 days ago
+1
IVillageIdiot 89p · 2 days ago
Part 1
1. I am a HUGE fan of EVERYTHING space (except instant death). I want to go personally, I want to help others go (if they want to do so), I want to develop this that and the other things that are required to move Mankind towards that future, as I do believe it to be our true destiny.
2. In fact, if I didn’t know better, I would say I am the #1 Space exploration fan on the Planet, however… there is SO MUCH competition for that seat, it’s only really an honest emotion. I’m not even close to being alone in that regard, not by a long-shot, and could never wear the crown.
3. Having said that, I am increasingly less and less impressed by NASA’s direction and it's management in general.
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+3
IVillageIdiot 89p · 2 days ago
Part 2
I get the distinct sense that when NASA was FIRST formed, when it brought the best and brightest over from the "previous program", it was FULL of Engineer types, hard-charging “GO-GETTERS”! Type A realists that were used to achieving and were 100% totally up to the challenge. They were given a CLEAR mission,
“PUT THE USA on the moon first, bring them back home alive, and... you have this much time in which to complete this objective.”
THAT is exactly what those kinds of people, and those specific people were used to doing! They made it work, and I’m not surprised at that, because it was normal... FOR THEM! What a great example they set, what a tremendous achievement on behalf of Mankind! It was truly WONDERFUL,... in every sense of that word!
Now, what have we got? Most, if not all, of THOSE Steely-Eyed Rocketmen are gone from the payroll, many aren't even with us any longer.
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+4
IVillageIdiot 89p · 2 days ago
Part 3
NASA, once run by Engineers, has been slowly replacing them year after year by Pol Appointees, Bureaucrats, Scientist (cause it's virtually the only game in town), Administrators, Clerks, PR Teams,... etc,... etc,... etc,..... effectively choking out what made it GREAT(!) in the first place. All the original greatness was replaced with politics and bureaucracy. It really makes my heart sick thinking of the progress we've thrown away, and what hath been wasted and delayed.
Imagine if tomorrow the next Chicxulub should fall, what 30-40 years of sustained development of flight COULD HAVE meant to our chances at avoidance or survival?
NASA has popularity nearly equal to US-MIL. Many, many, many people share the idea, and are supportive of the effort. I would say, so much so the OTHER nations of the West have setup their OWN versions of the same organization. That is NOT A QUIRK! That is the basis of a unifying Dream!
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+3
IVillageIdiot 89p · 2 days ago
Part 4
If you ask a NASA Bureaucrat today, what they need to get things moving again, do you know what they will tell you? The number ONE answer: BUDGET! If you were to go back and ask the original NASA Engineers; “what do YOU need to get things moving”, do you know what THEIR number one answer would be?
"XX months!".....
To the Engineer, “Budget” is just one more of the parameters which must be calculated to reach the objective, like weight or distance. To a Bureaucrat, budget…. IS…. the Objective.
NASA HAS... Engineers (to be sure), but it's not run BY Engineers any longer. Methane has floated to the top of the pond, which is a sure sign that Bureaucracy has taken hold in the mud below. NASA, like EVERY Government agency tends to age, and in that aging process, it has taken on TOO many bureaucrats, far TOO many managers, TOO many Pols, and (I don't enjoy saying it...but,...) TOO many Scientists.
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+4
IVillageIdiot 89p · 2 days ago
Part 5
I hate to include Scientists, but… you have to do so if you’re going to look honestly at the problem. Scientists have a different goal, they have a different method, they have a different agenda, and, consequently,… a different set of problems. They seek answers, for the sake of colleting and cataloging those answers on behalf of humanity. Science is a genuinely laudable effort, perhaps even a noble effort (in my opinion), and an effort WORTH pursuing by any rational standard.
AND,… (unfortunately) at odds with the actual mission NASA SHOULD pursue.
Yes,… NASA uses “Science”, but it’s NOT the goal! The GOAL is FLIGHT which advances humanity into space! I would submit, that is why it’s wallowing around accomplishing little or nothing at all with regard to getting “average people” and/or "working people" off this rock!
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+3
IVillageIdiot 89p · 2 days ago
Part 6
Pictures for the PR machine (love um), data for the Scientist (great, love it), but….. where is the effort to LIFT people and THEIR various interest off this rock,…? It’s in the back seat where Pols and Bureaucrats (also, a phalanx of GVT lawyers) want it…. Too many problems, and the competition will spoil the novelty driving the hope and BUDGET…..
I would argue, THAT… is the real problem.
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+3
IVillageIdiot 89p · 2 days ago
Part 7
However, I still want to help:
Money Solutions-
===============
1. Create the "Legal Constructs" for binding a NEW kind of Trust Fund, to Government, for long term use.
2. This kind of "Trust", would NOT be able to expend Principal, ONLY... Interest, Earnings, Dividends, and then… only a percentage of those.
3. This kind of "Trust", would allow an Agency (NASA) to place excessive funds per anum, back into it's OWN "Trust Funds" to be invested and the resultant revenues utilized.
4. MAKE Congress allow excessive (or.. saved budget) transferable to these Trusts, W/O penalizing the agency in the next cycle, by reducing the baseline budget.
5. Setup Trust Funds by Program and/or Objectives where the beneficiary is NOT a NASA General fund, BUT rather… a specific cost center for a specific purpose. Let people then contribute to programs (feeling free to make prioritization suggestions of course) THEY support, because the funds go DIRECTLY to that program. You want to support a better Engine? Contribute to the JPL Engine Development Trust!
6. Could Congress contribute to a Trust, PERMANENTLY sequestering capital to a given purpose rather than into a nebulous cost center? I’m sure of it….
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