NASA Problems and Solutions
Should the NASA Administrator Resign?
Don A. Nelson
Contact: nasaproblems@yahoo.com
January 2012
On more than one occasion NASA Administrator Charles Bolden has stated that he is frustrated...and after taking the NASA top position said, “I really don’t care what signal it sends. I did not want this job.” (Ref http://www.spacenews.com/civil/bolden-talk-yields-insights-more-personal-than-political.html). I met Charlie when he first came to NASA JSC as an astronaut candidate. He is an A-number one nice guy and tries to please everyone and a NASA administrator can’t be that guy. At a recent telecom he again said that his goal was to have a human mission to Mars. I challenged him that goal is impossible with the heavy lift Space Launch System (SLS) vehicles. There are too many negative to proceed with the development of Apollo class heavy lift launch vehicles. The “Austere Human Missions to Mars” presented by NASA at the AIAA Space 2009 conference requires nearly 2000 T be delivered to LEO to support a four member crew Mars mission. It would require 15 launches of the upgraded SLS to support the four year Mars mission with a launch cost of a minimum $30 billion plus the cost of the payloads. If one launch vehicle or payload fails the entire mission could be lost. With no cargo return capability on the Orion crew module there is no commercial value for this Mars transportation system. Reusable launchers with payload return capability and space based transportation vehicles with cargo bays commercial applications are the only affordable and viable option for human Mars missions.
The SLS is a political vehicle designed to try to save an industry that supports NASA launch operations. The economic environment of the 21st century dictates that we abandon government operated launch vehicles. Like the U.S. auto industry…we change or we shut down.
Charlie…by resigning you sent the message that we are on the wrong path!
Don A. Nelson
Aerospace Consultant…Retired NASA Engineer
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Content:
China’s Space Shuttle MPCV crew module deathtrap Space tugs to Space Cruisers
NASA Management Solutions NASA Technology Issues Letter of Concern
Commercial Space Shuttle
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LETTERS of CONCERN
July 14, 2011
NASA Headquarters
Office of the Administrator
Gen. Charles F. Bolden Jr.
Subject: Resignation
Charlie,
There is an old saying around NASA, “Tell the Administrator what you want him to hear…not what he needs to know.” As a retired NASA engineer I’m breaking this unwritten rule and telling you that it is in the best interest of NASA and the President that you resign. You have ignored, or failed to recognize vital issues which now have NASA on a course of certain failure.
Under your administration you failed to replace the management
Your administration has misled the President and Congress about the safety of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV)
The 2010 congressional NASA Authorization Act has a provision approving the use of commercially developed vehicles. However, your administration ignored numerous requests to evaluate a commercial space shuttle
Charlie, I know of your deep feeling for NASA and human space flight. Also I believe your commitment to the President is genuine. As you are aware the Florida space coast will be a deciding factor in the 2012 presidential elections. And as you are also aware the NASA technical oversight of the SLS/MPCV by the Executive Branch offices of the NASA Inspector General and Office of Science and Technology Policy has been non-existence and the President will be held accountable for this failure. There is no doubt that the SLS/MPCV will fail. To prolong the cancellation of this failed effort beyond the timeframe of adopting the commercial space shuttle will be devastating to the NASA community and will be a deciding factor in defeating the President in the 2012 election. Therefore it is in the best interest of NASA and the President that you acknowledge the SLS/MPCV is a failure and resign as NASA Administrator.
Don
Don A. Nelson
Retired NASA Engineer
1407 Moller
Alvin TX 77511
Sent by email and NASA internal mail.
REPLY:
From: Bolden, Charles (HQ-AA000)
To: Don Nelson
Cc: gnelson@who.eop.gov ; Danielle_Borrin@ovp.eop.gov ; Bolden, Charles (HQ-AA000)
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2011 12:32 PM
Subject: Re: NASA Administrator Resignation
Don,
As I hope you know, I have the utmost respect for your professional capabilities and competence. While I have no intention of submitting my resignation as you recommend, I can understand your frustration with the situation in which we find ourselves and intend to continue to work all day, every day to bring the nation an affordable and sustainable exploration program that works in synergy with our science, aeronautics, and technology development efforts.
Respectfully,
Charlie B.
Charles F. Bolden Jr.
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
300 E St. SW
Washington, DC 20546-0001
(202) 358-1801
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Bolden $20 Bet
March 5, 2010
NASA Headquarters
Office of the Administrator
Attn: Gen. Charles F. Bolden Jr.
Subject: $20 “Plan B” Bet
Charlie,
The Commercial Space Shuttle is the only option for the “Plan B” manned spacecraft heavy-lift launch vehicle compromise. It solves the launch gap problem, has the least development cost, is commercially operated, provides the highest level of safety with crew escape pods, has proven heavy lift capability, provides the only heavy payload return capability, and has the lowest mission operation cost.
History will record that NASA management ignored requests to evaluate the commercial space shuttle as the lunar heavy lift vehicle before proceeding with their disastrous Ares Orion launch system. The hand writing is already on the wall that the Chinese space program will have a reusable space transportation system and therefore must have a space shuttle. Will history record that it was on your watch that this nation conceded human space exploration to China?
Gave the attached supporting data to Mike Coats at JSC, bet you $20 that it will never reach your desk unless Mike sends it to you.
Don
Don A. Nelson
Nelson Aerospace Consulting
Retried NASA Aerospace Engineer
NASA REPLY:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546-0001
April 1, 2010
Space Operations Mission Directorate
Mr. Don A. Nelson
Nelson Aerospace Consulting
1407 Moller Road Alvin,TX 77511
Dear Mr. Nelson:
Thank you for your recent letter to our National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Administrator, Charlie Bolden, proposing that NASA consider developing a Commercial Space Shuttle as the only Plan B option for a heavy-lift launch vehicle. After discussing your proposal and enclosures with Mr. Bolden, I have a few observations and comments to share.
Although NASA does not have a Plan B, we are actively developing the technology, tools, and safety enhancements to make a future mission to Mars both realistic and achievable. Key to that effort will be a reliable heavy-lift propulsion system. Your letter suggests that lower operations costs can be achieved by turning the Space Shuttle over to a commercial entity. A sound business case, however, would be highly dependent on market demand beyond potential NASA requirements. Various studies and surveys, such as the annual commercial space transportation market forecast published by the Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space, indicate that there is not projected growth in the launch market. For the United States (U.S.) launch vehicle services, the market is primarily for U.S. Government payloads. Consequently, there may not be the market demand to profitably sustain a commercially-operated Space Shuttle. NASA's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request includes funding for a broad scope of Research and Development (R&D) activities aimed at developing next-generation space launch propulsion technologies. These activities aim to both reduce costs and shorten development timeframes for future heavy-lift systems. More specifically the R&D will target new approaches to first-stage launch propulsion, in-space advanced engine technology development and demonstrations, and foundational or basic propulsion research.
Hopefully this brief explanation gives a little more insight into understanding NASA's forward plan. Thank you for your continued dedication to human spaceflight and crewed vehicle safety enhancements. These are noteworthy contributions and your comments are greatly appreciated.
Lynn Cline for
William H. Gerstenmaier
Associate Director for Space Operations
Nelson reply to Bolden:
Email dated April 8. 2010
Charlie:
Ms. Cline's reply to the Commercial Space Shuttle option typifies the disconnect between NASA's senior management decisions based on conjecture and decisions made on unbiased engineering analyses.
In her letter she states:
1) “There may not be the market demand to profitably sustain a commercially-operated Space Shuttle.”
The United States had lost its profitable commercial space launch market before the downturn in the satellite launch business. Our space launch industry is dependent on government support for its survival. However, while significant efforts were made to lower the operation cost of the privatized expendable launch vehicles (EELV’s), none were made for the reusable space shuttle even though a NASA JSC study report that: “Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide significant benefits to the Government. (Ref.: “Concept of Privatization of the Space Shuttle”, Space Shuttle Program Office, Sept. 28, 2001).
2) “The R&D will target new approaches to first-stage launch propulsion, in-space advanced engine technology development and demonstrations, and foundational or basic propulsion research.”
Exhaustive launch propulsion systems evaluations have proven again and again that no significant improvements in the performance of first stage chemical engines can be achieved. In other words, we’re stuck with what we got.
In-space advance engine development can best be conducted if the engine can be tested in space and returned for evaluation. Only the space shuttle has heavy cargo return capability.
3) “NASA does not have a Plan B.”
While there may be no Plan B, NASA is investigating a heavy launch vehicle (HLV) space transportation solution for the failed Ares Orion launch system. The HLV’s will cost a minimum $11 billion to develop, has no commercial applications, has no cargo return capability, and fails to solve the launch gap. The HLV like the Constellation program requires two launches to lift 66 MT to LEO for a seven day manned lunar mission.
The existing space shuttle and EELV space transportation systems can deliver the same cargo mass to LEO and avoid the launch gap and loss of thousands of shuttle jobs. Using the space shuttle and EELV eliminates the HLV development risk and cost. A commercial space shuttle further reduces operations cost. The commercial space shuttle and EELV are the better candidates for establishing a human space based transportation system for lunar, deep space, and Mars missions. A space based transportation system is mandatory for human space exploration. To continue on the Apollo expendable vehicle concept path invites failure and disaster.
In addition there is a safety issue associated in transporting astronauts to and from LEO in space capsules that has not been addressed. The Soyuz capsule has experience two fatal incidences. Warning signs of another catastrophic Soyuz capsule failure are becoming increasingly alarming. The commercial space shuttle not only significantly lowers the cost of mission operation, it can provide crew escape pods. Has NASA forgotten that crew safety is their number one priority?
I strongly recommend that NASA have an unbiased external evaluation of the commercial space shuttle and EELV space transportation system…due diligence is mandatory in this nation’s critical stage of human space exploration.
Once again Charlie…this is happening on your watch.
Don
Don A. Nelson
Nelson Aerospace Consulting
Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer
1407 Moller Road Alvin, TX 77511
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March 30, 2011
The Honorable Barack H. Obama
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Subject: Presidential Directive Request for a Commercial Space Shuttle
Dear Mr. President:
There now are three failed attempts by NASA management to design a replacement vehicle for the space shuttle: Admiral Craig Steidle’s “fly off” concepts, the Ares I Orion, and the Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle. All three failures were based on archaic expendable vehicles concepts. Furthermore NASA management has misrepresented the safety of an expendable crew module in which every launch is a “test” flight and the reentry phase with no crew escape system has been a death trap on too many flights.
These obsolete and costly expendable vehicle concepts are the product of the NASA management cultural impasse that has been perpetuated by the incompetent oversight of the Executive Branch offices of the NASA Inspector General and Office of Science and Technology Policy. NASA management’s belligerent refusal to accept that their expendable rocket and crew concepts are unaffordable and unsafe will continue until cancelled by an executive directive.
NASA management has steadfastly refused to evaluate the commercial space shuttle. It does not take a rocket scientist to know that a reusable commercial vehicle is more cost effective and safer. Mr. President, the commercial space shuttle is the only option for an affordable 21st century reusable and “space based” transportation system. Only a presidential directive can make this a reality.
Don A. Nelson
Nelson Aerospace Consulting (retired NASA engineer)
NO REPLY TO THIS LETTER!
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of Inspector General
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Mr. Don A. Nelson 1407Moller Alvin, TX 77511
SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request
I am responding to your September 9, 2010, FOIA request for Inspector General documentation of any investigation that "confirm[s] the current plan to develop a heavy lift launch system and/or purchase commercial launch services will be safer and more cost effective than the spaceflight transportation system using the existing space shuttle vehicles."
The OIG has no records responsive to your request. However, for information about Shuttle costs and retirement, you can access our audit report, Review of NASA's Progress on Retiring the Space Shuttle Program (IG-10-012), at the NASA OIG web site, http://oig.nasa.gov/.
You have the right to appeal this initial determination to the Inspector General. Under 14 CFR § 1206.605(b), the appeal must: (1) be in writing; (2) be addressed to the Inspector General, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546; (3) be identified clearly on the envelope and in the letter as an "Appeal under the Freedom of Information Act"; (4) include a copy of the request for the Agency record and a copy of the contested initial determination; (5) to the extent possible, state the reasons why you believes the contested initial determination should be reversed; and (6) be sent to the Inspector General within 30 calendar days of the date of receipt of the initial determination.
Jim Morrison
Assistant Inspector General for Audits
OIG FOIA Officer -- Audits
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NASA’s Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program (SLS/MPCV) will fail because…mission costs are too high, the MPCV crew module has an unsolvable water recovery issue, and there is no commercial application.
The following SLS/MPCV “operation” cost estimates were presented to the Congressional Budget Office after it failed to make the Congress aware of the prohibitive cost to operate expendable heavy lift vehicles.
· The NASA human exploration budget will be flat lined at $2.8b for the foreseeable future. One report indicates a development cost of $38b and another reports that the first development version launch of the SLS could not take place until December 2017 and the 130mt production versions (crew and cargo) are not expected to unveiled until August 2032. This SLS development program scenario based on 13 flights over a 21 year period would have extreme difficulty maintaining the manufacturing labor force for such a low flight rate. However, it is the introduction of the cargo vehicle which forecast that it will require two launches of these mammoth vehicles to accomplish one mission. The SLS is the same heavy lift launcher concept used in the Constellation program which was cancelled because: "The U.S. human spaceflight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory. It is perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match allocated resources.” Such is the case today.
· NASA has failed to reduce the mission operation cost of the SLS/MPCV. The following $4.2b estimate of annual operations cost for the SLS indicated it will cost more to manufacture the expendable vehicles, plan the mission, and conduct flight operation than NASA has budgeted for human exploration. NASA is assuming that future budgets will be increased to cover mission operations. THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN!
SLS/MPCV Operational Launch Cost Estimate
FY 2010
Manned Launch $ mil
Flight/Launch Contract Labor Cost (11,000 total workforce JSC,MSFC,KSC)
1375
SRB (2) 5 segment
160
Civil Service
250
1st stage tanks
75
1st stage engines (5 RS-25E)
200
2nd stage (tank)
10
2nd stage engine ( 3 J2-X engines)
70
GFE
30
Logistic
87
Misc. ( fuel,range,etc.)
77
Orion MPCV
450
Total Manned Launch
2,784
Cargo Launch
SLS manned cost less flight/launch labor fixed cost and MPCV
709
Lander (cargo)
730
Total Cargo Launch
1,439
Annual Operation Cost ~ Two Flights/YR
Total
4,223
Flight/Launch Labor Cost – space shuttle labor cost for mission planning and flight preparation was reduced to an operational level of 16,500 employees in 2004. Constellation work force was assumed to be 6,000 which were unrealistic for support from three NASA centers. For the SLS/MPCV an optimistic mission operation contractor workforce of 11,000 was used. Salary only (no benefits) cost to NASA would be $125k per employee for an annual fixed cost of $1.375b plus benefits..
SRB (2) 5 segment – Thiokol had a manufacturing workforce of 1400 for shuttle and an engineering/staff support of 490. Using the lower $125k for the Thiokol workforce makes the annual labor cost for four 5 segment SBR’s to be $60m each. It will be extremely difficult to manufacture only four 5 segment SRB’s per year for less than $80m each.
Civil Service – Civil service oversight and support for shuttle was at 2000 employees in 2004. This number was use for this evaluation even though CS would have considerable more oversight responsibility for three different vehicles (SLS, MPCV, and lander) with five different primary propulsion systems. Fixed annual cost is estimated to be $250m.
1st stage tanks - The shuttle external tank production operations used 703 employees. However another 1300 employees charged to the tank production for engineering support, facilities, and quality control. If this number of production support employees could be reduce to 300 and material cost limited to $10m the tank cost could be reduced to $75m. Not an impossible goal.
1st stage engines (5 RS-25E) – The cost for the shuttle SSME engine (RS-25D) in 1989 was reported to be $38m. Considering inflation the cost and the reduction in non-reusable engine cost, the RS-25E was assumed to cost $40 per engine.
2nd stage (tank) – A tank cost of $10m assumes the 2nd stage tank can be built by the same labor force as the 1st stage tank. Cost includes materials and transportation to KSC.
2nd stage engines - (3, J2-X engines) – Reported to cost $24m each.
GFE – $87m was based on shuttle cost for government furnished equipment such as crawler transport.
Logistic - $77m was based on like shuttle charges for base maintenance as related to operations.
Misc. - $42m for range support, crew/capsule recovery, fuel, etc.
Orion MPCV - The Apollo CSM had a unit price of $77m in 1972, in 2010 $ that is $429m. Each ATV cost about $304 m according to ESA and the Japanese HTV spacecraft production cost is reported to $220m. A conservative unit cost for the MPCV is $450m.
Lander – Constellation program had a per unit lander cost of $730m.
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· The SLS/MPCV does not have a worthwhile mission objective. The MPCV’s 21 day mission duration limitation is 609 days short of being a Mars transportation vehicle. Missions to near earth asteroids are currently being conducts by robotic spacecraft at a fraction of the SLS/MPCV mission cost. The MPCV does not have a space shuttle type airlock making EVA extremely dangerous.
· There are no commercial or military applications for the SLS/MPCV which could reduce annual operations cost.
· NASA’s annual space technology budget of $1b is too small and too dispersed among too many organizations to provide any significant improvement in space transportation for the SLS/MPCV.
“It’s the Launch Cost…Stupid”… paraphrasing Bill Clinton’s presidential economy election theme. NASA must reduce its launch cost and the commercial space shuttle is the only option! The SLS/MPCV shuttle replacement plan is unaffordable, unsafe, and like the Constellation program suffers from incompetent NASA management.
Crew Modules are Death Traps
NASA Management has chosen not to disclose that these crew modules have unsolvable safety issues that are inherent to all crew modules with parachute water landings and crew recovery. There is historical evidence that substantiates crew modules have been no safer than the space shuttle. In fact it is by chance that the crew module safety record is not much worst. NASA management has chosen to disregard the perilous “entry” phase of flight where two Soyuz flight crews were killed when their crew module failed during retry and the recent near fatal mishaps…all related to manufacturing errors. Every flight of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) or any of the commercial crew modules will be a “test flight.”
Orion Crew Module Crash Site
Remember one of reasons the space shuttle was decommissioned was to improve crew safety and that is not the case with crew modules! Ironically only the CSS would have crew escape pods that would protect the crew during every phase of flight. This is another NASA management blunder which again will have fatal consequences if implemented!
Recently published statements attributed to NASA state that the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Is: “designed to be 10 times safer during ascent and entry than its predecessor, the Space Shuttle.” As a retired NASA engineer with extensive experience in the operation of crew modules, I challenged the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance about the authenticity of this statement. Their reply (see below) was the Orion failed to meet the safety requirements for entry during their Constellation Program evaluations and that they have failed to establish a Level 1 set of requirement for the commercial crew modules and Orion MPCV. It is my opinion that the Commercial crew modules and Orion MPCV are potential deathtraps and NASA has misled Congress about the safety of these vehicles.
While the crew escape tower on the MPCV may provide significant improvement over a Space Shuttle without crew escape pods, it does not negate the many factors that have made crew modules a death trap during the re-entry phase of flight. As example, historically the Russian Soyuz crew module’s safety record is not significantly better than that the Space Shuttle. While the Soyuz crew module has experienced a failure of the escape tower, it has been the re-entry phase of flight that has proven to be the fatal environment for flight crews. Potential fatal crew module failures are:
· Every crew module flight is a test flight! Manufacturing errors have occurred.
· Crew modules have very limited cross range capability which could require a reentry into unacceptable weather conditions.
· Crew module’s notorious reentry errors result in an expanses landing zone that could prevent rapid access to the crew in dire circumstances.
· Parachutes are known to fail. This is another unacceptable single point failure.
There are too many potential failures with fatal consequences for a crew module to be considered for 21st century human space transportation. The Russian Soyuz crew module is still in service only because their government cannot afford to develop a safer reusable lifting body winged runway landing crewed spacecraft.
Email reply: Excerpts from NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance:
“At PDR, the Cx (Orion) design PRA estimate was better than the requirement for ascent and not there yet for entry. We don’t have a set of level 1 requirements yet for the next NASA developed human system, but we do plan to use the Cx numbers above as part of our human rating requirements set for commercial crew to ISS. I agree this will be a challenge for any capsule for all the reasons you give if not more.”
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Commercial Space Shuttle
There has been an extensive undertaking to reduce the cost of expendable launch vehicles which has resulted in significant reductions in their operations costs. There has NEVER been any determined effort to reduce the cost of space shuttle operations. Competitive CSS launch cost can be achieved by:
· Use the existing Orbiter airframes and install modular quick replaceable subsystems.
· Removing onboard piloting functions.
· Removing all civil service support.
· Consolidation of launch and mission operations at the launch site.
· Automation of ground and flight operations.
· Shuttle assembly at launch pad.
Reducing space shuttle launch cost is not a technical challenge…it is a political challenge. The following chart shows the breakdown where significant cost reductions can be achieved by privatization of the space shuttle operations:
Space Launch System/Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle
Versus
Commercial Space Shuttle
SLS/MPCV
CSS
Launch Cost 130 mt /crew to LEO
$2.78b
$2.1b
Development Cost Estimate
$11.5b
$2.4b
Operational Availability
6 Years
4 years
Crew Safety
Poor
Good
Commercial Applications
No
Yes
Payload Return Capability
No
Yes
Maximum Launches/Year
2
12
Military Applications
No
Yes
Space Based Support
No
Yes
Vehicle Upgrade Potential
Limited
Excellent
Launch Fails Mission Fails
Yes
No
What is the Commercial Space Shuttle (CSS)?
The CSS uses the orbiter airframe, external tank, and SRM boosters. The orbiter is updated with subsystem components that are quickly replaceable modules to reduce vehicle turnaround time. Computer software and hardware is upgraded and the vehicle is operation without inflight piloting requirements. Crews will be flown only on missions requiring their support for onboard payloads or to be transferred to space based vehicles. On crewed missions the crew escape pods will be installed. The entry thermal protection system will have on orbit repair capability and advanced X-37 program improved tiles. Pad assembly of the space shuttle will also reduce operations cost and turnaround time. Rapid turn-around is an unique CSS feature that support a military requirement and provide the capability launch timely intercepts of asteroids/comets that may impact earth.
The CSS is a three phase program that transfers shuttle operation to private sector, automates the fleet, and incorporates existing technology to develop a space based transportation system. The CSS program:
Phase I: Eliminate dependency on the Russian government for manned access to space by providing continued space shuttle operations if funding are available. If not proceed to Phase II.
Phase II: Initiate a space shuttle upgrade program that reduces operations cost and provides a crew pod escape system.
Phase III: Is a NASA conducted technology program that addresses critical systems such as the entry thermal protection system and on orbit propellant storage. This approach deletes the requirement for the heavy lift launch vehicle (HLV) by developing a space based transportation system.
CSS Development Phases
PHASE I
Shuttle fleet retro-fitting of orbiters will be conducted jointly by NASA and the Corporation from NASA facilities during the transition period. After transition the Corporation will be permitted to continue to use NASA facilities until their Phase II commercial facilities are ready for operations.
Phase II
The corporation will be permitted to sell bonds and stock to finance modifications and startup cost.
The corporation will establish control and launch facilities for the CSS operations. Launch market demand will determine when the remaining orbiters will be scheduled for upgrades.
Phase III
The Commercial Space Shuttle will require advanced systems development coordination by NASA for improvements in operations and crew safety.
Space Based… Space Tug to Space Cruiser
The first step to a “Star Trek Enterprise” space cruiser is the unmanned space based tug. NASA’s future is in the development of these space based vehicles to be operated by the commercial sector…not in obsolete heavy lift launch vehicles.
The space transportation system for the 21st century must be developed as an evolutionary process using "space based" vehicles. The initial space based vehicles would be small unmanned vehicle supporting robotic missions. The development schedule for large crewed spaced based vehicles will accelerate or decrease as the funding and needs for space exploration requirements dictate.
Space tugs must be a top priority for NASA’s space transportation. They are a key factor for reducing mission cost and increasing mission success. Tugs can be supplied by the shuttle and expendable launch vehicles. ONLY THE SPACE SHUTTLE CAN RETRIEVE TUG PAYLOADS! Tugs can support near earth, lunar, and deep space missions.
Russian Space Based Tug
This proposed Russian vehicle called the Parom is a space based inter-orbit “tug”. The Parom will rendezvous with launch vehicles, retrieve their payload and transfer them to other in orbit vehicle or to higher orbits. Future space based tugs can conduct the following missions at significantly reduce operation cost and reduced chance of mission failure.
There is a long range space policy plan!
Unlike the SLS/MPCV, the CSS provides a stair step approach outlining the strategic plan for four decades. To get somewhere…we’ve got to know where we’re going.” The funding available may cause the schedule to vary, but the direction is clear.
Commercial Launch Market for CSS
The predicted average commercial medium to heavy launches for the next ten years is 11 per year. The CSS has the potential to capture a majority of these launches by offering the unique capability of satellite on-orbit checkout before release and returning faulty satellites for repair. Once the space tug is operational satellites can be serviced on-orbit or retrieve. The CSS can offer tourist flights to reduce cost of cargo delivery.
Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods
This is the only viable crew escape/safe haven system and is available only on the CSS.
· Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods
·
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China’s Space Shuttle
The China National Space Administration (CNSA) can be expected to introduce a reusable space shuttle transportation system by 2020. The program is designed Project 921-3 and is convincing evidence that CNSA understands that at 21st century space program must be based on reusable space vehicles with capability to launch and return crew and cargo from spaced based facilities. With a space shuttle and spaced based infrastructure China will become the dominate space faring nation.
In October 2006 the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) revealed that China is developing a winged space shuttle for use in the 2020 time frame.[9] Concept images indicate the planned space plane may be about 2/3 the size of the U.S. and Russian space shuttles. But instead of a using a large fuel tank that powered launch engines in the space plane, it uses a separate three-part liquid fuel booster.
Four Are Charged in Espionage Cases Tied to China
By Evan Perez
Companies Featured in This Article: Boeing
WASHINGTON -- The Justice Department unveiled charges against a U.S. military analyst and a former Boeing Co. engineer in separate cases that officials said underscore intense economic and military espionage efforts by China in the U.S.
The unrelated cases, filed in Los Angeles and Alexandria, Va., center on allegations that sensitive information about the Space Shuttle and Delta IV rocket programs, as well as U.S. military sales to Taiwan, were exposed to Chinese spies.
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Solutions to NASA Management Problems
“I think it's fair to say that there's been a sense of drift to our space program over the last several years” President Barack Obama
NASA’s ongoing inability to meet schedules, control costs, and prevent cancellation of projects is caused by their unwillingness to resolve the agencies internal problems. Internal problems that have been festering for years and must be addressed before NASA can again significant contribute to expanding mankind’s knowledge of the space frontier. This report identifies the problems and recommends solutions to stop the “drift to our space program” into oblivion.
Identifying the problems:
· NASA has dysfunctional management. The “One NASA” problem has never been solved and each NASA center continues to operate like an independent “fiefdom”. Program costs soar because there is no accountability for failure. The objective is get the program funded with the belief that Congress will provide for cost overrun rather than cancel the program.
· Manned spaceflight operations cost are excessive and consume too much of NASA’s resources. NASA has no incentive to reduce manned launch operation costs.
· Technology development programs have been neglected for decades and NASA today is technologically bankrupt. The troubled “Apollo on Steroids” Constellation Program’s development problems are the results of trying to build a 21st century space transportation system with 20th century technology.
Who is really in charge at NASA?
The President makes three political appointments to NASA: the Administrator, Assistance Administrator, and the Inspector General. Too often these appointees are unwilling or unprepared to challenge the NASA civil servant senior managers who have their own agendas. The conflict in the NASA Inspector General Office leading to the resignation of the Inspector General typifies the problem and the damage it has done to the agency.
Senior members of Congress with NASA oversight also contribute to the problem when they use their position to promote agendas that dilute the primary strategic plan for the Agency or continue to support programs that have failed to meet their development goals and have exceeded budget limits. The internal agency resistances to change the cultural impairment are major factors why many qualified political candidates refuse to accept appointment to NASA.
NASA Administrator
Must have the unique qualification of a Washington politician, engineer, scientist, and program manager with the ability to determine what passes the test of being both feasible and realistic.
The Administrator must have “independent” advisors who can challenge the “entrenched” NASA civil service managers. The general rule in today’s NASA is to tell the Administrator what you want him to hear and not what he needs to know.
NASA Inspector General
The NASA Inspector General Office has the NASA oversight responsibility; however this office is plagued by internal dissension and its technical evaluation capability is virtually nonexistent. The Inspector General must have outside independent evaluator(s) on technical issues. The Inspector General must also identify to the Administrator those project managers whose management decisions created program problems. In general, accountability of senior management doesn’t exist at today’s NASA.
The President must appoint a NASA inspector generals whose background knowledge relates to the agency…not just government career bureaucrats. To have accountability, there must be responsible oversight.
NASA Office of the Chief Engineer
This office must become the “eyes and ears” for the Administrator. The NASA chief engineer must be the administrator’s must trusted advisor and not necessarily a career civil service employee. The Administrator must provide this office with the resources to serve as the agency’s independent internal evaluator of proposed projects and monitor of existing projects. Each NASA’s center chief engineer office must serve as the coordinator agent for using the resources of their office in evaluating that center’s projects and report directly to the Headquarter Chief Engineer. They will have no allegiance to the center director. All evaluations will be public record. The peer pressure of internal monitoring by the NASA Chief Engineer will be the most effective mechanism the Administrator can have.
The Office of the Chief Engineer must be used as the training ground for future executive program managers for Senior Executive Service positions. Invaluable management experience can be obtained by appointing promising candidates to the Chief Engineer Office and rotate them around the various centers to gain insight into program management and each center’s capability. NASA’s management creditability problems can be attributed to the lack of extensive experience in project management. This process solves that inexperience problem and addresses the “One NASA” issue by creating a NASA senior management team with knowledge and a relationship with other NASA centers.
NASA Advisory Council
The NASA Administrator current appoints the members of this “advisory” council. This appointment policy defeats the objective of providing independent unbiased advice for the Administrator. Public input to the Council is not permitted and that must be corrected. Council members have been removed for issuing proclamations unfavorable to the Administrator position. This policy has been detrimental to the oversight of the Agency.
The NASA Advisory Council must be appointed by the executive branch and report to the President and Congress and not be subservient to the NASA administrator. The Council must also serve as forum where NASA employees and contractor can voice concern on NASA programs and policies without fear of management reprisal.
NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
This panel effectiveness has been negated by the appointment of members with limited technology knowledge.
For Example:
Safety Experts Call for Shuttle Shutdown (Source: Orlando Sentinel , 4/17/2009)
Saying NASA is at a critical crossroads, independent safety experts have called for the agency to stay the course and shut down the shuttle program after nine remaining missions. Keeping NASA’s shuttle fleet flying beyond 2010 would endanger astronauts and sap money from efforts to return American astronauts to the moon by 2020, the group said. “Continuing to fly the shuttle not only would increase the risk to crews, but also could jeopardize the future U.S. exploration program by squeezing available resources,” the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel said in its latest annual report, released Thursday. The panel was created by Congress after the 1967 Apollo 1 launch pad fire killed three astronauts.
These are the same “experts” that said they “didn’t do tech analyses” when requested to investigate the safety of Ares I. Their call for shuttle shutdown was based on a non-existence safety evaluation of the two transportation system.
It is recommended that membership on the ASAP consist of aerospace engineers and they not be appointed by the NASA administrator.
NASA Credibility Issue
GAO: The GAO said NASA missions faced "persistent cost growth and schedule slippage." Little seems to have changed. Since 2006, NASA has broken the bank on 10 of 12 major projects.
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Key Technology Development
NASA is technology bankrupt. For nearly three decades NASA has failed to institute a technology development program. Without advancement in technology there will be no advancements in aeronautics and space exploration. NASA’s policy of development technology during the program development contributes to excessive cost and program failures. Technology development must become NASA first priority. Technology programs must be established in the following disciplines:
· Propulsion Systems
· Structural Material
· Electrical Power Systems
· Avionics
· Manufacturing Tooling Systems
· Also see the author’s book.
In the late 1980’s NASA established technology teams in the above disciplines comprised of NASA employees and members of the aerospace community to identify and prioritize technologies need for future programs. No funding was ever provided for the technology programs. These technology working groups must be reestablished and funded or NASA programs will continue to fail.
Propulsion Systems:
The existing space transportation system launch and orbital vehicle performance capability is provided by chemical liquid oxygen/hydrogen (or RP-1 kerosene fuel) engines and solid rocket or hybrid boosters. These propulsion systems have reached their maximum performance potential. However significant cost reductions for this class of engines can be achieved with the development of reusable engines for launch vehicles and the development of propulsion systems for space based vehicles. Improved sensors that provide information to decrease maintenance and flight operations cost are key technology requirements for these class engines and, therefore must be assigned the highest priority. In addition space based propulsion systems would require the development of a long duration propellant storage system.
NOTE: The space shuttle main engine (SSME) is the only existing reusable engine. That technology must not be lost.
The long range advance propulsion technology concepts have a wide range of possibilities. Several propulsion systems for long range consideration are:
Solar Propulsion— Incorporating a reflective solar concentrator to heat liquid hydrogen to a vapor which is expanded through a nozzle to generate thrust.
Sunlight Sail—An extremely thin and large sheet of material is expanded in space to capture the force of the sunlight like sailboats capture the wind for their propulsion force.
Nuclear Propulsion—Same principal as solar propulsion except nuclear energy is used to heat the liquid hydrogen.
Anti-matter—Collides a proton with a positive charge into an antiproton with a negative charge that produces a tremendous force for propulsion.
Plasma Rocket—hydrogen gas is heated to extreme temperatures and accelerated by magnetic fields to provide thrust.
The long range propulsion technologies will be extremely challenging to develop and will require extensive laboratory research testing.
Structural materials—technologies are needed to decrease the structural weight of space vehicles. Carbon nanotubes materials appear to have tremendous potential for space structures. They are light weight and stronger than existing spacecraft materials. The tubes also have the potential to
solve the storage and leakage problems for cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen. The tubes can only be produced under laboratory conditions. A top priority must be assigned to the development and large scale production of this material.
Research is required for materials to replace the shuttle thermal protective system. Ceramic materials for engine components also have shown promise.
Electrical Power Systems—are limited to the capability of batteries, solar arrays, and nuclear power generators. Extensive research is required in all these areas. Electro-mechanical actuators research is required to remove hypergolic generator from flight systems.
Avionics—will present an extremely difficult management problem for the development of a space based autonomous vehicle. Foremost in these problems will be costs that may exceed 50 percent of the vehicle total cost. The integrated health monitoring and autonomous control system of
reusable space vehicles also presents formidable technology challenges in the areas of software and sensors.
Autonomous navigation systems must be developed and verified. One of the more exciting avionics technologies being investigated is in the field of nano-electronic devices. Laboratory demonstrations of accelerometers, gyros, pressure sensors, thermal actuators, and optical devices
are resulting in encouraging indications that this technology can significantly reduce space vehicle weight, improve safety by providing additional layers of redundancy, and reduce operations costs.
Manufacturing Tooling Systems- Advanced materials for future space programs must have machines that can process them. The transfer of manufacturing to foreign countries with low labor cost has diminished this nation capability to made manufacturing tools. There is an acute need for machines that process existing and advance materials which allow U.S. companies to produce products that can compete in the market.
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Author Biography
Don A. Nelson is an aerospace consultant and writer. Mr. Nelson has consulted with congressional and government offices on NASA issues since his retirement from NASA in January 1999 after 36 years with the agency. He has made numerous media appearances on national and foreign television. He participated in the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Projects as a mission planner and operations technologist. Mr. Nelson was a supporting team member for the first rendezvous in space, first manned mission to the moon, first manned lunar landing, and the first flight of the Space Shuttle. During his last 11 years at NASA, he served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was a member of the design team for the space shuttle. His NASA experiences give him a unique knowledge of NASA’s problems and for seeking feasible and realistic solutions. Mr. Nelson is a graduate of Southern Methodist School of Engineering. He is a certified private pilot and holds a Phase VI Pilot Proficiency Wings award from the Federal Aviation Administration.
Mr. Nelson is the author of:
“NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions”
by Don A. Nelson
Written by a retired NASA engineer, this easy-to-read book is insider's look at many of the space program's current problems. Not only does it predict the most recent shuttle disaster, it provides a detailed understanding of why our nation's exploration of its 'last frontier' is headed for disaster. With aging shuttles, no definitive plans for future of the vehicle, and poor management, Nelson's book is a wake-up call to all Americans to take note and action...or lose the hope of conquering the stars (Barnes & Noble review).
Now is the time to: ”Speak out…or forever suffer the consequences of remaining silent!”
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