Excerpts from NASA new millennium by Don Nelson

 Excerpts from NASA Book

"NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions"

By Don A. Nelson

3 – Is the Space Shuttle Safe?

When NASA loses an unmanned Mars spacecraft due to human error.. it’s an embarrassment.
When NASA loses a Space Shuttle . . . it’s a national tragedy!

The Shuttle is the only human space transportation launch system that does not have a crew escape module. Instead the crew must rely on a manually activated escape pole system that is difficult to operate and has very limited capability. It requires a manual activation by a flight crew member in the middeck compartment to pyrotechnically jettison the crew ingress/egress side hatch and then manually deploy the escape pole. One by one, each crew member attaches a lanyard hook assembly to the escape pole, and then the crew member slides down the pole and off the end. The escape pole is suppose to provide a trajectory for the crew member’s body so that it will not impact the Orbiter’s left wing. This escape system can only be used during atmospheric flight and vehicle accelerations that allow the crew to operate the system. It takes 90 seconds for a crew of eight to bail out of the Shuttle using this system. In a catastrophic Shuttle explosion, milliseconds can mean the difference between life and death . . . 90 seconds can be a death sentence!
The following is an excerpt from the October 27, 1999 statement of Michael L. Coats, Vice President, Reusable Transportation Systems Lockheed Martin Astronautics before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives. From 1978-1991, Mr. Coats was a NASA Astronaut, flying three Space Shuttle missions, the last two as Crew Commander.

"I cannot emphasize safety enough. I personally experienced sitting on the pad during STS-41-D in 1984 while a hydrogen fire was burning below us, knowing that we had no way to escape if the ground crew could not contain the fire. We should never put astronauts in that situation again. That is why we have recommended to NASA that a crew escape system definition and demonstration be a high priority over the next five years in any launch vehicle architecture."

Space Shuttle Description

Crew Piloting and Human Cargo Issues

Incorporating the human element into the onboard flight operations of any space flight vehicle creates major design and operations issues. Paramount among these issues are the questions . . . Should the vehicle be piloted by a flight crew and should a crew/passenger module escape system be a requirement? Before these two questions can be addressed, the elusive definition of human rating a space vehicle must be understood. Human rating (or manned rating) has and always will be a management decision based on the "acceptable capability" of the vehicle to transport humans...

History of Human Rating Launch Vehicles

The launch vehicles (Redstone, Atlas, and Titan) proposed for the Mercury and Gemini Projects were all existing ballistic missile launch vehicles in various stages of development.19  The dismal launch failure rates of these launch vehicles made them questionable choices for safely transporting humans to space. However, the urgency of the space program’s need to meet the Soviet challenge and the proven flight performance capabilities of these launch vehicles made them the only logical choices.
The procedure to human rate these vehicles was to add redundancy to the launch vehicle where practical, and provide some type of launch escape system for the crew. Launch aborts were the primary concern and development of in-flight abort sensing systems was given top priority. Because most catastrophic launch failures occur within seconds, an "automatic" abort sensing system was mandatory. Vehicle sub-systems were designed to identify the abort circumstance; cutoff the main engines, and start the separation/ejection sequence. A manual backup abort capability was provided for the ground controller, range safety officer, and crew. Providing manual backup abort capability for the crew was, and still is a point of contention for human rating of launch vehicles. Flight crews experiencing high acceleration forces and other flight distractions may misinterpret a failure indication, or react too slowly; whereas the ground flight controller serves as a backup to the automatic system in a noninvasive environment.

The 9’s Dilemma

Space vehicle managers have used a statistical method commonly referred to as "number of 9’s" to define the level of reliability and redundancy of the spacecraft. Six 9’s is supposed to indicate a reliability and redundancy level equivalent to commercial aircraft. If six 9’s (.999999) reliability cannot be demonstrated for human transportation space vehicles then it has been proposed that a crew escape system of at least two 9’s reliability be provided. The Space Shuttle management believes that the vehicle has a reliability of six 9’s and a crew escape module is not required. However, the problem with this theory is that determining the number of 9’s is based on mathematical conjecture...

Space Shuttle Operations Costs and Flight Safety

The Space Shuttle is a money hog. Its operations will require 25% of the NASA Fiscal Year 2000 budget allotment. Even with 25% of the budget, NASA is hard pressed to fly just seven flights per year. This budget reports that the Shuttle cost per flight has been reduced from over $600 million to around $360 million in Fiscal Year 1997. A closer look at the NASA budgets indicates this reduction is more a book-keeping ploy than actual cost reductions.

From Fiscal Year 1994 to 2000 the Shuttle budgets were approximately, $2.4 billion per year plus the undefined mission support costs. The flight rate varied from four to eight flights per year. In 1999 when the fleet was grounded and only four flights were flown, the launch cost for that year soared to over $700 million per flight. Adding in the institutional, upgrades, and ISS support, the average costs are still approximately $500 million per flight. The highly automated Ariane 5 commercial expendable launch system can fly the same Shuttle payload weight to orbit for $100 million. Automation of Shuttle operations is a mandatory requirement to reduce the heavy financial burden the operation cost put on the Agency’s resources.

Space Shuttle Upgrades Money Pit

From Fiscal Years 1994 to 2000 NASA Shuttle managers have spent $4.9 billion on Shuttle safety and performance upgrades. With all this money being spent on Shuttle, it would seem that all significant safety and performance problems would have been solved by now. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.

Making the Shuttle Safe for Human Space Transportation

Three interrelated conditions must be met before the Shuttle can be considered safe and cost effective for human transportation. First, the Shuttle operations must be automated to the level that crew piloting is not required. Second, the Shuttle must be equipped with a crew escape module. Third, Shuttle operations must be placed under the control of a private for profit organization. Consider the following:

 Automated Shuttle Operations

To understand the importance for automating the Shuttle flight operations, the reader must have some basic understanding of automated flight control systems. The Shuttle crew is being asked to put their fate in the hands of computers. This may seem like a big leap of faith in computer control systems. However, if you will recall the fear that the Y2K bug could shut down this country, you already know how dependent we are on computer controlled systems. The following is a basic description of the requirements for an automated flight control system for the Space Shuttle. These requirements do not significantly differ from those already being used on today’s military and commercial aircraft. In fact, many of the system concepts are already used in our cars and home appliances.24 

Automated Shuttle flight operation is not a technical problem, it is a political problem. All phases of automated space flight control have been previously demonstrated. Automated ascent flight is standard procedure for expendable launch systems. On-orbit precision automated spacecraft maneuvers are routine. Russian spacecraft (Soyuz, Progress) have completed over 80 automated rendezvous and docking maneuvers with the Mir space station. Third generation automated docking systems have accuracy of up to one millimeter capability and are highly reliable. The Russian Soyuz routinely performs automated entry and landings. The Soviet/Russian Space Shuttle Buran flight test was an unmanned test for ascent, orbit, entry, and landing. With the exception of docking, lowering the landing gear, and drag chute deploy, even today the Space Shuttle has the capability to conduct automated flight. However, some of the automated landing systems have never been allowed to be flight tested.

 Design Requirements for a Space Shuttle Automated Flight Control System

(see book or e-mail author for this information)

Crew Escape Module

A crew escape module was considered in the original design trades for the Shuttle. The original escape module would have weighed up to 10,000 pounds, depending on the number of crew required. Placing this much weight in the crew compartment of the Shuttle moves the center of gravity to a point so far forward that the aerodynamic control surfaces could not control it. In other words the vehicle was nose heavy and could not maintain stable flight. At this time the crew escape module was abandoned and the vehicle was flown with aircraft ejection seats for the two astronauts conducting the test flights. As the Shuttle flights proceeded, NASA made the erroneous assumption the vehicle redundant flight systems made it safe enough to remove the ejection seats.

After the Challenger accident crew modules were again studied. The results were the same; the escape module was just too heavy to be placed in the crew compartment area. The issue was again reviewed in 1994 for the Access to Spacestudies and with the same conclusion. In July of 2000, another crew escape module study group was formed to study the problem. They were told that the crew module could weigh no more than 5000 pounds, but the crew size could be reduced to six. Their study resulted in a module weighting 10,000 pounds. History does repeat especially when all the conditions are the same. The problem can be solved, but NASA management must be willing to change the conditions.

There are two options for solution to the problem. Both options require that Shuttle management give up its unjustified position requiring piloting for Shuttle flights. Removing the flight deck piloting function systems will allow that weight to be used for the escape module. This will include the weight of the commander and pilot, their seats, forward flight deck displays and controls systems, escape pole system, forward windows, and other non-required items. The first option places the crew escape module(s) in the payload bay nearer the vehicle center of gravity. This solution solves the aerodynamic stability problem. However, the volume of the escape module must be charged against the payload carrying capability.

The second option is to install the escape module (seats) on the flight deck. A seat ejection system would eject four crew members from seats on the flight deck. Two additional crew members could be ejected from the lower middeck on rails connected to the seat ejection rails on the flight decks. The weight of this ejection system is approximately 3700 pounds. Removing the piloting sub-systems (commander and pilot weight, their seats, forward flight deck display and control systems, escape pole, forward windows, etc.) would provide the weight saving to install the 3700 pound ejection crew escape system without violating the aerodynamic stability limit. This is the preferred option. The ejection seat concept was developed and flown on the Columbia OV-102 Shuttle. The ejection trajectory is shown in the following NASA image:



 

NASA management will not consider either option because both require that their irrational requirement for piloting be deleted. Piloting is a non-mandatory requirement. It is an emotional and political issue. Deleting piloting and automating flight control would show that it does not take a "marching army" government jobs’ program to fly Shuttle missions.It is not a technical issue because all phases of space flight have been successfully demonstrated with automated control systems. With all the technology advancements made in autonomous flight control, this has become a ridiculous requirement, a requirement that places the lives of Shuttle crews in great danger.

It is ironic, that NASA, a leader in advance technology is so opposed to accepting advance flight control technology for the Space Shuttle.

Shuttle Privatization

The third requirement to make the Shuttle safe for human transportation is to remove NASA from the space flight operation business. Shuttle operations must be placed under the control of a private for profit organization. NASA Shuttle managers have no incentive to reduce operation costs. This lack of incentive has caused the operations environment to become stagnated with antiquated flight systems, too many hands on procedures, and low employee morale. These are the ingredients for another Shuttle disaster.

Countdown to Another Space Shuttle Disaster?

In 1992, the prediction for a Space Shuttle catastrophic failure was 1 in 72 flights. After seven years of safety upgrades the prediction decreased by only 1 in 423 flights. Even with these upgrades, the fleet was grounded for most of 1999. The Shuttle is still sending warnings that it is a very dangerous launch system. Considering the following:

May 1999—Space Shuttle Discovery had a launch delay caused by hail damage to the external fuel tank.
July 1999—Space Shuttle Columbia had a hydrogen gas leakage scare.
December 1999—Space Shuttle Discovery on a mission to repair the Hubble Space Telescope had a record nine launch delays spread over two months. Delays were due to damaged wiring, a contaminated engine, a dented fuel line, concern over fuel line welds, a nicked cable, and paperwork errors.
January 2000—Space Shuttle Endeavor launch is delayed by computer trouble. Damaged wiring had already delayed its launch four months.
March 2000—Space Shuttle Atlantis must have one main engine replaced because of another paperwork snafu.
August 2000—Inspection of the 20 year old Space Shuttle Columbia revealed about 3,500 defects in wiring.25 
October 2000—The 100th flight of the Space Shuttle was delayed twice because of safety concerns with the external tank and a misplaced safety pin.

Tick-tock . . . tick-tock . . . is time running out for another Shuttle crew?

 6 – Human Exploration of Mars—Still A NASA Management Fantasy

To strive for mankind to walk on the surface of Mars is a noble goal . . . but

Many factors must be resolved before human Mars exploration can be considered as a feasible and realistic endeavor. First, there must be a worthwhile reason for having human activity on Mars. There are numerous noble reasons proposed for human missions to Mars: being first with flag and footprints, discovering past or present life, and colonization are just a few. All of these are noble endeavors, but none have attracted enough support for investing the multi-billion of dollars required to fund such a project. In today’s society, and that of Christopher Columbus, investors in any project want to know about the returns on their investment. Be it political or financial, a worthwhile return on investment is a mandatory requirement for a Mars human exploration endeavor. As of today there are none worthwhile of the enormous required investment. However, that does not mean that none exists. If one does exists, mankind’s role on Mars will be determined by robotics spacecraft explorations. However, the past and currently planned Mars robotics exploration activities have been so anemic that it may take decades just to identify that role. Even if the next robotics exploration mission made a discovery that would require human surface participation, there would still be decades of political and technical preparations needed to prepare for that activity. By the time the human role on Mars is defined, technology advancements will have been achieved that will make any current human Mars mission concepts obsolete. For NASA to be planning Mars human exploration missions at this time, with so little knowledge of the requirements is a terrible waste of their limited resources.78 

The second major factor why a human manned Mars mission is not in the imminent future is the cost of putting heavy payloads in earth orbit. The Ariane 5 launch vehicle is today’s most cost efficient launch system. A 40,000 pound payload can be placed in low earth orbit with the Ariane V for approximately $100 million. Extremely optimistic human Mars mission plans have estimated an earth orbit mass requirement of 600,000 pounds, which at today’s launch cost would be $1.5 billion for "one" manned Mars mission launch. Although it may be feasible to develop a Mars launch vehicle with today’s performance capability, it is certainly not realistic to expect that human Mars missions will ever be conducted with today’s launch system costs.

Another major stumbling block to Mars human exploration is that the New NASA’s management has failed to recognize that the Moon is the next logical step in human space exploration. It is the logical place to develop the initial skills for feasible and realistic long duration space travel and robotics exploration. Periodic Mars robotics missions should not be abandoned. However, lunar robotics exploration must be restarted and expanded to determine if there is a science or commercial role for human activity on the Moon. The longer we wait to start this process, the longer we will be in developing the tools for establishing mankind’s permanent presence in deep space.

The Space Exploration Initiative Failure

(see book or e-mail author for this information)

Proposed Lunar Space Transportation System

The Lunar Space Transportation System (STS) must be developed as an evolutionary process based on a need for the exploration requirement. The primary requirement of lunar exploration will be to determine the scientific and commercial resources of the Moon. The secondary requirement is to determine if those resources should be developed. The Lunar STS development schedule will accelerate or decrease as the needs for exploration requirements dictate.

(see book or e-mail author for this information)

Space Based Vehicles

To be a serious competitor to the Ariane 5 launch system, the commercial Space Shuttle program must seek improvements in the delivery of payloads requiring high earth orbit insertions. In the near term, existing upper stages will be used to provide this delivery capability. However, to establish a "permanent" and cost effective next generation space transportation system, the upper stage (the earth orbital system) must be space based. The following requirements are the initial development goals for an earth orbital space transportation system:



 

 New Technologies Required to Support the Lunar/Mars Space Based STS

The following critical technologies have been identified as required development for establishing the proposed STS. The technology areas are listed in order of priority:

Long duration storage and management of cryogenic fluids.

  Avionics for autonomous vehicle control and vehicle health monitoring.

Aerobrake.
Electrical power systems.
Propulsion systems.
Materials for construction of space based vehicles.

Cryogenic fluid storage and management—is essential if reusable space based vehicles are ever to become a reality and the Lunar/Mars STS program is ever to be operationally efficient. The capability to store cryogenic fluids for years must be developed. The transfer of cryogenic fluids also presents a difficult development challenge. To meet these challenges the following areas merit investigation:

Cryogenic pressure transducers
Cold vapor pressurization
Lightweight cryogenic lines, fittings, and insulation systems
Liquid acquisition devices
Refrigeration systems
Gelled cryogenics.

* Avionics—will present an extremely difficult management problem for the development of a space based autonomous vehicle. Foremost in these problems will be costs that may exceed 50 percent of the vehicle total cost. The integrated health monitoring and autonomous control system of reusable space vehicles also presents formidable technology challenges in the areas of software and sensors. Autonomous navigation systems must be developed and verified. One of the more exciting avionics technologies being investigated is in the field of nano-electronic devices. Laboratory demonstrations of accelerometers, gyros, pressure sensors, thermal actuators, and optical devices are resulting in encouraging indications that this technology can significantly reduce space vehicle weight, improve safety by providing additional layers of redundancy, and reduce operations costs.

* Aerobrake—assist in decelerating the trans-space vehicles return to earth would provide a vital contribution by reducing the propellant weight carried to orbit. With an Aerobrake system, the propellant weight can be reduced by 20 percent. This technology becomes even more critical for the Mars STS. Major technology problems are low-mass, high strength thermal composite materials, space assembly, repair, and inspection solutions.

* Propulsion—The existing space transportation system launch and orbital vehicle performance capability is limited by the maximum capability of chemical liquid oxygen/hydrogen (or RP-1 kerosene fuel) engines. These engines have reached their maximum performance potential. Since, in the foreseeable near-term (10-15 years) future there is no replacement for these engines, as launch vehicle booster engines, they will be the engine of choice for some time. The technology programs needed for these existing class of engines are those that improve reliability, reusability, and reduced maintenance. Improved sensors that provide information to decrease maintenance and flight operations cost are key technology requirements for these class engines and, therefore must be assigned the highest priority.

NASA Management Response to the Proposed Operational Lunar/Mars STS

(see book or e-mail author for this information)

Sent from my iPadhttp://nasaproblems.com/
 

NASAProblems.com

This webpage is an information mechanism for solutions to NASA's human space projects problems. Members of the American aerospace community are encouraged to use this webpage as an instrument to openly express constructive concerns and solutions for the problems at NASA. No names will be used unless requested............. "Speak out... or forever suffer the consequences of remaining silent"
Don A. Nelson, Coordinator ......... Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer
Issues:
International Space Station
Petition to Congress for "No" vote on NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan
Petition provides information on why the NASA plan will accelerate the collapse of the human space program.
Space Shuttle Safety
Space Shuttle Safety Moratorium
Requests Presidential executive order for Shuttle flights... Reply... Justifications.
NASA Headquarters Space Shuttle Safety Letters and Replies 
Attempts to get crew escape modules on Shuttle... Comments on replies.
"NASA’s gambling, again, with a teacher's safety", By Don A. Nelson 
Houston Chronicle article Apr. 19 2002... Comments... Replies.
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 2000 
ASAP recommends new crew escape system as soon as possible.
NASA Human Space Program Management Solutions
NASA Directives for 21st Century 
Based on inputs from the aerospace community. Jan. 2002. Rejected by NASA management... Comments.
"NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions" 
Excerpts from NASA book. Must read chapter 7's "The Real space Race." 

Comments and inputs can be sent to: nasaproblems@...

Last update: Jan. 2003
Suggestion: Print webpage to read and study (approx. 15 pages).

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Concerned American Aerospace Engineers 
Petition to Congress
Vote “No” on NASA’s Integrated Space Transportation Plan for a $117 billion International Space Station

If Congress approves NASA’s proposed Integrated Space Transportation Plan it will accelerate the collapse of the human space program. The plan is based on conjecture and lacks the technical analyses to insure a feasible and realistic approach to the solutions of the human space program problems. Please consider the following:
* The keystone in the Integrated Space Transportation Plan is the orbital space plane. NASA management believes it is required to increase crew members on the space station. However, it will take two years to define the configuration and cost of the project. Congress doesn’t know what it’s being asked to approve.
The space plane is based on the same expendable launch concept as the DynaSoar X-20, Manned Orbital Laboratory, National Launch System, Advanced Launch System, Personnel Launch System, and the Ariane Hermes. These launch concepts have all proven to be too costly to develop. In 1991 Langley Research Center estimated the cost to develop an expendable launched orbiter personnel/cargo vehicle to be $6.1 billion. It is appallingly apparent that the development cost for the space plane could exceed $10 billion!
The proposed launch vehicle, the heavy lift Delta 4 will cost somewhere from $130 to $180 million per flight. The Delta 4 provides the same launch functions as the space shuttle’s solid rocket booster, external tank, and main engines which cost only $125 million per flight. The space shuttle’s orbiter and space plane will have the same operating requirements. Unless NASA changes their operating philosophies for human space flight the operating cost of the space plane will be the same as the shuttle’s orbiter... with a total launch cost of nearly $500 million per flight! At the very minimum, for an automated space plane the launch cost will be $280 million per flight.
* Increasing crew members on International Space Station decreases research capability.
Currently the three station crew members can provide only 27 hours per day for station support activity, of which only 20 hours per week is for research support. Using the space plane to increase the crew to six does not even provide 54 hours of support activity. What it does do is increase the mandatory crew exercise time to over 15 hours per day. This increase oscillation activity is devastating to the primary research activity for station... microgravity experiments. To be an effective space research platform, the station’s flight systems and research activities must be automated. Long term human residence on the station must be limited to cases where the crew member is the subject of the research. NASA has failed to recognize that previous permanently crewed space stations have all failed to conduct effective space research programs because of the overwhelming need for resources to support human habitation. Today, surgeons can safely perform remote robotics operations on humans. Ironically, the station’s Payload Operations Control Center is conducting limited remote control research. With this facility and available technology, there is no need to develop a space plane. Instead, Congress must direct NASA to conduct automated flight operations and put research back into the human space program.
* The International Space Station re-boost is a mandatory requirement for keeping the station in orbit. Russia’s commitment to supply the Progress re-boost spacecraft ends NASA Fiscal Year 2006. This is four years before the space plane could possibly be ready. Congress must address the issues and costs to keep the station from being destroyed.
Each year 80 meters per second must be added to the station’s orbital velocity or it will decay into the atmosphere. The space shuttle’s Orbiter can add only 7 meters per second. Currently the Russian government sends 6 Progress re-boost vehicles to station each year at a cost of approximately $65 million each.
The European Space Agency’s Automated Transfer Vehicle is being developed to provide the same functions as the Progress and is scheduled for first flight in late 2003. Nine Ariane 5 launches have been scheduled for delivering the transfer vehicle to station. Target cost of the transfer vehicle is $70 million with an additional launch cost of $107 million. Compared to the $280 million minimum launch cost of the space plane either cargo re-boost vehicle is a bargain.
From 2006 to 2012 a minimum funding of $2 billion is required to keep the station in orbit. It is a safe assumption that the U.S. taxpayer will pick up this bill.
* The Space Launch Initiative program to develop technologies to replace the space shuttle will in effect be scuttled.
This is really a moot point since the $3.9 billion funded for this effort is already being mismanaged. There are two technologies that must be advanced before any significant improvement in launch systems can be achieved... structural material and main engine propulsion systems. NASA has failed to define a realistic and feasible development path for either of these technologies.
* NASA’s plan requires that Shuttle operate for another 20 years. Their plan significantly increases human transportation costs and their proposed safety upgrades fail to provide any significant improvements.
NASA’s plan to use the space plane to reduce the number of shuttle flights to 2 or 3 per year is not cost effective. All the operations support infrastructure for shuttle will still be required and will still have to be funded. Shuttle cost per launch will increase.
NASA’s shuttle upgrade and safety programs have been mismanaged for years. Since 1994 NASA has spent over $5 billion on these programs, yet as obvious by the recent shuttle groundings; the launch system is still on the verge of collapse. In their proposed shuttle upgrades, operations cost reduction is never a consideration. Instead, shuttle launch costs continue to soar because of NASA’s human space flight management’s refusal to automate flight operations. Crew escape capsules cannot be incorporated because of their archaic cultural doctrine requiring pilots for shuttle flights. Congress’s failure to address this critical issue will insure the loss of another shuttle crew!
* NASA’s Integrated Space Transportation Plan commits the human space programs to staggering space station cost of $117 billion and another twenty years of vague space research.
In 1995 the General Accounting Office estimated the total station cost (development plus launch costs to 2012 ) to be $94 billion. Since that time cost overruns of nearly $5 billion have occurred. NASA now believes a fifth shuttle flight is required each year which would cost $4.5 billion. After fiscal year 2006 a minimum of $2 billion must be funded for cargo vehicles to keep the station in orbit till 2012. A $10 billion space plane development plus a very optimistic operating costs for two years of $1.1 billion would push the expected total minimum cost of the station to $117 billion.
In 1993 the Freedom space station was canceled after the estimated total cost reached $118 billion.Congress must not approve NASA’s ill conceived Integrated Space Transportation Plan. Congress must stay the course of sound fiscal investment in our Nation’s space endeavors and direct NASA to reduce the cost of its human space programs.

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Space Shuttle Safety Moratorium
The space shuttle without crew escape modules is unsafe for human transportation. There has never been a launch vehicle that has not had multiple catastrophic failures. This requested moratorium is an instrument seeking to correct this grave situation.

Request for Executive Order Limiting Space Shuttle Operations

August 25, 2002

Office of the President of the United States
Mr. George W. Bush
Subject: Executive Order for a Moratorium on Space Shuttle Flight
Mr. President,
I am a recently retired NASA aerospace engineer and it is my duty to inform you that our space shuttle astronauts are in eminent danger. Your intervention is required to prevent another catastrophic space shuttle accident. NASA management and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel have failed to respond to the growing warning signs of another shuttle accident. Since 1999 the launch system has experienced the following potential disastrous occurrences:
July 1999 - Space Shuttle Columbia delayed by hydrogen leak.
December 1999 - Space Shuttle Discovery was grounded with damaged wiring, contaminated engine, dented fuel line, and paper work errors.
January 2000 - Space Shuttle Endeavor is delayed because of wiring and computer failures.
March 2000 - Space Shuttle Atlantis main engine must be replaced because of paperwork errors.
August 2000 - Inspection of Space Shuttle Columbia reveals 3,500 defects in wiring. Wiring defects plague entire fleet.
October 2000 - The 100th flight of the space shuttle was delayed because of a misplaced safety pin and concerns with the external tank.
April 2001 - NASA failed to keep adequate watch on safety operations of a major contractor.
July 2002 - The inspector general reports that space shuttle safety program not properly managed.
April 2002 - Hydrogen leak forces scrub of the Atlantis flight.
August 2002 - Shuttle launch system grounded after fuel line cracks are discovered in all the fleet!
Mr. President, as you are painfully aware NASA management has been lacking for a number of years. Unfortunately, your new NASA Administrator has failed to recognize the eminent space shuttle danger and has accepted the consul of the pre-existing NASA shuttle management. These managers still pursue a management philosophy that has stagnated the safety upgrades efforts and perpetuates the staggering launch costs.
The space shuttle or any space transportation vehicle without crew escape modules will never be safe to transport humans. To incorporate crew escape modules in the space shuttle requires that the piloting function be removed from the vehicle. Unfortunately, the background of the shuttle management is that of former flight controllers and astronauts. They have been trained to never trust automated flight control systems. Therefore, they are adamantly opposed to automation of the space shuttle. Efforts by NASA engineers and contractors to automate the shuttles are met with stern rebukes and reprimands in some cases.
Mr. President, to prevent another shuttle disaster it is requested that an Executive Order be issued that places a moratorium on space shuttle operations. This moratorium must limit shuttle missions to flight crews that do not exceed four members. The moratorium must remain in effect until crew escape modules can be incorporated.
This moratorium will serve as a catalyst to kick-start the resisting NASA management into action. The lives of our astronauts and the future of our space program must not be ignored. The warning from the Thiokol engineer was ignored and the Challenger exploded. The terrorist training warning from FBI agents was ignored and we had the 9-11 disaster. When the next shuttle explodes...and Murphy’s Law says it will, we can exclaim with pride a loud "YES!" as the crew escape module carries our astronauts to safety... or if this moratorium is ignored...we can watch in horror and shame as the astronauts face certain death.
Don A. Nelson
Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer
Reply from the President's OSTP: "I do not think that it is appropriate for the President to issue a moratorium on Space Shuttle launches at this time" Dec. 4 2002.
Comment: Dec. 12, 2002 another Shuttle propellant leak found!

Moratorium Questions and Answers from the Aerospace Community

Q. Why did you ask for a moratorium that limits the crew to four? If the system is unsafe, why not shut it down?
A. Complete shutdown of the system is certainly an option that should be considered. However, it can be argued that the current risk level is acceptable for vital missions until the crew escape modules are installed. The space shuttle is still an experimental launch vehicle. Every flight provides knowledge to the reusable flight vehicle data base. Unfortunately, NASA management has let conjecture cloud their judgment and the vehicle is being flown as if it were certified by the FAA. Astronauts are being assigned to flights for frivolous reasons (teacher in space, etc.). Unfortunately, the upgrade program to improve flight safety is in shambles. What this moratorium would do is kick-start the upgrade process. It would focus on the most critical issue and that’s providing an effective crew escape system. To do anything less condemns some future crew to the same fate as that of the Challenger’s!
Q. Why limit the crew to four.
A. The primary reason is that it will save at least three lives and reduce the time to evacuate the cabin in event of an emergency. With a crew of four, the pilots would be required to support the payload activities. This means that fewer pilots fly more missions. Flying more in order to remain proficient at piloting and have the time to train for payload support. It forces the shuttle and station project offices to consider automation and turn more in-flight control activities over to the ground controllers. Also with less people to train the operations cost goes down. Money and resources would be saved which could be applied to the upgrade program.
Q. Wouldn't’t the crew limit have an adverse effect on the space station?
A. No, just the opposite. The objective of the space station is to be a research facility, not a space hotel. There are already too many people on the station. The more people you have, the more cost you have, the more problems you have. Like the space shuttle, the station has too many hands-on operations. Automation is not a dirty word. The station should be operated as a manned tended facility. The only need for human long term occupancy is when they are a subject of the research.
Q. Why do you disagree with NASA’s conclusion that crew escape modules cannot be incorporated on the Shuttle?
A. At the AIAA Space 2000 conference, I asked then NASA Administrator Dan Goldin; “If Space Shuttle safety is NASA’s number one priority, why isn’t a crew escape module(s) NASA’s number one Shuttle upgrade?” His reply was that it would cause an “unacceptable weight penalty of 7500 pounds.” Another part of the problem is that the weight increase for putting a crew escape module or individual modules in the Orbiter flight deck moves the vehicle center of gravity (c.g.) to an unstable aerodynamic position. Putting ballast in the aft to move the c.g. back only increases the weight problem. Therefore, the only solution is that weight must be removed from the flight deck area to install the crew modules. The only significant weight in this area that is not absolutely required for flight operations is the piloting function. If the piloting function is removed approximately 4000 pounds of weight margin is then available for the escape modules.
Q. Wouldn’t removing the pilots from the Shuttle operations be another safety issue?
A. Actually it would be a safety improvement. Human error is a major concern, especially during the launch phase. The level of reliability and redundancy of automated flight systems has increased significantly since the initial Shuttle design. A sobering example of this is the recent airliners collision over Switzerland. The automated system made the correct decision which was tragically over-ridden by a ground controller’s fatal error. Even NASA’s own design specifications for new launch systems eliminates the requirement for piloting. This is more of an emotional issue than a technical. issue. The moratorium is an attempt to get past the emotions and political aspects and back to engineering.
Q. This has got to a big ticket item. Do you have some idea what it might cost?
A. It is a big ticket item. A preliminary study estimated the cost to be $5.4 billion. However this was a total Shuttle upgrade package. It included the cost of airframe, avionics, and ground facilities upgrades. The total Shuttle upgrade would replace the $20 billion plus Space Launch Initiative program. Putting an X-38 type spacecraft on the EELV's is a $15 billion step backwards. Just adopting the avionics/crew modules only upgrade for automated operations was estimated to be $1.5 billion. NASA management has already wasted more funding than this on their futile Space Launch Initiatives program.
Q. With NASA’s current budget problems, isn’t this an impossible goal for the near term?
A. In round numbers each Shuttle flight now costs half a billion dollars. By automating, over $200 million per launch can be saved by the reduction in flight and ground operations. Also the flight rate can be significantly increased by automated post and preflight operations. Flying only a minimum of four flights per year saves $800 million per year. The real question is, can NASA and the government afford not to make this upgrade to the flight system?
Q. Isn’t it more important that NASA put it’s funding on the critical system problems, like the hydrogen bed liner?
A. Upgrading of the Shuttle must be a package deal. From 1994 to the year 2000 NASA has spent $4.9 billion on a hodge-podge of Shuttle upgrades. After all these upgrades the catastrophic expected failure is a dismal 1 in 500 flights. By their most optimistic estimate the failure will still be 1 in 1000 after spending billions more on proposed hodge-podge upgrades. Launch vehicle systems reliability is not at a development level for airline type operations. If NASA proceeds with their piecemeal upgrade philosophy, we can be assured there will be another Challenger type disaster!
Q. You have been proposing a crew escape module(s) and automated shuttle flight system for some time. Why do you think it hasn’t been adopted?
A. There are two reasons. Credibility is one reason. It is hard for anyone to believe that if anything could be done to improve flight safety, NASA wouldn’t do it. But I don’t think many people are aware that NASA has changed. For example, Shuttle engineering management has been generally replaced by former flight controllers and astronauts. While these managers were highly qualified in their previous assignment, they generally lack the engineering background to evaluate and manage an advanced integrated development project. Again, the dismal upgrade efforts, are evidence of a lack of management skills.
Q. And the other reason?
A. NASA management has failed to provide a feasible and realistic strategic plan that gives a long range overview of how the development of the space transportation system will proceed. The mismanaged X-33/VentureStar program was dead before it started and even now management is wavering on the direction of the once again revised Space Launch Initiative. Without an achievable vision of the future, the 17,000 or so Shuttle people are very protective of their jobs. So when Shuttle changes are proposed that would reduce manpower requirement... out come the “marching armies” of Shuttle supporters with their prediction of safety problems if their jobs are eliminated. Automating the Shuttle operation eliminates those jobs.
Q. And the solution is?
A. Automate the Shuttle operations and turn the flight operations over to a contractor operator. Then proceed with the next step in the development of space transportation... the development of a space based upper stage. A space based upper stage would be a very exciting project. It’s the logical step for the development for a space based lunar/Mars transfer vehicle. That’s where the people supporting the Shuttle operation should be working. Their future is in the payload bay of the automated Shuttle. Their future should be in space research.
Q. Before, your moratorium letter, have you ever approached the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel about the crew module?
A. Yes, I tried to get two different panels to request an independent study on the feasibility of a crew escape module and automated space shuttle flight system. Neither panel replied to my request. However, the 2000 Annual Report states that a crew escape system will provide the largest potential improvement in crew safety and the time is past due for implementation. The 2001 Annual Report made no reference to the need for a crew module.
Q. Are you optimistic about getting the safety panel to support the moratorium?
A. No I’m not... It’s been my observation that the panel has been very timid and ineffective. For example, after months of my prodding one panel that the X-33 had serious safety problems, NASA assigned one safety monitor. That’s like the FAA certifying that the Boeing 777 was safe for flight on the word of one inspector. The panel lacks the ability to conduct independent investigations and replies on what NASA tells them. Even NASA’s safety offices are uncoordinated and ineffective.
Q. If this is the case, why bother with the moratorium?
A. I’m attempting to get support from the aerospace community and the government. I’ve sent requests to aerospace organizations, congressional committees, and the President, asking that they make a public statement on the moratorium. I plan to post their replies on my webpage.
Q. Why are you going to all this effort?
A. Because I believe that in the not too distant future there will be another Shuttle disaster. I want to be able to tell myself I did all I could to save that crew....

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NASA Headquarters Space Shuttle Safety Letters and Replies

NASA Headquarters

Washington, DC 20546-0001
August 8, 2002
Reply to Attn of:
Mr. Don A. Nelson
Dear Mr. Nelson
Thank you for your letter dated July 11, 2002, regarding the crew escape module for the Space Shuttle. Because the Space Shuttle Program falls within the responsibility of the Office of Space Flight, I have been asked to address your request.
The current Space Shuttle is safe for human operations. Over the years the Space Shuttle Program has initiated studies for enhancing crew escape options. These studies have always shown that modifying the orbiters to include a crew escape module would provide an increase in the probability of crew survival in the event of a catastrophic event. However, such a design would decrease available crew volume and adversely impact onorbit operational capabilities. Also, the crew's ability to evacuate the vehicle while on the launch pad would be degraded due to the entire crew having to be accommodated on the flight deck.
In addition, one technology area of significant concern is the design on the crew escape module actuation system. The activation system has to provide sufficient time to escape a catastrophic event, but cannot produce "false positive" indications that would destroy the vehicle unnecessarily. In summary, all previous studies of Space Shuttle crew escape have concluded that the addition of a crew escape module will not lead to an appreciable increase in overall crew safety.
Again, it is due to the your values and commitment to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that makes space transportation not just a dream but also a reality. Your interest in NASA and the Space Shuttle is greatly appreciated.

Associate Administrator of Space Flight

Comments:
The current Space Shuttle is safe for human operations.
Reply: False, the launch system is currently grounded! The space shuttle is still an experimental launch system, operating with a fatal flaw...operating without crew escape modules. It is the only launch system that does... even the Russian Buran space shuttle had a crew escape system.
These studies have always shown that modifying the orbiters to include a crew escape module would provide an increase in the probability of crew survival in the event of a catastrophic event.
Reply: True, the probability of a crew member failure to survive would be 1 in 30,000.
Such a design would decrease available crew volume and adversely impact onorbit operational capabilities.
Reply: False, removing the piloting systems provides adequate space on the flight deck for the escape modules. Removing the piloting systems provides the weight margin for the crew escape modules. Removing the piloting systems requires a change in NASA’s antiquated flight operations philosophies and this is the real issue. Will it require another shuttle disaster to get NASA’s flight operations into the 21st century?
The crew's ability to evacuate the vehicle while on the launch pad would be degraded due to the entire crew having to be accommodated on the flight deck.
Reply: False, The entire crew of four can be accommodated on the flight deck and the crew escape modules provide the greatest opportunity of survival. With the crew escape module the crew can be evacuated by crew modules ejection in mili-seconds instead of the 15 minutes required to get the tower walkway platform back in position.
The activation system has to provide sufficient time to escape a catastrophic event, but cannot produce "false positive" indications that would destroy the vehicle unnecessarily.
Reply: False positives indications are and will, always be a concern. However, state of the art automated flight control systems have significantly reduced the possibility of such an occurrence. The over -riding concern is that a ground flight controller or pilot astronaut will take too long to identify the problem or miss-identify it. Again, will it require another shuttle disaster to get NASA’s flight operations into the 21st century?
Don A. Nelson

 
X-Priority: 1 (Highest) Date: Friday June 04 June 1999
To: Don Nelson
From: William Readdy
Subject: June 3, 1999 Fax to Office of Space Flight
Mr. Nelson,
  Thanks for your continuing interest in our Space Shuttle Program. I'll answer your fax/letter of June 3 to Joseph Rothenberg because Shuttle falls into my area of responsibility.
SAFETY remains our number one priority, not operations costs. Human access to space is our primary mission, and upgrades to the Space Shuttle are necessary to support this mission, improve safety, prevent obsolescence, and promote efficiency.
You offer no practical solutions to the real issues associated with assured crew escape and certainly not in the near term. The reality is that true assured crew escape for all phases of flight will require extensive redesign of the existing vehicle. In short, we don't agree that NASA's commitments for the next two decades of human space flight can be met with your proposed approach.
We don't agree that taking people out of the space program and lowering the Shuttle to the level of expendable vehicles is the right answer, nor is the expense of modifications you suggest justifiable. The cost-benefit trades have been done and they don't pay back.
Since you left NASA, great strides have been made in terms of real safety, reliability and cost reduction. We have made, and continue our commitment to making, real changes to the hardware, software and operations - huge differences across the board - and simultaneously the fleet has become much more capable.
Sincerely,
Bill
William Readdy
Deputy Associate Administrator
Office of Space Flight
NASA Headquarters Code M-7
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Comments: The “great strides have been made in terms of real safety, reliability and cost reduction.” are non-existence. At this time the fleet is grounded. NASA's reported cost reductions are being audited. I question that, “The cost-benefit trades have been done and they don't pay back.” would stand up in an independent analyses.
Don A. Nelson

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NASA Directives for the Twenty First Century

These directives are mandatory changes that NASA management must adopt. The directives are based on inputs from concerned aerospace engineers. Failure to incorporate these changes will result in the lost of another Space Shuttle and it’s crew. The civil space program will continue to deteriorate and NASA’s creditability could be permanently damaged. Many can argue that NASA management’s creditability has already been seriously compromised (also see directives comments from readers).

In the past there have been numerous attempts to institute change at NASA, but they have all failed. They failed because they lacked a clear definition of feasible and realistic directives. In an effort to correct this error, the following NASA directives for operations has been formulate. These directives must be adopted to move the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) forward into the twenty-first century. Failure to adopt these directives will only continue to accelerate NASA's self destruction!
* The Space Shuttle launch system is unsafe for human transportation and has outrageous operations costs. To correct this dire situation NASA must:
A) Incorporate an automated flight control and vehicle monitoring system to improve flight safety and reduce flight costs. This requires deleting the NASA requirement that all crewed launch vehicles be piloted.
B) Install a passenger escape module system!
C) Items A and B will be made to Space Shuttle OV-102 (Columbia). Upon completion, NASA will negotiate with a private concern for flight operations of the launch system. The remaining Space Shuttles will then be retrofitted for automated operations and turned over to the private operator. Current NASA shuttle operations will be phased out.
Justifications: Over twenty-four percent of the NASA budget is required for Space Shuttle operations. This excessive cost for launch services prevents NASA from performing its primary role as a research and development agency. In addition, this antiquated launch system has an expected catastrophic failure of 1 in 423 flights. In the last three years, the launch vehicles have experienced hydrogen leaks, 3,500 defective wires, paperwork errors, computer errors, and other serious safety snafus. If these warnings continue to be ignored, there will surely be another Challenger type catastrophic .
2) A space transportation system must be established that supports the government agencies, the military, and the commercial space industry with reliable and cost effective access to space. This will be accomplish by:
A) Consolidating all Space Shuttle operations under the management of a private (for profit) organization. This organization should be based on the same concepts of Arianespace launch company. It will operate only those Space Shuttles that have been automated.
B) Legislation requiring NASA to contract with the private launch organization for a minimum of “TBD” launches per year for “TBD” years after the launch system becomes operational.
C) The automated Space Shuttle and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle will be the baseline vehicles for the space transportation system until replaced by an advanced launch system.
D) The goal of the automated Space Shuttle launch system will be to make the system competitive with the Ariane V. Savings to be realized could exceed $1 billion per year for every four Shuttle flights.
E) To continue to be a serious competitor to the Ariane V and other launch systems, improvements must be made in the delivery of payloads requiring high earth orbit insertions. In the near term (4 to 7 years) existing upper stages must be used to provide this delivery capability. However, to establish a “permanent” and cost effective next generation space transportation system, the upper stage (the earth orbital system) must be space based. The spaced based upper stage will have the following requirements:
a. Must be capable of carrying a payload to a geosynchronous transfer orbit or of placing a payload directly into geosynchronous orbit.
b. Have the capability to store propellants on-orbit for a duration that provides adequate mission performance margins.
c. Be designed for on-orbit payload transfers, consumables replenishment, and maintenance.
d. Be designed with the goal of being a baseline configuration for a space based lunar transfer vehicle.
e. Serve as a test bed for next generation propulsion and avionics systems.
Justifications: Without a baseline plan which outlines the long range development of a feasible and realistic space transportation system, NASA will continue to flounder.
 3) The International Space Station (ISS) operation concept is fatally flawed. A permanently crewed space station requires too much of the station’s resources for habitation. This severely limits space research which is the prime purpose of the station. To be a cost effective and productive space research facility, the station must be automated and crew-tended. Therefore:
A) The ISS flight systems must be controlled by on-board automation and ground monitoring/command.
B) NASA and the international partners must automate the on-board space research.
C) Flight and research systems will be periodically evaluated during scheduled crew visits.
D) If space research is identified that requires long duration crew presence, this research must provide its own funding.
E) If the ISS operations cannot be automated within budget constraints, the project should be canceled.
Justifications: The Soviet/Russian space station Mir operated for 16 years. The only significant research achieved on the Mir and other long duration manned space stations was the effects of long duration zero gravity on humans. Since the need for long duration human space flight cannot be expect to occur for the next twenty to thirty years, additional research in this area cannot be justified. Therefore short duration crew-tended support will provide all required interfaces with the space research systems.
4) NASA must have an effective project review procedure. NASA’s current Non Advocacy Review process is not working, as is evident by the many project failures and budget over-runs. To correct this situation NASA must:
A) Establish a truly independent program assessment office. The office must be based at NASA Headquarters and report only to the Administrator.
B) The office must be staffed with qualified evaluators. At least one full-time evaluator must be stationed at the site of the project.
C) The site evaluator will be available to other government review organization to facilitate any information they may require.
D) All evaluations made by the program assessment office must be made public. Minority opinions must be reported.
Justifications: NASA project and center managers strongly resist project reviews. They have been known to exert considerable political pressure to limit the scope, time, and frequency of review evaluations, This attitude occurs because there are too many reviews by organizations with limited technical knowledge. In addition, the administrator must have his evaluators. Otherwise, the administrator will be told only what the project managers want to be known. 5) There are three technologies areas that define the capability of space exploration: propulsion, structural materials, and avionics. NASA must organize and fund diversified working groups to conduct extensive long duration research programs for these key technologies.
Justifications: In general, NASA’s advance research projects for space transportation are a group of uncoordinated, hodge-podge of squeaky-wheel hobby shop activities. Until NASA again becomes an effective space research agency, this Nation space program will continue to be a fiasco!

Directives Comments: Constructive comments and concerns will be posted. Unless instructed not to be, all names will be kept confidential.
Comment: While I agree with some of his recommendations concerning the bloated flight operations bureaucracy and need for eliminating Pilot Astronauts from the operation I'm not for turning the operation over to a purely commercial operation. His example of the Aeriannespace operation doesn't address the fact that it is highly subsidized by the European countries. NASA's problems are much deeper than the design of Shuttle hardware and operations. Any commercial for profit operation would still be highly subsidized and there would be no government to oversee the operation.
Reply: Government subsidizes are the way of doing business these days. The commercial Space Shuttle, EELV. or any other launch system will be subsidizes!
Comment: I resent the Space Shuttle being called unsafe!
Reply: No human launch vehicle without a crew escape module is safe.
Comment: Even if these directives were adopted, NASA doesn't have the management to carry them out!
Reply: Give the NASA working folks direction and they will lead NASA management!

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Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Annual Report for 2000

Crew escape. The Panel recommends, below, that the absence of an expanded crew escape capability be addressed as a significant safety upgrade. Crew escape will be an item of special interest for the Panel in 2001.
Ref.: Finding #2
The Presidential Commission on the Shuttle Challenger Accident addressed crew escape in their report and recommended that NASA, “Make all efforts to provide a crew escape system&ldots;.” NASA responded by initiating crew escape studies. Phase I was intended to provide a minimum system prior to return to flight. Phase II was not tied to the return to flight schedule and was intended to provide an automated escape system at a later date uncompromised by the tight return to flight schedule.
The Phase II study concluded that an automated escape system was feasible for certain flight regimes and recommended further trade and design studies and a focused development program.
Over the lifetime of the Space Shuttle, a reliable post-launch crew escape system will provide the largest potential improvement in crew safety. NASA has completed or has underway a number of studies that also suggest such a system is feasible. The time is past due for the implementation of a more capable crew escape system.
Finding #2
There is no in-flight crew escape system for the Orbiter other than for abort below 20,000 feet during a controlled glide.
Recommendation #2
Complete the ongoing studies of crew escape design options and implement an improved system as soon as possible.

Note: The above ASAP report was released in February 2001!!! The 2002 report "watered down" the crew escape issue to the point no action was taken!

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Houston Chronicle Viewpoint Article and Comments 4-19-02

"NASA’s gambling, again, with a teacher's safety", By Don A. Nelson, Retired NASA engineer.

Once again, NASA is gambling that the Shuttle can be flown safely with a teacher on board. This is the same gamble they took before the Challenge disaster. Since that terrible tragedy, NASA has spent billions on Shuttle upgrades and is planning to spend billions more. For all this effort the Space Shuttle still has a predicted failure disaster of one in 426 flights. This failure is amazingly good for a space launch vehicle. However, it is an appalling failure prediction for any launch vehicle carrying people into space without a crew escape system. NASA management will argue that the Space Shuttle does have a crew escape system. However, this system can only be used for altitude below 20,000 feet and during a controlled glide. It also requires the astronauts to open the crew hatch, deploy a slide pole, and then each crew member must slide down it to escape from the vehicle. This procedure takes 90 seconds to evacuate the crew... this is a lifetime when milliseconds can mean the difference between life and death!
The NASA, 2001 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel report failed to make a crew escape system a priority. The report states, "The Space Shuttle is acceptable today because of extensive risk-reduction efforts that attempt to obviate the need for a crew escape system." Again, this is the same gamble that NASA was taking prior to the Challenger disaster. The safety panel also called for "formal documentation of the risk acceptance rationale for the Space Shuttle lack of a crew escape system." In other words, do what NASA does best these days, create more paper work. This panel has made a tragic mistake in believing that more paper work can save the lives of a flight crew.
NASA has been studying crew escape systems for the Shuttle for the last 30 years. Once again a study is in progress. This time they are looking at aircraft type crew ejection seats, rocket propelled crew extraction modules, a crew compartment/ escape capsule, and a hybrid system consisting of ejection seats for the pilot and copilot with an escape capsule located in the cargo bay for the remainder of the crew. The safety panel reports that, "none of the options for crew escape can be funded within the current constraints on the Space Shuttle budget; they must be considered as part of any viable long-range plan that addresses safe human access to space." However, Congress has provided another $2.1 billion to upgrade the launch system, but NASA management cannot find the funding for a crew escape system?
None of the above proposed options will work and NASA management is aware of why they will not work. When the weight of a crew escape system is added to the Shuttle, it becomes aerodynamically unstable and cannot fly in the atmosphere. Therefore, to add weight to the vehicle, some weight must be removed. The only weight that is not mandatory for flight is the weight required for the piloting operations. With current technology it is now possible to remove all the piloting hardware and replace it with automated flight control systems. This would decrease the vehicle weight enough to allow for an escape system to be added. NASA Space Shuttle management is adamantly opposed to automated flight operations. They believe that a pilot is mandatory for flight safety. However, with the possible of pilot error, the safety risk is actually increased.
Although, piloting is not a mandatory requirement for flight safety, it is a requirement for NASA to satisfy their internal and external political agendas. If the piloting function is removed from flight operations, it will become "painfully" evident that 17,000 people are not required to "operate" the Shuttle. It will become evident that the Space Shuttle can be operated in the commercial market and for a "profit." ... and therein lies the key factor for not having a Space Shuttle crew escape system!
Hydrogen leaks, damaged wiring, dented fuel line, questionable welding, paperwork errors, and a transitioning workforce are just some of the grave occurring indications that the aging Space Shuttle flight system is now prime for another catastrophic failure.
In October 1999, former astronaut Michael Coats testified at congressional subcommittee that he personally experienced sitting on the pad during STS-41-D in 1984 while a hydrogen fire was burning below him and knowing he had no way to escape. Only one month after the release of the NASA safety report justifying not having a crew escape system, NASA had to scrub the launch of Space Shuttle Atlantis because of another hydrogen leak. This time there was no fire and no crew on the vehicle. The gambler was lucky this time... but what about next time... or the time when the teacher is on board?

REPLIES:
Dear Viewpoints,
Nelson's assertion (OP ED 4/16/02, NASA 's gambling, again, with a teacher's safety) that the current shuttle program is unsafe and the vehicle can be modified because there doesn't need to be a pilot in the loop is ridiculous. Safety is the number one priority at NASA. It is drilled into us. I don't want to get into the fact that the shuttle flies the majority of entry on autopilot and it isn't until after the vehicle is subsonic that a crew on a nominal day will take over control. I have a hard time understanding that, with the exception of some crew commands and switch throws to deploy landing gear, etc., the current auto system is so lacking. Also, the assertion that the requirement for pilot in the loop capability adds such an enormous hardware/weight constraint to vehicle is purely baseless. Also there will always need to be the capability on orbit to have a pilot in the loop so what hardware savings would be strictly for entry/auto land?
Nelson's push for the possibility of retrofitting a shuttle with an escape system is full of vague generalities and scare tactics. This vehicle is far more complex than the Apollo capsule and operates in many different flight regimes. There are hundreds of people working every mission watching over the crew and vehicle to assure their safe return. I won't go into all the meetings that were held for the few small hardware issues that came up on this current mission. The outcome of the meetings was to ensure that we did the right and safe thing for the continuation of a successful mission.
You want to know NASA's biggest problem? It is SPIN or in our case the lack thereof. We don't do the agency or the public justice in promoting what we do, why we do it and what the benefit to everyday life is. Instead we have, for the most part, relied on the media to spread our word, and that gamble has continued to get us in trouble when their bias has consistently criticized NASA as a wasteful and fruitless endeavor. How many people realize that for all the science and understanding that NASA has provided in the past 40 odd years from exploring the moon, to pictures of distant galaxies or to the increased understanding of our own planet, that all this has been done for pennies on the dollar. I believe the current budget is less than ONE PERCENT of the Federal budget. For a few dollars out of everyone's hard-earned tax dollars NASA has been able to discover and take pictures of distant nebulas, study the earth's weather, and improve airline safety. What other endeavor has such a large return for such a small investment?
In most articles, no matter the stunning achievement or latest scientific discovery, the media has always harped on the cost of such programs. Earlier this week, the Chronicle couldn't give proper due to Jerry Ross on his achievement of being the first 7-time astronaut without quoting the cost of the S-Zero Truss. Going into space is expensive! Building the most complex space station is not only technically challenging on earth let alone in space but yes it costs a lot of money! There are issues of cost overruns, but building such a large craft with 16 international partners in zero gravity going 17000 miles per hour tends to throw a few kinks in estimates for costing the project.
The public needs to be made aware of what NASA does and the agency can no longer rely on the media to get our message out. In the age of the Internet where a person like Mr. Nelson can put up a website full of technical and philosophical is representations and then gain a public forum in a newspaper is not what the agency needs to count on for educating the public on all the good we do. My hope is that Don Nelson puts behind him this bitter rage and moves on. It is time to move on, get a hobby and let us who are still committed to the human exploration of space do our jobs- "To safely explore and promote understanding of our planet, the universe and our place in it as only NASA can" As for the Chronicle, a paper that has constantly harped on NASA's short comings and budgetary problems, it is my sincere hope that you will provide this counterpoint to such an off-base editorial as Don Nelson's.
To go forward in the face of overwhelming odds is to risk failure. But risks must be taken because the greatest hazard in life is to risk nothing. The program that risks nothing does nothing, has nothing, is nothing.

XXXX XXXXXXXXX
Shuttle Flight Controller

Comment: Fifteen years ago when I was in the same division as this flight controller, I would have written the same reply. However, after my assignment in advance projects, I gained insight into the real problems of Shuttle operations. This flight controller's knowledge is limited to the antiquated Shuttle operations. This reply illustrates the frustration of many NASA employees. It also illustrates that NASA human space flight management will not admit that they have serious problems. Problems that more money will not cure. Until this happens the SPIN coming out of NASA will continue to drag the agency down. As a recovering alcoholic will tell you, the first step in recovery is to admit they have a problem.

Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002
Subject: Barbara Morgan - professional astronaut
Don,
I know the press may have been misleading, but please don't mistake Barbara Morgan's place in the Astronaut Office. As opposed to her previous assignment where she served as a backup Payload Specialist, Barbara was selected as a member of Astronaut Class 17 in 1998. She is trained as a full-up Mission Specialist, having successfully completed the entire gamut of training with no exceptions or allowances. I'd fly with Barb any day on any mission.
Best wishes!
XXXXX XXXX
( NASA Astronaut )
Reply: Barbara Morgan’s training is outstanding... no problem there... it's the launch vehicle I'm very concerned about... it we don't get a crew escape system , we can expect to lose another crew... Many of my colleagues believe if that happens human space flight will be curtailed for a very long time... The sad thing is that we can install the system if we could ever get beyond the politics....

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2002 4:17 PM
Subject: more information
I read one of your articles entitled "NASA's Deadly Gamble...Another Teacher PR Stunt" and wondered why you have such suspicion towards an agency which at some point in your 36 year association must have had your loyalty. Maybe you should include in your article information regarding how safe we are compared to other space agencies flying manned missions.
As an engineer working shuttle flight software, the very instrument that would automate flight operations, I would mistrust a system not allowing manual takeover capability. This is a lesson Airbus should have learned decades ago, if you want to talk about saving lives. As far as I know, no manual piloting has ever resulted in damage or disaster.
Shuttle upgrades is tasked with making the astronaut more situationally aware. This would contribute to saving not only the crew, but the orbiter, a national treasure, as well. As someone who has seen the very best NASA ever offered, I find it incredible you wouldn't aid the country in understanding the sometimes insurmountable problems this industry faces...like insufficient technologies which is the reason why no better crew escape module has been designed.
As someone who works in an inherently unsafe business, my regard for safety is conscientious and comprehensive. This business risks lives. All of us know it and I am offended by your implication of sinister politics limiting the quest for enhanced safety. NASA isn't gambling with lives. Those people choosing to space travel also choose the embedded risks knowing they are entrusting their lives to people like you. What kind of an example are you setting for the new generation?
XXX XXXXXXXX
Orbiter Engineer
Reply: Your comments and questions are very good! It has been very difficult coming to the conclusion to criticize my former agency. I was there at the best of times. However, yesterday as I listened to the new center director and administrator at the JSC all hands... thinking of what we were and what we've become... I felt sadness and frankly I'm a shame of “today's” NASA. As to why, in my last years before retirement, it became painful evident that Shuttle was consuming too much of our funding. Also upgrades to the system never were directed to cost reductions. When engineers tried to input cost reductions they were criticized as not being team players or proposing an “unsafe” solution. A preliminary cost reduction study done by Rockwell on the "Access to Space" effort was very encouraging. They proposed an automated unmanned Shuttle to be used for commercial payloads. The Shuttle would be OV-102 since it was not required for ISS. Shuttle management wouldn't listen.... think about that... That meant that money being used for OV-102 could be used for other research ... but NASA managers were afraid that the money wouldn't remain in the NASA budget... the Rockwell proposal didn't get anywhere... I tried a number of times to get a comprehensive automated Shuttle study conducted and got my hands slapped... but good... It was then I realized that management was not willing to even consider any advanced unmanned concepts for Shuttle operations. Regardless of how cost effective or safer the concept might be...
Automated aircraft flight cannot be compared to launch vehicle operations. As a member of Mission Operations Systems Division, I remember the mission control guidance officers feared two things... one an abort and the other was the crew would try to take over and "fly" the vehicle. They trusted the software and not the crew... The sims proved that time after time... Also the next generation manned launch vehicle will be automated... MSFC will see to that... Automated flight was one of the few things that was correct about X-33. As an engineer it is evident that "man-in the-loop onboard" is a weaklink for standard flight modes... launch, entry, rendezvous, etc... down mode failure should be ground control... this is the way the Russian do it. Pilots just cannot think fast enough to react. Think about it ... which would you rather have as a passenger on Shuttle... a pilot or an escape pod? You can't have both.
Let me assure you that it is politics that keeps the agency in this dismal state. I've got the battle wounds to prove it... two written reprimands just for trying to get NASA to do a comprehensive study on automated Shuttle flight. Let me issued you a challenge... "study" the automated Shuttle section and the advance space transportation system on this webpage... some very talented engineers gave me these inputs.. most were afraid to speak up because they feared reprisal from management.
As for the example I would like to set for the next generation... hopefully the next generation will do their homework and speak out.... not an easy thing to do these days at NASA!

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 Excerpts from NASA Book

"NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions"

By Don A. Nelson

3 – Is the Space Shuttle Safe?

When NASA loses an unmanned Mars spacecraft due to human error.. it’s an embarrassment.
When NASA loses a Space Shuttle . . . it’s a national tragedy!

The Shuttle is the only human space transportation launch system that does not have a crew escape module. Instead the crew must rely on a manually activated escape pole system that is difficult to operate and has very limited capability. It requires a manual activation by a flight crew member in the middeck compartment to pyrotechnically jettison the crew ingress/egress side hatch and then manually deploy the escape pole. One by one, each crew member attaches a lanyard hook assembly to the escape pole, and then the crew member slides down the pole and off the end. The escape pole is suppose to provide a trajectory for the crew member’s body so that it will not impact the Orbiter’s left wing. This escape system can only be used during atmospheric flight and vehicle accelerations that allow the crew to operate the system. It takes 90 seconds for a crew of eight to bail out of the Shuttle using this system. In a catastrophic Shuttle explosion, milliseconds can mean the difference between life and death . . . 90 seconds can be a death sentence!
The following is an excerpt from the October 27, 1999 statement of Michael L. Coats, Vice President, Reusable Transportation Systems Lockheed Martin Astronautics before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives. From 1978-1991, Mr. Coats was a NASA Astronaut, flying three Space Shuttle missions, the last two as Crew Commander.

"I cannot emphasize safety enough. I personally experienced sitting on the pad during STS-41-D in 1984 while a hydrogen fire was burning below us, knowing that we had no way to escape if the ground crew could not contain the fire. We should never put astronauts in that situation again. That is why we have recommended to NASA that a crew escape system definition and demonstration be a high priority over the next five years in any launch vehicle architecture."

Space Shuttle Description

Crew Piloting and Human Cargo Issues

Incorporating the human element into the onboard flight operations of any space flight vehicle creates major design and operations issues. Paramount among these issues are the questions . . . Should the vehicle be piloted by a flight crew and should a crew/passenger module escape system be a requirement? Before these two questions can be addressed, the elusive definition of human rating a space vehicle must be understood. Human rating (or manned rating) has and always will be a management decision based on the "acceptable capability" of the vehicle to transport humans...

History of Human Rating Launch Vehicles

The launch vehicles (Redstone, Atlas, and Titan) proposed for the Mercury and Gemini Projects were all existing ballistic missile launch vehicles in various stages of development.19  The dismal launch failure rates of these launch vehicles made them questionable choices for safely transporting humans to space. However, the urgency of the space program’s need to meet the Soviet challenge and the proven flight performance capabilities of these launch vehicles made them the only logical choices.
The procedure to human rate these vehicles was to add redundancy to the launch vehicle where practical, and provide some type of launch escape system for the crew. Launch aborts were the primary concern and development of in-flight abort sensing systems was given top priority. Because most catastrophic launch failures occur within seconds, an "automatic" abort sensing system was mandatory. Vehicle sub-systems were designed to identify the abort circumstance; cutoff the main engines, and start the separation/ejection sequence. A manual backup abort capability was provided for the ground controller, range safety officer, and crew. Providing manual backup abort capability for the crew was, and still is a point of contention for human rating of launch vehicles. Flight crews experiencing high acceleration forces and other flight distractions may misinterpret a failure indication, or react too slowly; whereas the ground flight controller serves as a backup to the automatic system in a noninvasive environment.

The 9’s Dilemma

Space vehicle managers have used a statistical method commonly referred to as "number of 9’s" to define the level of reliability and redundancy of the spacecraft. Six 9’s is supposed to indicate a reliability and redundancy level equivalent to commercial aircraft. If six 9’s (.999999) reliability cannot be demonstrated for human transportation space vehicles then it has been proposed that a crew escape system of at least two 9’s reliability be provided. The Space Shuttle management believes that the vehicle has a reliability of six 9’s and a crew escape module is not required. However, the problem with this theory is that determining the number of 9’s is based on mathematical conjecture...

Space Shuttle Operations Costs and Flight Safety

The Space Shuttle is a money hog. Its operations will require 25% of the NASA Fiscal Year 2000 budget allotment. Even with 25% of the budget, NASA is hard pressed to fly just seven flights per year. This budget reports that the Shuttle cost per flight has been reduced from over $600 million to around $360 million in Fiscal Year 1997. A closer look at the NASA budgets indicates this reduction is more a book-keeping ploy than actual cost reductions.

From Fiscal Year 1994 to 2000 the Shuttle budgets were approximately, $2.4 billion per year plus the undefined mission support costs. The flight rate varied from four to eight flights per year. In 1999 when the fleet was grounded and only four flights were flown, the launch cost for that year soared to over $700 million per flight. Adding in the institutional, upgrades, and ISS support, the average costs are still approximately $500 million per flight. The highly automated Ariane 5 commercial expendable launch system can fly the same Shuttle payload weight to orbit for $100 million. Automation of Shuttle operations is a mandatory requirement to reduce the heavy financial burden the operation cost put on the Agency’s resources.

Space Shuttle Upgrades Money Pit

From Fiscal Years 1994 to 2000 NASA Shuttle managers have spent $4.9 billion on Shuttle safety and performance upgrades. With all this money being spent on Shuttle, it would seem that all significant safety and performance problems would have been solved by now. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.

Making the Shuttle Safe for Human Space Transportation

Three interrelated conditions must be met before the Shuttle can be considered safe and cost effective for human transportation. First, the Shuttle operations must be automated to the level that crew piloting is not required. Second, the Shuttle must be equipped with a crew escape module. Third, Shuttle operations must be placed under the control of a private for profit organization. Consider the following:

 Automated Shuttle Operations

To understand the importance for automating the Shuttle flight operations, the reader must have some basic understanding of automated flight control systems. The Shuttle crew is being asked to put their fate in the hands of computers. This may seem like a big leap of faith in computer control systems. However, if you will recall the fear that the Y2K bug could shut down this country, you already know how dependent we are on computer controlled systems. The following is a basic description of the requirements for an automated flight control system for the Space Shuttle. These requirements do not significantly differ from those already being used on today’s military and commercial aircraft. In fact, many of the system concepts are already used in our cars and home appliances.24 

Automated Shuttle flight operation is not a technical problem, it is a political problem. All phases of automated space flight control have been previously demonstrated. Automated ascent flight is standard procedure for expendable launch systems. On-orbit precision automated spacecraft maneuvers are routine. Russian spacecraft (Soyuz, Progress) have completed over 80 automated rendezvous and docking maneuvers with the Mir space station. Third generation automated docking systems have accuracy of up to one millimeter capability and are highly reliable. The Russian Soyuz routinely performs automated entry and landings. The Soviet/Russian Space Shuttle Buran flight test was an unmanned test for ascent, orbit, entry, and landing. With the exception of docking, lowering the landing gear, and drag chute deploy, even today the Space Shuttle has the capability to conduct automated flight. However, some of the automated landing systems have never been allowed to be flight tested.

 Design Requirements for a Space Shuttle Automated Flight Control System

(see book or e-mail author for this information)

Crew Escape Module

A crew escape module was considered in the original design trades for the Shuttle. The original escape module would have weighed up to 10,000 pounds, depending on the number of crew required. Placing this much weight in the crew compartment of the Shuttle moves the center of gravity to a point so far forward that the aerodynamic control surfaces could not control it. In other words the vehicle was nose heavy and could not maintain stable flight. At this time the crew escape module was abandoned and the vehicle was flown with aircraft ejection seats for the two astronauts conducting the test flights. As the Shuttle flights proceeded, NASA made the erroneous assumption the vehicle redundant flight systems made it safe enough to remove the ejection seats.

After the Challenger accident crew modules were again studied. The results were the same; the escape module was just too heavy to be placed in the crew compartment area. The issue was again reviewed in 1994 for the Access to Spacestudies and with the same conclusion. In July of 2000, another crew escape module study group was formed to study the problem. They were told that the crew module could weigh no more than 5000 pounds, but the crew size could be reduced to six. Their study resulted in a module weighting 10,000 pounds. History does repeat especially when all the conditions are the same. The problem can be solved, but NASA management must be willing to change the conditions.

There are two options for solution to the problem. Both options require that Shuttle management give up its unjustified position requiring piloting for Shuttle flights. Removing the flight deck piloting function systems will allow that weight to be used for the escape module. This will include the weight of the commander and pilot, their seats, forward flight deck displays and controls systems, escape pole system, forward windows, and other non-required items. The first option places the crew escape module(s) in the payload bay nearer the vehicle center of gravity. This solution solves the aerodynamic stability problem. However, the volume of the escape module must be charged against the payload carrying capability.

The second option is to install the escape module (seats) on the flight deck. A seat ejection system would eject four crew members from seats on the flight deck. Two additional crew members could be ejected from the lower middeck on rails connected to the seat ejection rails on the flight decks. The weight of this ejection system is approximately 3700 pounds. Removing the piloting sub-systems (commander and pilot weight, their seats, forward flight deck display and control systems, escape pole, forward windows, etc.) would provide the weight saving to install the 3700 pound ejection crew escape system without violating the aerodynamic stability limit. This is the preferred option. The ejection seat concept was developed and flown on the Columbia OV-102 Shuttle. The ejection trajectory is shown in the following NASA image:



 

NASA management will not consider either option because both require that their irrational requirement for piloting be deleted. Piloting is a non-mandatory requirement. It is an emotional and political issue. Deleting piloting and automating flight control would show that it does not take a "marching army" government jobs’ program to fly Shuttle missions.It is not a technical issue because all phases of space flight have been successfully demonstrated with automated control systems. With all the technology advancements made in autonomous flight control, this has become a ridiculous requirement, a requirement that places the lives of Shuttle crews in great danger.

It is ironic, that NASA, a leader in advance technology is so opposed to accepting advance flight control technology for the Space Shuttle.

Shuttle Privatization

The third requirement to make the Shuttle safe for human transportation is to remove NASA from the space flight operation business. Shuttle operations must be placed under the control of a private for profit organization. NASA Shuttle managers have no incentive to reduce operation costs. This lack of incentive has caused the operations environment to become stagnated with antiquated flight systems, too many hands on procedures, and low employee morale. These are the ingredients for another Shuttle disaster.

Countdown to Another Space Shuttle Disaster?

In 1992, the prediction for a Space Shuttle catastrophic failure was 1 in 72 flights. After seven years of safety upgrades the prediction decreased by only 1 in 423 flights. Even with these upgrades, the fleet was grounded for most of 1999. The Shuttle is still sending warnings that it is a very dangerous launch system. Considering the following:

May 1999—Space Shuttle Discovery had a launch delay caused by hail damage to the external fuel tank.
July 1999—Space Shuttle Columbia had a hydrogen gas leakage scare.
December 1999—Space Shuttle Discovery on a mission to repair the Hubble Space Telescope had a record nine launch delays spread over two months. Delays were due to damaged wiring, a contaminated engine, a dented fuel line, concern over fuel line welds, a nicked cable, and paperwork errors.
January 2000—Space Shuttle Endeavor launch is delayed by computer trouble. Damaged wiring had already delayed its launch four months.
March 2000—Space Shuttle Atlantis must have one main engine replaced because of another paperwork snafu.
August 2000—Inspection of the 20 year old Space Shuttle Columbia revealed about 3,500 defects in wiring.25 
October 2000—The 100th flight of the Space Shuttle was delayed twice because of safety concerns with the external tank and a misplaced safety pin.

Tick-tock . . . tick-tock . . . is time running out for another Shuttle crew?

 6 – Human Exploration of Mars—Still A NASA Management Fantasy

To strive for mankind to walk on the surface of Mars is a noble goal . . . but

Many factors must be resolved before human Mars exploration can be considered as a feasible and realistic endeavor. First, there must be a worthwhile reason for having human activity on Mars. There are numerous noble reasons proposed for human missions to Mars: being first with flag and footprints, discovering past or present life, and colonization are just a few. All of these are noble endeavors, but none have attracted enough support for investing the multi-billion of dollars required to fund such a project. In today’s society, and that of Christopher Columbus, investors in any project want to know about the returns on their investment. Be it political or financial, a worthwhile return on investment is a mandatory requirement for a Mars human exploration endeavor. As of today there are none worthwhile of the enormous required investment. However, that does not mean that none exists. If one does exists, mankind’s role on Mars will be determined by robotics spacecraft explorations. However, the past and currently planned Mars robotics exploration activities have been so anemic that it may take decades just to identify that role. Even if the next robotics exploration mission made a discovery that would require human surface participation, there would still be decades of political and technical preparations needed to prepare for that activity. By the time the human role on Mars is defined, technology advancements will have been achieved that will make any current human Mars mission concepts obsolete. For NASA to be planning Mars human exploration missions at this time, with so little knowledge of the requirements is a terrible waste of their limited resources.78 

The second major factor why a human manned Mars mission is not in the imminent future is the cost of putting heavy payloads in earth orbit. The Ariane 5 launch vehicle is today’s most cost efficient launch system. A 40,000 pound payload can be placed in low earth orbit with the Ariane V for approximately $100 million. Extremely optimistic human Mars mission plans have estimated an earth orbit mass requirement of 600,000 pounds, which at today’s launch cost would be $1.5 billion for "one" manned Mars mission launch. Although it may be feasible to develop a Mars launch vehicle with today’s performance capability, it is certainly not realistic to expect that human Mars missions will ever be conducted with today’s launch system costs.

Another major stumbling block to Mars human exploration is that the New NASA’s management has failed to recognize that the Moon is the next logical step in human space exploration. It is the logical place to develop the initial skills for feasible and realistic long duration space travel and robotics exploration. Periodic Mars robotics missions should not be abandoned. However, lunar robotics exploration must be restarted and expanded to determine if there is a science or commercial role for human activity on the Moon. The longer we wait to start this process, the longer we will be in developing the tools for establishing mankind’s permanent presence in deep space.

The Space Exploration Initiative Failure

(see book or e-mail author for this information)

Proposed Lunar Space Transportation System

The Lunar Space Transportation System (STS) must be developed as an evolutionary process based on a need for the exploration requirement. The primary requirement of lunar exploration will be to determine the scientific and commercial resources of the Moon. The secondary requirement is to determine if those resources should be developed. The Lunar STS development schedule will accelerate or decrease as the needs for exploration requirements dictate.

(see book or e-mail author for this information)

Space Based Vehicles

To be a serious competitor to the Ariane 5 launch system, the commercial Space Shuttle program must seek improvements in the delivery of payloads requiring high earth orbit insertions. In the near term, existing upper stages will be used to provide this delivery capability. However, to establish a "permanent" and cost effective next generation space transportation system, the upper stage (the earth orbital system) must be space based. The following requirements are the initial development goals for an earth orbital space transportation system:



 

 New Technologies Required to Support the Lunar/Mars Space Based STS

The following critical technologies have been identified as required development for establishing the proposed STS. The technology areas are listed in order of priority:

Long duration storage and management of cryogenic fluids.

  Avionics for autonomous vehicle control and vehicle health monitoring.

Aerobrake.
Electrical power systems.
Propulsion systems.
Materials for construction of space based vehicles.

Cryogenic fluid storage and management—is essential if reusable space based vehicles are ever to become a reality and the Lunar/Mars STS program is ever to be operationally efficient. The capability to store cryogenic fluids for years must be developed. The transfer of cryogenic fluids also presents a difficult development challenge. To meet these challenges the following areas merit investigation:

Cryogenic pressure transducers
Cold vapor pressurization
Lightweight cryogenic lines, fittings, and insulation systems
Liquid acquisition devices
Refrigeration systems
Gelled cryogenics.

* Avionics—will present an extremely difficult management problem for the development of a space based autonomous vehicle. Foremost in these problems will be costs that may exceed 50 percent of the vehicle total cost. The integrated health monitoring and autonomous control system of reusable space vehicles also presents formidable technology challenges in the areas of software and sensors. Autonomous navigation systems must be developed and verified. One of the more exciting avionics technologies being investigated is in the field of nano-electronic devices. Laboratory demonstrations of accelerometers, gyros, pressure sensors, thermal actuators, and optical devices are resulting in encouraging indications that this technology can significantly reduce space vehicle weight, improve safety by providing additional layers of redundancy, and reduce operations costs.

* Aerobrake—assist in decelerating the trans-space vehicles return to earth would provide a vital contribution by reducing the propellant weight carried to orbit. With an Aerobrake system, the propellant weight can be reduced by 20 percent. This technology becomes even more critical for the Mars STS. Major technology problems are low-mass, high strength thermal composite materials, space assembly, repair, and inspection solutions.

* Propulsion—The existing space transportation system launch and orbital vehicle performance capability is limited by the maximum capability of chemical liquid oxygen/hydrogen (or RP-1 kerosene fuel) engines. These engines have reached their maximum performance potential. Since, in the foreseeable near-term (10-15 years) future there is no replacement for these engines, as launch vehicle booster engines, they will be the engine of choice for some time. The technology programs needed for these existing class of engines are those that improve reliability, reusability, and reduced maintenance. Improved sensors that provide information to decrease maintenance and flight operations cost are key technology requirements for these class engines and, therefore must be assigned the highest priority.

NASA Management Response to the Proposed Operational Lunar/Mars STS

(see book or e-mail author for this information)

Robotics Exploration of the Moon and Mars

Since 1959, there have only been 53 robotics missions to the Moon. Of these 53 missions, 17 were failures.80  Since the 1976 Soviet Luna 24 sample return mission there has been only three robotics missions to the Moon; the Japanese Hiten in 1990, Clementine in 1994 and Lunar Prospector in 1997. Only three lunar missions are currently planned. The European Space Agency’s SMART-1 in late 2002 will lunar explore geology, topographic, and mineralogy.  In 2003 the Japanese space agency will send their Lunar A and in 2004 the Selene spacecraft to conduct studies on moonquakes, tectonics, thermal properties and interior structure.

Even with the successful Apollo missions, we still know very little about the commercial and scientific resources of Earth’s celestial next door neighbor. Reports of water in the polar region were neither confirmed nor denied by the Lunar Prospector. The question of the abundance of helium-3 is still unknown. This rare Earth isotope could be a significant power source for fusion reactors’ space propulsion systems. With no scheduled lunar missions, NASA management has elected to ignore the Moon.

 Artemis Lunar Lander

In my opinion the best opportunity for returning to robotics exploration of the Moon and perhaps even salvaging the SEI was the proposed NASA JohnsonArtemis Lander Project. The project was being conducted by a small group of engineers who believed that a robotics lunar spacecraft was required to gather scientific and engineer data both prior to and concurrent with human exploration. What this spacecraft would have done was provide a low cost lunar space transportation vehicle for transporting small scientific and engineering payloads to the surface of the Moon.

Dollars and Sense

In September and November of 2000 there were two articles in the Houston Chronicle that illustrate the misguided direction of the Nations’ space program. The September article was on a NASA management decision to develop a $540 million propulsion module for the International Space Station. This would be their second attempt to development the module. The first development attempt was over budget and was to be canceled after spending $200 million on the spacecraft. The propulsion module was believed necessary because the Russian government may not be able to fund their commitment to provide Progress spacecraft launches to deliver critical re-boost propellant to the station. This also puts in question their agreement to provide Soyuz crew transportation launches. Then in December 2000, NASA announced they now believed Russia will be able to provide the necessary Soyuz and Progresses’ to fulfill their obligations to the ISS.82  The propulsion which was still not completed would be mothballed for some future use. The cost to store the module would be $50,000 per month. The space station money pit just keeps getting deeper and deeper.

The November article in the Houston newspaper was an announcement that NASA had stopped working on its planned 2004 mission to Pluto. Canceling the mission could mean a delay in exploring the mysterious planet for 200 years. Reason given for the mission cancellation was a $150 million in cost over-runs, caused mainly by an increase in launch cost.83  NASA’s failure to reduce launch costs has again denied it the capability to conduct space research. The $540 million that was to be spent on the space station propulsion module would save the Pluto mission. NASA has the dollars; they just don’t have the sense to manage them!

The cost of the Apollo program to the taxpayers was nearly $117 billion in year 2000 dollars. It is therefore unrealistic to believe that a human exploration of the Moon or Mars can be funded with the same goal and concepts of the Apollo program. The Congress is unwilling to fund a "flag and foot prints" program. It is also unrealistic to believe that having the government offer a prize for exploration on the Moon or Mars would attract any qualified contenders. International cooperation will never be fruitful until there is a feasible plan and a reliable space transportation delivery system. The cost factor dictates that there is only one feasible plan for deep space human exploration. That plan is for NASA to establish a need for human explorations by robotics explorations. Enthusiasm alone will not overcome the prohibitive cost factor for human exploration of the Moon and Mars. It is a matter of Dollars and Sense!

 7 – Light at the End of the Tunnel?

NASA must change its operating philosophy or that light at the end of the tunnel will be an approaching freight train!

A telephone survey conducted by the Space Foundation in March 2000 indicated the American public still has an overwhelmingly favorable opinion of space exploration and NASA.84  However, not many people have knowledge of what is actually going on within our space program. Already the trust in theNew NASA is beginning to falter in the Congress and the news media. Congress is not willing to fund some proposed initiatives and is placing funding constraints on existing projects. The media is beginning to question NASA’s problems with the upgrading the space transportation system, Mars exploration, and the International Space Station. NASA’s favorable opinion with the American public will erode unless management takes decisive actions to reverse the direction the Agency is headed. This chapter presents the following mandatory actions that NASA management must take to avoid losing the support for the space program:

NASA must adopt a more aggressive plan to eliminate the stagnant "government jobs programs" they have created with their management of the Space Shuttle and International Space Station operations. Their continued day to day management of these routine operational activities prevents NASA from conducting their primary mission . . . space research.

The advance research programs for space transportation are a hodge-podge of squeaky-wheel hobby shop activities. Advance research activities must be aligned to support the next generation space transportation systems. This will require that NASA develop a long range plan that is based on feasible and realistic concepts. The NASA community must believe there will be a next project or they will never complete the present one.

NASA management must have an effective project review procedure. NASA’s current Non Advocacy Review process is seriously flawed. The failed X-33 RLV project, the excessive cost overruns in the space station programs, and the failures of the Mars Climate Orbiter and Polar Lander are glaring incidents that could have been avoid with competent reviews. A truly independent project review organization must be established. This organization must report only to the NASA Administrator.

The NASA safety office is an uncoordinated ineffective organization and this situation must be corrected. Their lack of oversight of the X-33 flight test program and disregard of the Shuttle crew escape module issue are prime examples of how lax NASA’s flight safety oversight has become. This office must be restructured. The NASA safety offices must be under a central office at Headquarters and not under the authority of each NASA center director.

The Space Launch Initiative . . . Another NASA Management Fiasco?

(see book or e-mail author for this information)

NASA’s Project Review Process . . . Another Management Problem

The General Accounting Office, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Management and Budget, and the NASA Independent Program Assessment Office are the principal NASA project review organizations. In addition, there are numerous NASA project review boards and advisory panels. None of these boards and panels are effective mechanisms for alerting NASA Headquarters management and the Congress to the potential for cost over-runs and program failures. The failures and billion of dollars in cost overrun of the X-33/Venture Star, Space Station Freedom, International Space Station, Mars Polar Lander, and the Mars Climate Orbiter are all glaring examples that NASA and the Congress do not have an effective project review process.

The Real Space Race

For those who will be tempted to use this book to discredit NASA and reduce its capability to conduct space research, let me "disclose" another formidable concern that we all face. In my office, I have two photos on the wall. Between these photos is hanging the tee square I used in my freshman engineering drafting class. The photo on the left shows the night sky of the Large Magellanic Cloud. The photo on the right is the same except for a drawn in box showing the 1987A super nova. This catastrophic star explosion occurred 160,000 years ago and poses no threat to our planet. However, it is a sobering reminder that someday our Sun (or a close neighboring sun) will also go nova and explode! We would like to believe that our Sun will endure for eons and perhaps it will. However, what about the concern for asteroids like 1999 AN10? We now believe that one like this impacted earth and wiped out the dinosaur population. Will humanity suffer the same fate? Is our species doomed to extinction?

The world of science fiction has mankind being saved by NASA. They send astronauts to the on-coming asteroid and blow it into harmless pieces. They prepare an armada of space ships to transport us to some new world just before our Sun explodes. However, that’s in the world of science fiction, and in the real world, they can do none of these feats. At least today, they cannot do them, but then there is the tee square between the two Magellanic Cloud photos. Today it’s an obsolete engineering drafting tool, research made it obsolete. In time research will make everything we know obsolete. It will make the way we travel to space obsolete and make the world of science fiction real. Space research is the key to the survival of humanity. We must make space research the very theme of our being. . . . or that light at the end of the tunnel will indeed be a freight train!

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How to Order the Book

Available from most Booksellers. Distributed by Ingram.

To order from publisher call: 1-888-795-4274 (press 3) or

http://www.xlibris.com/NASANewMillenniumProblemsandSolutions

Barnes & Noble http://www.bn.com/index.asp

Amazon.com http://www.amazon.com
ISBN: 0-7388-6377-7 paperback ISBN: 0-7388-6376-9 hardcover
Also check your library or have library acquisition order book.

e-book available from author for mailing cost

e-mail: danelson@...

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Author Biography

Don A. Nelson is an aerospace writer. He retired from NASA in January 1999 after 36 years with the Agency. He participated in the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Projects as a mission planner and operations technologist. Mr. Nelson was a supporting team member for the first rendezvous in space, first manned mission to the moon, first manned lunar landing, and the first flight of the Space Shuttle. During his last 11 years at NASA, he served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was on the initial design team for the space shuttle. He has participated in every shuttle upgrade effort until his retirement.

Mr. Nelson is a graduate of Southern Methodist School of Engineering. He is a certified private pilot and holds a Phase VI Pilot Proficiency Wings award from the Federal Aviation Administration.

Mr. Nelson is the author of, "NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions."

e-mail: nasaproblems@...

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