More observations from Bob Thompson former SPM --Shuttle costs

                       THE SPACE SHUTTLE- MORE OBSERVATIONS
 By Bob Thompson – NASA Space Shuttle Program Mgr.  1970 – 1981
The post Apollo decision to build the Shuttle followed by the modular Space Station was not based on business type considerations by those of us at the working level in NASA.. Profit and loss were not factors that had high priority in any meaningful debates. The kernel of all discussion was what a leading space faring nation should do at that point in time to enhance Man’s evolution in space flight activity. If economic opportunities emerge, so much the better but we did not involve ourselves in any serious manner in those issues. We did of course consider the influence of forward planning on NASA’S annual budget requirements and the need for that continuing support.
Likewise at the center level we had no significant knowledge of other government agencies or commercial need for launch support services. Those discussions were confined to Washington interfaces.
On Feb 17, 1972 shortly after President Nixon announced the decision to proceed with the expendable tank Shuttle, where in NASA had agreed to a forward budget projection for the total Agency activity of 1% or less, Senator Mondale requested the General Accounting Office to review the economic justification for the program. The final GAO report was submitted to the Senate in June 1972 and should be a matter of record.
In NASA’S concurrence on this report it was clearly pointed out that many factors other than economics are included in the justification of the program. These are enumerated in the report and include the desire of staying in the business of manned flight after Apollo and Skylab. It also reasoned that we should not abandon the field of manned space flight to the Soviet Union.
After this report the active opposition in the Senate was somewhat muted and the economic exaggerations found in many unfocused discussions were mainly residual irritants if someone wanted to make a point that the Shuttle failed to live up to the promise of 60 flights per year or some fuzzy cost per pound number. As a matter of record, the external tank manufacturing rate was thought to be the critical factor in flight rate during our planning. We planned facilities for 12 flights per year and had plans to expand up to 24 flights if required. We had no data on Orbiter refurbishment time and booster production was not considered a limiting factor.
The perception that the Shuttle was too expensive was not challenged by NASA Management and is accepted as fact today. It was expensive but what did it provide and was it worth it’s percentage of the National budget for the capability that it gave the Nation.
Are we moving to a better deal? What split exists between taxpayer money and private investment in our so called “Commercial” programs and what do they buy? What can we expect from SLS/Orion ? Maybe it is time for another GAO Report or at least a change in leadership. The 2012 election is almost here.
6/24/2012