Ample opportunity for change in direction, BHO, bolden, garver useless---I agree

Miles Gray | July 22, 2011 4:00 PM | Reply
It is not nearly as clear cut as some make it out who should take responsibility for the Shuttle's termination.
First, the Columbia accident investigation board called for considering termination of the Shuttle unless the system was recertified. The system was recertified every time it flew. There were also other modifications to the vehicle that could have been considered to improve safety. The CAIB really knew little about what it was saying and did an incomplete job.
Second, Bush, as a result of recommendations of O'Keefe, announced the Vision and called for development of a new Crew Exploration Vehicle. New systems should have made maximum use of Shuttle-based systems. The best place to start is from where you are-not to throw away what you have in the hope you might be able to come up with something new, different and better. This was the lesson that the US failed to heed in ending Apollo.
Third, Griffin came in, announced the new system would be Apollo on steroids, and basically it would be a totally new vehicle and booster based little on the Shuttle. As Augustine later confirmed, such as system could not be developed on anything like the cost or schedule that NASA had to work with.
Fourth, the Constellation Program could not get their act together in order to figure out how to design or build anything. They were further away from flight when the program was cancelled than when the program was started.
Fifth, a year before the Augustine group started their investigation, it was generally known that nothing would be ready to take the Shuttle's place for at least half a decade after 2010. The NASA Administrator and the AA for Exploration, who had responsibility for the new vehicle, and the AA for Shuttle and Station, all could have and should have spoken up and decided changes were in order. They all closed their eyes, kept their mouths shut, and continued on a path towards termination with no replacement.
Sixth, when Augustine finished their work, it was abundantly clear that there was no forthcoming replacement for Shuttle on anything like a reasonable schedule, and once again the NASA leadership and the executive branch, including Obama, failed to speak up or change direction. Coincidentally, this was about the last opportunity to decide against termination of the program since this was coincident with the termination of hardware production.
Seventh, for as long as a year after Augustine, until early 2010, the decision could have been made to extend out the remaining Shuttle flights, flying no more than two a year, in order to minimize the gap. No such decisions were made and there was no discussion of any options.
Who should be held responsible?
While Bush and O'Keefe might have started the ball rolling in this direction, and while Griffin did everything in his power to speed the program's demise, there was ample opportunity for Obama, Bolden and Garver to make other decisions. Gerstenmaier, who's responsibility it is to ensure proper support for ISS and human space flight, should have spoken up and said other options needed to be considered.
These people, by their silence, decided to continue on the same path established in 2004 without regard to the failures of the Constellation management and Griffin's designs. The whole lot of them are useless in my estimation.
There were ample opportunities for other outcomes. The responsibility lies about 75% with the current management, including Obama, and about 25% with the people who established the plan in prior administrations without due consideration of other options.