Saturday, August 30, 2014

Fwd: Really Amazing photos



Sent from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Moon, Larry J. (JSC-EA411)" <larry.j.moon@nasa.gov>
Date: August 30, 2014 10:47:16 AM CDT
To: "Moon, Larry J. (JSC-EA411)" <larry.j.moon@nasa.gov>
Subject: FW: Really Amazing photos

I thought these photos were amazing enuf to share.  Thanks to Walt Cunningham for sharing the below link to them.  

 

Passing on some more amazing pictures.      Walt

 


 

 

 

 

 

Insufficient funds/wrong approach


NASA's Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program (SLS/MPCV) will fail because…mission costs are too high, the Orion/MPCV crew module has an unsolvable water recovery issue, and there is no commercial application.

The following SLS/MPCV "operation" cost estimates were presented to the Congressional Budget Office after it failed to make the Congress aware of the prohibitive cost to operate expendable heavy lift vehicles.

·         The NASA human exploration budget will be flat lined at $2.8b for the foreseeable future. One report indicates a development cost of $38b and another reports that the first development version launch of the SLS could not take place until December 2017 and the 130mt production versions (crew and cargo) are not expected to unveiled until August 2032. This SLS development program scenario based on 13 flights over a 21 year period would have extreme difficulty maintaining the manufacturing labor force for such a low flight rate. However, it is the introduction of the cargo vehicle which forecast that it will require two launches of these mammoth vehicles to accomplish one mission.The SLS is the same heavy lift launcher concept used in the Constellation program which was cancelled because:"The U.S. human spaceflight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory. It is perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match allocated resources." Such is the case today.

·        NASA has failed to reduce the mission operation cost of the SLS/MPCV. The following $4.2b estimate of annual operations cost for the SLS indicated it will cost more to manufacture the expendable vehicles, plan the mission, and conduct flight operation than NASA has budgeted for human exploration. NASA is assuming that future budgets will be increased to cover mission operations. THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN!

 "It's the Launch Cost…Stupid"… paraphrasing Bill Clinton's presidential economy election theme. NASA must reduce its launch cost and the commercial space shuttle is the only option! The SLS/MPCV shuttle replacement plan is unaffordable, unsafe, and like the Constellation program suffers from incompetent NASA management.

Don Nelson nasaproblems.com

Friday, August 29, 2014

Signs of failure were ignored.


 

As a NASA aerospace engineer I was trained to look for warning signs of possible failure. We had indicating signs of failure before the Challenger and Columbia disasters…they were there but we ignored them. Notice I wrote "disasters" not accidents. Both were disasters because they were preventable and even survivable…they were not accidents.  Instead of admitting that the space shuttle disasters were human failures, NASA management concluded that the space shuttle had to be decommissioned and that the shuttle funding be used to develop a safer system for getting humans into space.   However, NASA management is once again ignoring the warning signs that there shuttle replacement is not.


They call them Runway landers!


Evolve and USE SHUTTLE

Evolve And Use Shuttle
Posted on December 7, 2011 by Bob
Instead of planning the retirement of the Space Shuttle program, America should be preparing the shuttles for their next step in space: evolving, not shutting them down and laying off thousands of people. You know the very people whose experience we will need in the years ahead. Except if you lay them off now, they won't be around in the next decade. Today's Shuttle operation is made up of five elements. Here's how we can put them all to use in a whole new space program. America, extend and transform the Shuttle, don't end 'em.
Those five elements of a Shuttle extension – the four segment solid booster motors, the big orange External Fuel tank, the trio of liquid Shuttle main engines, the vast existing Shuttle facilities like hangars and launching pads, and above all the skilled and experienced work force that has been operating the Shuttle fleet for nearly 30 years, can be the foundation of a whole new space goal.
We need to start thinking like our friends in the Russian space program. The first launch of the Soyuz rocket that is used today for taxi flights to the International Space Station had its first flight in November 1963 — the same month President Kennedy was assassinated! But while the rocket and capsule look the same as the
one that flew first in 1963, there have been many changes, some subtle and some more obvious. Newer and more powerful engines, a new upper stage, and advanced spaceship controls and systems mark today's Soyuz. In fact, the Soyuz itself is a more advanced version of the R-7 ICBM that Russia developed in the late 1950s and which first lofted spaceman Yuri Gagarin in 1961. Instead of abandoning the system for something entirely new — which is what the U.S. intends to do after the Shuttle — Russia has made incremental improvements to Soyuz, basically building an entire space program around that space-going workhorse.
See any lessons here?
America has invested 30 years in the Shuttle system. Instead of retiring it and beginning with a new "clean sheet of paper" approach
that will take extra time and money, I propose we follow the Russian example and make the basic Shuttle the foundation of a space program that can take us literally to Mars. Use the boosters, engines and big tank as the backbone of a new heavy lift rocket. Fly that rocket from the same facilities as the current Shuttles use. Keep much of the existing workforce working, because the only thing you will change is older designs and engines, making way for a heavy lift launcher derived from the Shuttle basics and capable of carrying large new spacecraft to the station or destinations beyond.
You may ask — how do we get from here to there?
By continuing to fly the existing Shuttles until a commercial crew-carrying cousin comes available after testing, or until the all-cargo ships start flying. On my evolution chart, I see these cargo Shuttles evolving, too, until they become a truly huge heavy lift rocket that can fly elements of an interplanetary spaceship aloft and link them
together, using the space station as the testing ground.
But I also have a place for a space capsule in this plan. An Orion-like capsule can be docked to the interplanetary ship and provide aero braking tests as we advance further and further into the solar system, headed in the direction of Mars.
What's aero braking? That's a way to use the gravity and upper atmosphere of Earth to sling shot a ship out either deeper into space, or slow it down to be "captured" by Earth's gravity. It flies in a series of ever-widening spirals. What's the big deal? Because aero braking doesn't need a heavy and expensive rocket stage to muscle our ships around in space. It's a technique we have used successfully in robotic missions to Mars. If we truly want to make humans on
Mars a national objective without sending the money — printing presses into overtime, that's one way to get us there.
But none of this is possible if we abandon the Space Shuttle, and the many decades of experience in flying a winged craft into space and safely back to a runway. They call 'em a runway lander.
And the story of why we need that instead of a spaceship-turned-boat space capsule as our space taxis is the subject of my next blog. Along with ideas on using that big orange fuel tank so familiar to those who have watched Shuttle launchings in a new role: a spaceship itself. More on those ideas soon.
By Buzz Aldrin

Posted in Space news | Leave a comment | Edit
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Runway landers. Re abbey--don't go back to capsules!

Orion Crew Module Crash Site

Remember one of reasons the space shuttle was decommissioned was to improve crew safety and that is not the case with crew modules! Ironically only the CSS would have crew escape pods that would protect the crew during every phase of flight. This is another NASA management blunder which again will have fatal consequences if implemented!

Recently published statements attributed to NASA state that the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Is: "designed to be 10 times safer during ascent and entry than its predecessor, the Space Shuttle." As a retired NASA engineer with extensive experience in the operation of crew modules, I challenged the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance about the authenticity of this statement.  Their reply (see below) was the Orion failed to meet the safety requirements for entry during their Constellation Program evaluations and that they have failed to establish a Level 1 set of requirement for the commercial crew modules and Orion MPCV. It is my opinion that the Commercial crew modules and Orion MPCV are potential deathtraps and NASA has misled Congress about the safety of these vehicles.

While the crew escape tower on the MPCV may provide significant improvement over a Space Shuttle without crew escape pods, it does not negate the many factors that have made crew modules a death trap during the re-entry phase of flight. As example, historically the Russian Soyuz crew module's safety record is not significantly better than that the Space Shuttle. While the Soyuz crew module has experienced a failure of the escape tower, it has been the re-entry phase of flight that has proven to be the fatal environment for flight crews. Potential fatal crew module failures are:  

·        Every crew module flight is a test flight! Manufacturing errors have occurred.  

·        Crew modules have very limited cross range capability which could require a reentry into unacceptable weather conditions.

·        Crew module's notorious reentry errors result in an expanses landing zone that could prevent rapid access to the crew in dire circumstances.

·        Parachutes are known to fail. This is another unacceptable single point failure.

There are too many potential failures with fatal consequences for a crew module to be considered for 21st century human space transportation. The Russian Soyuz crew module is still in service only because their government cannot afford to develop a safer reusable lifting body winged runway landing crewed spacecraft.


Don Nelson nasaproblems.com

Can NASA be Saved?

http://nasaproblems.com/


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Who in their right mind would Retire this capability with no Replacement!!!