Space shuttles have taken 355 people to space. Since their demise in 2011, the United States has been unable to put people into space except on other nations' spacecraft. It's a capability the U.S. has had since Alan Shepard's flight on May 5, 1961. The U.S. went from flying and operating the most advanced and capable spacecraft in the world, to flying as passengers under foreign command. Americans continue to journey to space on Soyuz spacecraft, but we are no longer able to work on facilities such as Hubble, or assemble large structures in space. We will look back on the space shuttle one day and realize what the nation lost, or rather, what it gave up.
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Tuesday, November 28, 2017
Wednesday, November 22, 2017
Monday, November 20, 2017
STS record !
John Warren Goerger THE 'SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM' had an EXCELLENT RECORD.
The two failures weren't something inherent with the design or operations of the Space Shuttles but rather, a very Screwed Up NASA / Shuttle Management!!!!
BIGGS who was working with Space Transportation in developing the beginning of a quasi-private ownership of at least 1 Space Shuttle for ~$1.5 Billion (1981 dollar 'buying power) & SpaceTrans would do all the "Marketing" of the; SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM was exactly what President Ronald Reagan was advocating; the eventual privatization, initially 50% & eventually 90% of long term Human activity in space---lunar & asteriod mining, human settlements there & O'Neill Space Settlements, while NASA would be focused mainly on purely scientific investigations of the Solar System & Astronomy in general.
Biggs informed President Reagan 6 names of men NOT to be charge of NASA because anyone of those six men would destroy the Civilian Space Program and especially the Space Shuttle Program.
Reagan, for some reasons didn't listen to Biggs, hired one of the "six" to oversee NASA & that person was the 'Acting Director' of NASA when the Challenger was loss..
Loss not because of some inherent flaw in the design / engineering but BECAUSE OF INEPT MANAGEMENT!!!
The same goes for the tragic and preventable loss of Columbia Shuttle & Crew!!!
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The two failures weren't something inherent with the design or operations of the Space Shuttles but rather, a very Screwed Up NASA / Shuttle Management!!!!
BIGGS who was working with Space Transportation in developing the beginning of a quasi-private ownership of at least 1 Space Shuttle for ~$1.5 Billion (1981 dollar 'buying power) & SpaceTrans would do all the "Marketing" of the; SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM was exactly what President Ronald Reagan was advocating; the eventual privatization, initially 50% & eventually 90% of long term Human activity in space---lunar & asteriod mining, human settlements there & O'Neill Space Settlements, while NASA would be focused mainly on purely scientific investigations of the Solar System & Astronomy in general.
Biggs informed President Reagan 6 names of men NOT to be charge of NASA because anyone of those six men would destroy the Civilian Space Program and especially the Space Shuttle Program.
Reagan, for some reasons didn't listen to Biggs, hired one of the "six" to oversee NASA & that person was the 'Acting Director' of NASA when the Challenger was loss..
Loss not because of some inherent flaw in the design / engineering but BECAUSE OF INEPT MANAGEMENT!!!
The same goes for the tragic and preventable loss of Columbia Shuttle & Crew!!!
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Sunday, November 19, 2017
Get shuttle flying!
Get the Space Shuttle Back In the Air!
By WALTER CUNNINGHAM
Published in the Houston Chronicle, May 16, 2003
Walter Cunningham was a member of the backup crew for Apollo 1, served on the Apollo 1 Accident Investigating Committee and flew Apollo 7, the first manned Apollo mission. His book, The All-American Boys, is available in the bookstores.
Okay, so we've had another manned space disaster, the third in 40 years, and the faint-hearted are once more out to save us from the risks. They are concerned age and corrosion have taken their toll or the shuttle is too fragile or the wear and tear of going in and out of space is greater than anticipated. Congressman Joe Barton goes so far as to say, "We ought to scrap the program, or limit it to transporting only cargo, not humans."
Columbia won't be the last space disaster! Unfortunately, we can spot some common factors in the three tragedies. Complacency was a factor in at least two of them and Management decisions played a significant role in all three. Following the Apollo 1 and Challenger accidents, virtually everyone got on the bandwagon to make the vehicles accident proof. In the aftermath of Columbia, we have an opportunity to break that pattern. We can become more accepting of the risk in manned spaceflight and more realistic about our expectations. We can still avoid the mistakes of spending billions of dollars and years of time for dubious or cosmetic "improvements" or adopting operational restrictions that add little or nothing to safety but have a severe impact on operational flexibility.
Following the disastrous Apollo 1 launch pad fire that killed the crew, dozens of safety and operational improvements were incorporated into the spacecraft and Apollo 7 was launched 21 months later. During those 21 months, our crew placed a great deal of emphasis on keeping engineers, managers, and even Congressmen from "killing us with kindness." That is how we referred to the tendency to go overboard on changes in the name of safety. It is possible to add so many safety features, the vehicle becomes overweight, looses its operational flexibility and is no longer able to perform its originally intended mission. Most of this "overkill" was motivated by well-intentioned concern-their way of avoiding a repeat of the Apollo 1 disaster. We eventually adopted that old rule: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it!"
Those of us on the first two flight crews knew that our own over-confidence played a role in the fire. We had many safety concerns about the Apollo 1 spacecraft but thought we could "fly the crates they shipped them in." Weren't we the best pilots in the world?
The cause of the Challenger accident in 1986 was quickly determined to be hot exhaust gas leakage through a solid rocket booster seal even though earlier missions had been successful in spite of similar exhaust gas leakage. Complacency and over-confidence lead management to launch in weather so cold that hot gas "blow-by" was almost certain to occur; and Challenger blew up.
When it was determined that some of the Challenger crew may have been alive until impacting the water, two minutes and 45 seconds later, engineers came up with a bailout "scheme." It incorporates a fireman's pole out the hatch, launch and reentry flight suits and requires the Orbiter to be in "stable, controlled flight at an altitude of 30-40,000 feet." Shuttle pilots with whom I have spoken say it provides more the hope of a bailout than a real bailout capability. It did allow everyone-NASA engineers and management, Congress and even the public-to feel they had done something in the name of safety.
Now we are dealing with the most recent failure in the dangerous business of exploring space. Once more, there is a real risk of overkill as Congressional Committees, engineers, and managers concluded they have a duty to take all human risk out of the operation.
The Shuttle Thermal Protective System is a complex and impressive solution to the reentry heating problem. The tile component is extremely fragile; the reinforced carbon-carbon a bit more robust. Design requirements say the delicate heat-shield tiles should not be hit by anything, even raindrops. It was, obviously, never expected to launch through a hailstorm of external tank insulation, the most likely cause of the Columbia disaster. That possibility was avoided-or so NASA believed-by the selection of the foam insulation material and the adhesive for attachment. Foam insulation has come off the external tank on a majority of missions. After 20 years of successful reentries with some tile damage, management became used to the risk. Since NASA did not consider some damage to the tiles on launch a safety issue, it was only a slight stretch to conclude that Columbia would be okay, as well.
Once again, over confidence and complacency have encouraged bad judgment. Our weakness was not so much in our equipment as in our decision processes. But management's honest and incorrect conclusion that the falling insulation caused little damage did not lead to the loss of the crew! It was the long series of decisions by NASA management to continue launching Orbiters through shedding insulation that lead to loss of the Columbia and its crew.
Even if they had correctly concluded that the insulation had damaged the Orbiter's thermal Protection system enough to compromise reentry, there was absolutely nothing that could have been done to save the crew. All those knowledgeable about space flight and the Space Shuttle know that. When Shuttle Program Manager, Ron Dittemore, was honest enough to say so, NASA Administrator, Sean O'Keefe, took exception, saying, "To suggest that we would have done nothing is positively fallacious. If there had been . . . a clear indication (of problems) . . . there would have been no end to the efforts . . .."
O'Keefe, who has otherwise handled the Columbia disaster very well, was displaying three deficiencies: lack of space experience, lack of systems knowledge, and lack of awareness that, in manned spaceflight, it's only results that count, not efforts.
During the Nineties, under continuous budget pressure, NASA delayed some scheduled safety improvements. This reduced the emphasis on safety and contributed to an attitude of doing the job in spite of budget deficiencies. So far, it does not appear to have played a direct role in the Columbia disaster.
Second guessers have had a field day speculating on what NASA could have done to save Columbia. Even if we had known STS-107 was in trouble, all the second guessing schemes were virtually impossible, took dangerous shortcuts on procedures and training, and violated operating norms and mission rules developed over decades of spaceflight. They would all have introduced more risk to an already hazardous undertaking.
Let me repeat, there was absolutely nothing that could have been done to get STS-107 back!
There is no dearth of proposed hardware changes and/or operating restrictions to keep future Orbiters from suffering the fate of Columbia. Most of the proposals for cockpit escape capsules, post-launch external inspections, and restricting orbiters to International Space Station (ISS) compatible orbits seem to lose sight of why the Space Shuttle was developed in the first place. It was to carry large, heavy payloads and crews into near earth orbit on a routine basis. It was not to be 100 percent foolproof and absolutely safe. No country can afford such a luxury. President Kennedy did not say, "We will make spaceflight absolutely safe in this decade and when it is safe, we will go to the moon."
Astronauts have always understood there is only so much that can be done to reduce the inherent risk in every space mission. The thermal protection system has always been the weak underbelly of the Orbiter - its Achilles heel. NASA should improve this critical system if possible but it might be easier to eliminate any possibility of damage from other parts of the launch system. I mean the foam insulation on the external tank.
Retrofitting cockpit escape capsules to the Shuttle fleet would take years and cost billions. One scheme would reduce the useful operating time by spending hours or days performing EVA inspections of the underside of each Orbiter following launch. Restricting shuttle missions to ISS compatible orbits would exact a 30 percent payload penalty and greatly limit operational flexibility.
NASA would be better off concentrating on a fix for the External Tank insulation problem and getting the Orbiters back in the air to do what they do best-fly.
Considering what it does, the Space Shuttle really has a good safety record. It is certainly the safest manned space vehicle the U.S. has ever developed. Its record of two failures in 113 missions translates into reliability greater than 98 percent-and management decisions could probably have avoided both of the failures. Considering what the Space Shuttle has accomplished in the past 22 years opening up a new frontier, it has been a marvelously safe machine. How many died opening up the American West in the nineteenth century? How many aviation pioneers lost their lives in the 30 years before commercial aviation took off in the 1930s?
It's time we acknowledged that space is the most dangerous environment into which man has ever ventured. There will always be risk associated with manned space flight. There are also gains to be made from the exploration of space. We should reduce the risk to the point where the gain to be made exceeds the perceived risk and then GET ON WITH THE JOB!
Chris Kraft letter to the editor on 25 May
Yes, he was right on!
Much has been written about the Columbia accident, the whole gamut from some learned and some not so learned. However, Walter Cunningham's Outlook was, without question, the best I have read on the subject. He showed a thorough understanding of the issues and problems that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is facing. Hopefully, all those at NASA and on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, in Congress and at the White House will recognize the significance of his analysis. It was right on!
Christopher C. Kraft Jr., former director, Johnson Space Center, Houston
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Saturday, November 18, 2017
American Space Renaissance Act – To permanently secure the United States as the preeminent spacefaring nation.
As a military pilot, I can attest that our national security and our very way of life require both military and commercial space capabilities. Bridenstine
http://spacerenaissanceact.com/
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http://spacerenaissanceact.com/
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Friday, November 17, 2017
Thursday, November 16, 2017
Wednesday, November 15, 2017
Monday, November 13, 2017
Sunday, November 12, 2017
Critical capability!
America needs this!
Write your representative demanding NASA develop a new winged space shuttle able to take off (launch) & land from any international airport runway!!!
Increase NASA'S budget to at LEAST 3-5% of our Federal Budget for the next 5-7:yrs, with the stipulation that Private Industries, if learning that space is profitable, take over the major investing & manned space operations including developing & usage of lunar mining, settlements then NASA'S budget could be cutback to around 2-3% of the Federal Budget.
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Saturday, November 11, 2017
Posing on your site
Maybe best answer is to just send to each other's email.
You have mine
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You have mine
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Fwd: [Keep the shuttle flying] New comment on New Free e-Books Available about 2 Famous NASA Spa....
Ok, sounds good---guess I need the proper address.
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Begin forwarded message:
From: Anonymous <noreply-comment@blogger.com>
Date: November 11, 2017 at 3:33:48 PM CST
To: bobbygmartin1938@gmail.com
Subject: [Keep the shuttle flying] New comment on New Free e-Books Available about 2 Famous NASA Spa....
Anonymous has left a new comment on your post "New Free e-Books Available about 2 Famous NASA Spa...":
Have you ever thought about creating an e-book or guest authoring
on other sites? I have a blog based on the same ideas you
discuss and would really like to have you share some stories/information. I know my visitors would enjoy your work.
If you are even remotely interested, feel free to send me an e mail.
Posted by Anonymous to Keep the shuttle flying at November 11, 2017 at 1:33 PM
Friday, November 10, 2017
Wednesday, November 8, 2017
Monday, November 6, 2017
Shuttle
Tod Richard LauertoEdu-Craft Diversions
Just finished the 1/144 Shuttle MLP, which now holds the model I built in the '80s.
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Sunday, November 5, 2017
Kraft on shuttle cancellation
image June 30, 2011
Charles F. Bolden, Jr.
Administrator National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA Headquarters
300 E Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Administrator Bolden,
We believe that the planned retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet after the flight of STS-135 next month will create an unacceptable flight risk for maintaining safe and reliable operations of the International Space Station (ISS). As you well know, the shuttles are the only spacecraft that can provide independent spacewalks for critical ISS repairs.
If an incident or life support failure rendered the ISS uninhabitable, repair spacewalks to restore operations would not be possible from the space station. In a worst case scenario, deterioration and loss of systems on an abandoned ISS could result in an uncontrolled, catastrophic reentry with risks to populated areas around the world. This would have significant ramifications to foreign relations and liability for the United States, Russia and the other countries who participate as partners on the International Space Station. The recent near miss of space debris, which caused the ISS astronauts to seek shelter in the Soyuz spacecraft, is a reminder that a catastrophic accident is a stark possibility.
This issue was the subject of a commentary article we co-authored, published in the June 12th edition of the New York Daily News, which is enclosed.
The Space Shuttle fleet is the only spacecraft, now operating or under development, that is equipped with the airlocks, life support supplies and robotic arm needed to support the required two-person spacewalking repair crews. We believe the Space Shuttle fleet should be kept in service to provide the capability of independent repair spacewalks in the event that the International Space Station is crippled by a systems failure or accident. The Space Shuttles would also be available to support one or two logistics and science missions per year, provide unmatched capacity to return components and scientific experiments to Earth (with low gravitational loads on crew and cargo during reentry) and extend the reliability of space station operations with a Service Life Extension Program.
The capability of the Space Shuttles to provide the independent repair spacewalks, critical for restoring operations on a disabled ISS, would also be vital for protecting the ISS cargo and crew transport business of the emerging commercial space industry. Keeping the shuttle fleet in service would also comply with a new, internationally accepted flight criteria that we believe should be established: Any object placed in orbit that is too large for an uncontrolled reentry must have a spacecraft available to support independent EVA repairs.
To maintain this vital life safety margin for long-term ISS operations we are requesting the following:
* Congress should request an immediate, 3 week, impartial study and hold emergency hearings on this matter.
* In these hearings, Congress should consider passing emergency legislation ordering NASA to halt all work on modifying the Space Shuttle fleet for museum display. Atlantis, Discovery and Endeavour should be stored at Kennedy Space Center in the Orbiter Processing Facility and maintained in such a manner as to keep them flightworthy. Moreover, the Vehicle Assembly Building, Crawler-Transporters, Launch Complex 39-A, Shuttle Landing Facility and other facilities and support equipment needed for Space Shuttle operations should be maintained in place to support future Space Shuttle flights.
* NASA and its International Space Station partners should consider the shared responsibility of developing funding solutions for the continued operation of the Space Shuttle fleet to ensure the long-term safety of space station operations. NASA led plans, as well as commercial alternatives to operate the shuttles commercially, should be presented to Congress and considered to reduce costs and budget impacts.
* To avoid any gap in providing independent repair spacewalks as a safety contingency for the space station, Congress, NASA and the ISS partners should evaluate the option of postponing the launch of STS - 135 until more external fuel tanks and other parts can be built to support additional shuttle flights in 2012.
We appreciate your consideration of our recommendation for NASA and Congress to take immediate action to reverse the retirement of the Space Shuttles. The Space Shuttles are the only solution for restoring space station operations with independent spacewalk repair capabilities. Given the risks and liabilities for NASA and the ISS partners if the International Space Station is crippled by a systems failure or accident, the Space Shuttles are too valuable an asset to be retired into museums. Sincerely,
Christopher C. Kraft
Former Director of NASA Manned Spaceflight Center
Houston, Texas
Scott R. Spencer
Transportation Management Consultant
Wilmington, Delaware
Endorsed by:
Robert L. Crippen, Pilot STS-1, Commander (STS-7, STS-41C & STS-41G)
Frederick H. Hauck, Pilot STS-7, Commander (STS-51A & STS-26)
Walter Cunningham, LM Pilot, Apollo 7
Neil A. Armstrong, Commander, Apollo 11
James A. Lovell, Jr., Commander, Apollo 13
Eugene A. Cernan, Commander, Apollo 17
Gene Kranz, Director of Mission Operations - Flight Director
Tom Moser, NASA Space Station Program Director
John W. Robinson, Chairman, Space Propulsion Synergy Team
cc: President Barack Obama
Vice President Joseph Biden
U.S. Senator Bill Nelson
U.S. Representative Ralph Hall
Why we must save the space shuttle: If the Int'l Space Station is disabled, we need a rescue fleet
BY CHRISTOPHER KRAFT AND SCOTT SPENCER, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
Sunday, June 12, 2011
For more than 10 years, space crews from the United States, Russia and other countries have successfully lived and worked year round, in six-month shifts, on the International Space Station, where they have conducted scientific research. In the coming years, that work will continue - but with a crucial safeguard missing: the space shuttle fleet that gives human beings a unique capability to fix the space station's guidance system and rocket thrusters in the event of a terrible failure.
The shuttles are now about to retire - all of them, with no true replacements. This is an extremely dangerous development.
Loss of control of the space station would mean a catastrophic reentry into the Earth's atmosphere of the massive structure - the largest object ever placed in orbit around the Earth, measuring over three football fields long and weighing more than 400 tons.
The tons of falling debris that would survive reentry would pose an unprecedented threat to populated areas around the world.
Such an international catastrophe would have significant ramifications for foreign relations and liability for the United States, Russia and the other countries who participate as partners on the space station.
To be sure, the space station has numerous, triple-redundant life support and control systems that makes such a total technical failure unlikely. However, to say that it is so redundant that it could never happen ignores the tragic lessons learned due to the overconfidence in fail-safe technology in disasters throughout history, from the sinking of the Titanic to the nuclear reactor crisis in Japan.
In fact, the numerous space station backup systems offer little margin of safety in the event of damage from a fire, space junk impact or a potential collision from the more frequent docking of manned and unmanned commercial spacecraft resupply missions.
If the life support, guidance systems or rocket thrusters are damaged, the station could need a rapid rescue mission to stay in orbit. And as repair vehicles, the space shuttles have unique capabilities.
It's true that pallets on the space station are packed with spare parts needed for critical repairs, but none of them could be installed to repair and regain control and use of the $100 billion space station if it is deemed uninhabitable for repair crews. In that case, an independent repair spacecraft will be needed. And the Russian Soyuz space capsules and other commercial space capsules that are intended to replace the space shuttles lack the life support systems needed for the multiple six-hour repair spacewalks.
Only the space shuttles have the vital airlocks and life-support supplies - as well as the robotic arm that is needed to move the hardware necessary for the required two-person spacewalking repair crews.
Before the last scheduled shuttle flight lifts off early next month, an urgent discussion needs to take place between the United States and its International Space Station partners to keep the shuttle fleet in service to provide a vital safety margin for repairing the space station in the event of a critical systems failure.
In fact, to prevent any gap in this crucial repair capability, we urge NASA to delay the last shuttle launch so that additional external fuel tanks and other parts can be built to support additional shuttle flights in 2012.
We also request that Congress hold hearings on this matter. The space shuttle fleet provides the only insurance against a catastrophic reentry of the space station. With such valuable equipment in orbit - and the dangers should that equipment fall to Earth - it is never wise to play Russian roulette in space.
Kraft is the former director of NASA's Manned Spaceflight Center in Houston. Spencer is a transportation management consultant in Wilmington, Del.